As the eminent authority on Afghanistan, Dr. Barnett Rubin recently observed, the principle strategic obstacles to security and stability in Afghanistan today are not the Taliban or local warlords. They are 1) the slow growth of government services and capacities, 2) the equally slow growth of the country’s legitimate economy, and 3) the inability of both of these sectors to provide the Afghan people with viable alternatives to traditional patronage systems, the opium trade, and the security, livelihoods, and services currently provided by the international community. However, further complicating these strategic-level problems are the permutations and changes occurring within Afghanistan almost daily. These changes certainly impact how external actors view the country; in fact, if one compares how they perceived Afghanistan in 2004 versus how they perceive it today, one can make the following distinctions.

– A nation once viewed as a humanitarian and security problem is now largely viewed as a development and security problem.

– The initial emphasis on action and quantity by donors/security actors (“we have set up X programs that have led to X results”) has matured into a greater emphasis on the substance and quality of these programs. (The international community, in other words, is moving away from the false metrics of “look, we are doing something.”).

– Who “owns” Afghan development remains an open question, especially when it comes to controlling budgets and security activities. But as Mark Sedra points out in the following Research Paper, there is a growing sentiment that Afghan ownership needs to increase now rather than later. (Transferring greater control and responsibility to Kabul, however, should also involve embedding contracted experts within government institutions, thereby ensuring needed levels of transparency and competency within them.)

– A previous preoccupation with corruption and cronyism has now expanded to include concerns about the actual absorption and oversight capacities of the Afghan government.

– The belief that stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan is a national-level challenge is appropriately transforming into the belief that it is a regional-level problem.

– Concerns about narcotics trafficking are evolving into full-blown fears about Afghanistan becoming a corrupted narco-state.

– There is growing concern that the insurgency of the past (with all its traditional elements) will increasingly yield to a new Iraq-like approach (featuring suicide bombers, etc.).

– And finally, there is a growing awareness that when it comes to providing real security sector reform in Afghanistan, both the current agenda and its eventual successor need improvements of their own. But just what might these improvements look like? To ensure security and stability, what next steps should the Afghan government and donor nations actually pursue? The purpose of Mark Sedra’s Research Paper is to provide possible answers to these open questions.

Peter FABER, Research Advisor, NDC Academic Research Branch

NB: The views expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Les opinions exprimées dans cette publication sont celles de l’auteur et ne peuvent être attribuées au Collège de Défense de l’OTAN ni à l’Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord.
Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan -
A Continued March towards Implementation

Mark SEDRA

Security sector reform (SSR) in Afghanistan is nothing if not an exit strategy. Unfortunately, the current five-pillar SSR Process (military reform; police reform; judicial reform; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and counter-narcotics) is a flawed system. Those tasked with implementing it have failed to consider lead-nation or donor competencies appropriately, and they have not established strong links/synergies between its different pillars. As a result, security sector reform in Afghanistan today is both a good and bad news story. The purpose of this Research Paper is to update that story and to highlight needed next steps for each of the five SSR pillars.

1. Military Reform (Currently Led by the United States)

This pillar is one of the success stories of security sector reform in Afghanistan. Its achievements include the following:

- The rapid training of 23,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops thus far.
- The formation of four regional corps commands (Kandahar, Gardez, Mazar-i Sharif and Herat).
- The creation of assorted Sustaining Commands (Recruiting Command, Education and Training Command, Acquisition and Logistics Command, and the Communications and Intelligence Command).
- A Ministry of Defense General Staff now comprised of over 1,450 personnel (the ultimate goal is 3,000).
- Current ANA personnel attrition rates of only 1.2% per month, an impressive figure considering that it reached a high watermark of 10% per month in the summer of 2003.
- The fulfilling of needed ethnic quotas (within 2% of the target figure) for those selected to attend the Kabul Military Training Center.

Despite these achievements there is still much to be done. Those committed to genuine military reform face the following challenges:

- Sustainability – Afghan National Army salaries will likely cost $80-100 million a year in the coming years, which will equal roughly 1/3 of government domestic revenues at current levels. The U.S. and its partners should therefore expect to sustain the ANA financially for at least 7-10 years. Given this burden, they might question the current target of 70,000 ANA members. Does Afghanistan really need a force of this size to achieve a rapid regional presence, as the Ministry of Defense and coalition military officials affirm? Should it be scaled back, with the available resources diverted to improving local law enforcement capabilities?

- Maintaining a proper ethnic balance within Afghan security forces – The disproportionate influence enjoyed by the Panjshiri Tajik faction over the Defense establishment has decreased, but it must be reined in further.

- The slow development of supporting commands – Since standing up ANA combat forces has been the first priority of donors and sponsors (in order to meet existing security threats and to ease the security burden on international forces), the development of logistics and other support structures has lagged. Greater attention must be

1 Mark Sedra is a Cadieux-Léger Fellow at the Policy Research Division (CPC) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Canada. The views he expresses in this Research Paper are strictly his own and should not be attributed to the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He would, however, like to thank Colonel Peter Faber of the NDC for his editorial assistance in crafting this Research Paper.

2 The SSR agenda was set at two G8 donor meetings held in Geneva in the spring of 2002.

3 Many experts insist that the Bonn political process – i.e., the “roadmap” developed to help build Afghanistan into a viable state – should be succeeded by a “Kabul Process”. If this call to “indigenize” the political process actually occurs, it must be mirrored in the SSR agenda, which will endow Afghan stakeholders with greater authority over its direction and mold it to reflect better the realities on the ground.
paid (in terms of personnel and resources) to the development of supporting commands, as combat forces will not be able to function effectively until they are operational.

- **Equipment shortages** – ANA troops presently possess the minimum equipment needed to perform their duties. However, to be effective in Afghanistan's complex and dangerous security environment, the scope and sophistication of their stocks must grow.

- **Mentoring** – Although the United States has established a comprehensive and effective mentoring system for the nascent Afghan National Army, gaps nevertheless remain, particularly within the Ministry of Defense. NATO is well placed and equipped to fill these gaps and help expedite the creation of an effective and democratically accountable defense sector.

2. Police Reform (Currently led by Germany and the United States)

The modest successes achieved in this pillar, widely perceived to be the lynchpin of the SSR agenda, have fallen well below expectations. These accomplishments include:

- A functioning Police Academy that offers training for commissioned officers (2.5 years) known as Saran, and non-commissioned personnel (3 months), referred to as Satanman. As of April 2005, 41 Saran and 2,100 Satanman have graduated from the Academy.

- A US Constabulary Program that has, in parallel, established a Central Training Center (CTC) in Kabul and seven Regional Training Centers (RTCs) across the country. The Centers train rank-and-file police personnel via three courses – a Transitional Integration Program (TIP), which is a two-week basic training course; a 4-week long police training course for illiterate officers; and an 8-week training course for literate officers. (Current plans call for the discontinuation of training for illiterate officers and the extension of the 8-week course to 11 weeks). In providing these courses, the CTC and RTCs have trained roughly 30,000 officers thus far, but it is necessary to note that one third of those trained have only completed the initial TIP course.

Although these achievements are certainly significant, daunting challenges remain. They include:

- **Staffing** – There are two significant problems here. First, the current target figure of 62,000 police and border guards may be insufficient – in light of today’s adverse security conditions, the Afghan Ministry of Interior has claimed that a revised force ceiling of roughly 80,000-120,000 may be more suitable. Although the upper level figure is most certainly excessive in view of severe internal resource constraints, a modest expansion of the projected force may be required to meet the country’s complex security challenges. (The ANA recruiting system could help here by doubling as a police/border guard recruiting system). Second, current officer-patrolman ratios are extremely top-heavy, with a ratio of almost one officer for every two patrolmen, which is an imbalance that needs to be addressed in the near term.

- **Corruption** – The Interior Ministry and its police forces are plagued by corruption. A Professional Standards Unit (PSU) is being established to address this systemic problem, but it represents only a first step in terms of what must be done.

- **Administrative reform** – Salaries, which now average a paltry $25 a month, must be elevated to correspond with ANA standards.

- **Sustainability** – As in the case of the ANA, the Ministry of Interior will not be able to cover its recurrent or capital expenditures for at least five years. Long-term budgetary support from Germany, the US, and the UNDP-operated Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) will be needed if police reform is to succeed.

- **Mentoring and professionalization** – Today’s Afghan police are both heavily militarized and factionalized. Former mujahidin commanders occupy the bulk of the leadership positions, thus importing military mentalities and existing patronage systems into current police structures. The planned establishment of Embedded (Police) Training Teams (ETTs) with support from the United States represents a crucial first step in combating the clientalism, corruption and lack of professionalism that plague the force. However, the scale of the problem necessitates increased and innovative engagement from a range of other actors, such as the European Union. Considering the EU’s extensive experience in supporting police training and reform initiatives in other countries, it is ideally placed to help modernize and professionalize the Afghan police.

- **Equipment and infrastructure** – Across the country, Afghan police infrastructure is decrepit and equipment shortages are endemic. For instance, the Kabul Model Police District (a program supported with U.S. funding) has 10 – 20 firearms for 378 officers. If the Afghan police, regardless of the training they receive, are not endowed with adequate facilities and equipment, they will inevitably succumb to previous corruptive and criminal patterns.
3. Judicial Reform (Currently led by Italy, although the U.S., Canada, the European Commission, the UN Development Program [UNDP], the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], the UN Office for Project Services [UNOPS], and the UN Development Fund for Women [UNIFEM] are also involved)

For multiple reasons, the judicial reform process has lagged far behind the other pillars of the SSR agenda. Overlapping legal norms in Afghanistan (secular law, based on the French civil code; Shari’a law; customary or informal law; and international conventions) pose a serious problem, as does corruption (drug-related or not), crumbling infrastructure, and the varying application of customary law across the country. (At present, 90% of adjudications are undertaken through the informal justice system).

In spite of these challenges, some noteworthy achievements have been made:

- Interim Criminal Procedure and Juvenile Codes have been enacted and a Penitentiary Law has been drafted.
- The International Development Law Organization (IDLO) and USAID have completed law collection initiatives.
- IDLO has trained 450 judges and prosecutors, while USAID continues to provide training to a range of justice operators.
- Structural reforms within the three permanent Afghan judicial institutions (the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice, and Attorney General) are progressing steadily under the aegis of the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program.
- USAID & UNDP mentors and advisors have been embedded into permanent judicial institutions, with some good effect.
- 20 court facilities have been rebuilt by UNDP (with Italian funding) and USAID.

Unfortunately, these modest successes are competing with a plethora of problems. Some possible solutions to these problems include the following:

- Conduct a comprehensive needs assessment and develop an overarching judicial reform strategy. (One of the major legal and security challenges facing Afghanistan today is the deluge of land disputes that emerged after the collapse of the Taliban regime. It is an area that needs special attention.)
- Harmonize donor activities with the priorities of permanent Afghan legal institutions. The IDLO program to train Afghan jurists best illustrates the importance of this point. Representatives from the permanent Afghan legal institutions have protested that the program has been undertaken without adequate consultation with the Afghan government and was designed with little consideration of government objectives and priorities.
- Overcome the acute lack of joint planning and cooperation that currently exists between the main international stakeholders and the permanent Afghan judicial institutions – the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice, and the Attorney General. Bridges must also be built between the Afghan institutions themselves, particularly since they continue to view each other as rivals rather than partners in the renewal of the justice system.
- Increase donor funding – thus far, the justice sector has received a paltry 2% of the funding allocated to the security sector reform agenda.
- Establish a system to record and preserve the rulings made in the informal justice system.
- Provide actual legal recourse for the poor in the form of legal aid. At present, legal aid services can only be found in two cities of the country, Kabul and Kunduz. This predicament has deprived the underprivileged of any access to justice. Donors must pay more attention to this issue. The PRTs provide one medium to jumpstart efforts to address this problem on a countrywide basis.
- Pay more attention to corrections system reforms. The majority of the country’s prisons, including those in Kabul, do not come close to meeting basic international standards. Since no justice system can function without serviceable prisons, concerted donor attention and investment is needed in this area.

4. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Ex-Combatants (Currently led by Japan)

The formal DDR program, titled the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), began in October 2003. Its stated goal is “to decommission formations and units up to a total of 100,000 officers and soldiers and in the process to collect, store and deactivate weapons currently in their possession in order to be able to reconstruct the Afghan National Army and return those not required to civilian life.” In trying to reach this ambitious goal, DDR has met with notable success. Its achievements include the following.

- 93,342 soldiers removed from the payroll of the Ministry of Defense. (By “de-financing” these forces, many of whom where “ghost soldiers,” the Afghan government has been able to re-allocate funds to more productive areas.)
- 61,397 Afghan soldiers formally demobilized.
- 34,726 light weapons collected.
- 9,085 heavy weapons cantoned (more than 90% of the estimated number in the country).
- 400 tons of ammunition destroyed.
Despite these palpable achievements, DDR advocates must continue focusing on two current problems:

- **First:** Concentrate on the reintegration phase of the current program. (In DDR, lest we forget, it is the R that remains the weak and underdeveloped link). Since commanders of various stripes have found ways to insulate their clientalistic networks from external pressures, the Afghan government requires an economic stimulus package to ensure that ex-combatants find sustainable employment in the licit economy. However, achieving this goal will require durable donor funding and attention. Any tendency to characterize the DDR process as “mission accomplished” at the conclusion of its disarmament and demobilization phases, thereby stimulating a shift in resources and expertise to other areas, will only imperil the process’ impressive early achievements. Without successful reintegration, Afghanistan’s DDR process could add up to nothing more than a brief hiatus in the country’s cycle of mobilization.

- **Second:** Concentrate on disbanding approximately 1,870 illegally armed Afghan groups and their estimated 129,000 militiamen through the Government-run Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program, which will feature three phases – voluntary compliance, negotiated participation, and enforced adherence. (Twenty-five of these illegal groups have been deemed particularly high risks due to the threat they pose to the upcoming parliamentary election, to general good governance, and to on-going counter-narcotics operations.)

The Afghan government plans on passing a National Gun Law and a Private Security Company Law to launch the DIAG process and to provide the legal foundations it needs. Unfortunately, the overall program lacks direct incentives to induce voluntary and negotiated compliance at this time. (Afghan government and international stakeholders currently assume that promised community development projects will entice most of these groups to comply with the DIAG process. But since many of these groups are alienated from the communities in which they live and are profitably immersed in the illicit economy, this assumption may be dubious indeed.)

Other open questions also remain here. Does the government have the capacity and political will to enforce the DIAG process? How will the negotiations be undertaken? Will donor support to community development projects materialize? And how will commanders be engaged in the process?

5. **Counter-Narcotics (Currently led by the United Kingdom)**

In 2004, poppy cultivation took place in all of Afghanistan’s provinces; it involved 10 percent of all households; it generated an estimated $2.8 billion in income, which was equivalent to roughly 60% of the country’s legal GDP; and it yielded a crop that has accounted for over 87% of the world’s heroin.

To stem this scourge over the long-term, donor nations need to support the Afghan government’s eight-pillar counter-narcotics strategy, which is as follows:

- Build institutions and mechanisms. (A Counter-Narcotics Ministry, a Cabinet Sub-Committee on Counter-Narcotics, a Counter-Narcotics Trust Fund, and more).

- Conduct counter-narcotics awareness-raising campaigns. (Encourage anti-drug Fatwas, proselytize that “poppy growing is incompatible with Islam.”)

- Provide Afghan farmers with alternative livelihoods. (Pursue comprehensive rural development that ranges from alternative crop initiatives to irrigation and road infrastructure development projects.)

- Strengthen interdiction and law enforcement capabilities. (Continue to strengthen the Afghan Special Narcotics Force [ASNF], the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan [CNPA], and the National Interdiction Unit [NIU].)

- Mobilize the criminal justice system. (Further develop the Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force, the Counter-Narcotics Justice Center, etc.)

- Pursue eradication efforts, but only in tandem with alternative livelihoods programs. (Expand the activities of the Central Poppy Eradication Force [CPEF], the Central Eradication Monitoring & Planning Cell [CEMPC], and CNPA eradication teams.)

- Reduce the demand for drugs and actively attempt to treat addicts. (In regard to the latter point, establishing drug treatment centers in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-i Sharif, Nangahar, Kabul, Gardez and Faizabad is a step in the right direction.)

- Pursue counter-narcotics efforts on a regional level.

Although this eight-pillar strategy is well crafted and comprehensive, its advocates must remain cognizant of the following realities:

- **Halting the drug trade in Afghanistan is a long-term goal that even with concerted international support could take more than a decade to achieve.**

- For counter-narcotics efforts to bear fruit, the Afghan government must demonstrate the necessary resolve to confront public officials implicated in the drug trade.
– Finding suitable alternative crops will be difficult, particularly since the poppy plant is drought resistant, easy to store, and immensely profitable.

6. The Path Ahead – Cross-Sectoral Challenges

The above sections have shown that while security sector reform in Afghanistan has made major strides, it still faces immense obstacles that threaten to undermine the entire process. To ensure that the process overcomes these obstacles, a number of steps must be taken by the Afghan government and its international partners, including the following:

– Security – Security sector reform requires a base level of security to succeed. When that base is absent, as is currently the case in Afghanistan, stakeholders adapt accordingly. Unfortunately, adaptation often means prioritizing the hard security elements of SSR (professionalizing and equipping security forces) above its soft security elements (entrenching rule of law and institutionalizing mechanisms of democratic oversight). This selective approach can then reinforce corrupt patterns and authoritarian practices rather than forge a democratically accountable and rights-respecting security system. To create the security space needed for holistic forms of security sector reform in Afghanistan, the current NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) should expand and re-orient itself to bolster SSR and state building processes.

– Coordination – Although significant strides have been made in this area, a “coordination deficit” still exists in Afghanistan. Effective SSR requires a strategic-level coordinator who “facilitates connectedness.” Since most stakeholders believe the Office of the Afghan National Security Council should serve in this capacity, it should be endowed with the resources and authority to do so. In terms of tactical-level coordination, that role might logically fall to local provincial administrators, who have thus far had a negligible voice in the SSR process.

– Local ownership – Who clearly “owns” SSR programs in Afghanistan remains an ambiguous question. Unfortunately, a natural tension sustains the ambiguity. If you want increased Afghan ownership of SSR, you have to accept slower capacity building in local institutions. Conversely, faster capacity building entails a heavier and more intrusive international footprint. In my view, Afghan ownership should increase now rather than later, but this transfer of authority should be accompanied by measures that check corruption and abuses of power, oversee expenditures, and help increase Afghan capacities. Such measures can take the form of embedded mentor programs and NGO contractor support within ministries.

– Sustainability – the current Afghan government’s tax-to-GDP ratio is a meager 4%, which leads to an over-reliance on donor largesse. Since this general problem will not subside for several years to come, SSR donor nations will have to bear the bulk of the recurring costs (including salaries) associated with their programs if they expect them to survive. This holds especially true for military, police, and justice reforms.

– Resources – Resource distribution among the SSR pillars is highly uneven. Disparities in resource allocations must be narrowed. For instance, the chronically under-resourced justice sector requires a massive infusion of donor support.

– A long-term focus – Full-fledged, multi-pillar reform in Afghanistan will take 10-20 years. Since no degree of “Afghanization” will paper-over this fact, the international community should not delude itself into thinking otherwise.

– Capacity building – Afghanistan today requires politically predictable state building – which involves the development of human and institutional capacity – rather than nation building – which focuses on the formation of national identities and unifying values. In the coming years, the key objectives of the state building project should include: 1) infusing the state with a monopoly over the use of force; 2) extracting resources from society more effectively (reference the low tax-to-GDP problem again); and 3) entrenching the rule of law. Unfortunately, the Afghan government lacks the capacity to achieve these objectives without the support of its international partners. In fact, the viability of the government itself is largely dependent on the presence of international military forces and on continued donor political and financial support. Breaking this dependency will require a concerted effort to build local capacities. With a generation of Afghans reared on war and deprived of educational and professional opportunities, building local capacities to manage a modern state poses an immense challenge. But without a long-term commitment, the gains made in rebuilding Afghanistan will only be transitory.

– Regional cooperation – There is a growing appreciation that Afghanistan’s security and development problems are by definition regional problems. The still open question, however, is how should Kabul go about building an effective regional strategy that will contribute to the resolution of these problems? One possible solution is to combine several approaches – i.e. actively seek mutual economic interpenetration, build forms of security cooperation modeled after NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, and regionalize counter-narcotics efforts. Through these targeted efforts, a latticework of effective political affiliations may emerge.
- **Factionalism and politicization** – This two-part problem exists both within the donor community and Afghan institutions themselves. It is critically necessary to de-politicize and de-factionalize the security sector – the Afghan people must believe that their security forces are non-partisan and acting in the national interest. As long as the public views the security services as agents of particular ethnic, political, or sectarian constituencies, the services will not achieve the necessary legitimacy to perform their duties effectively.

- **Corruption** – It is endemic in Afghanistan and the drug trade has only exacerbated the problem. Minimizing corruption, however, requires a macroscopic, system-level approach to Afghan development in general, and to the Bonn Process and its successor in particular. Localized or targeted anti-corruption efforts will not be enough.

**Conclusion**

Although Afghanistan’s security sector reform process has tallied a number of important achievements over the past three years, including the creation of an Afghan National Army and the implementation of a DDR program, it is not yet clear whether the foundations laid for the process are both stable and sustainable. The adverse security environment in the country has led to expedient types of reform. Developing the efficiency and effectiveness of security forces, for example, has taken precedence over situating those forces within a legal and political framework that can mitigate abuses of power and ensure strict observance of international standards and principles.

Although the present approach may seem both viable and justifiable in the short-term, particularly as a means to relieve pressure on international forces and provide immediate stability to the nascent Afghan government, it also permits the persistence of a culture of impunity that over the long term could de-legitimize SSR and serve as a catalyst for renewed conflict. That is why stakeholders working in Afghanistan must rediscover a security sector reform process that is holistic in character. Enhanced cross-sectional links and stakeholder coordination coupled with increased investment in the overlooked “soft” security aspects of the agenda, notably judicial reform, will infuse the security sector with a democratic ethos and guarantee its long-term legitimacy and viability. Plainly speaking, the Afghan government and the international community cannot afford to fail on this vital issue.
NDC RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

INTERNAL ACTIVITIES

Visiting Fellows

NATO-Russia Fellowship Programme:


Col. Youri KROUPNOV, Russian Navy Staff (Sept-Dec. 2005).

Mediterranean Dialogue Fellowship Programme:

Dr Mehdi TAJE, Tunisia (Sept 2005-Feb. 2006)

Internship

Ms Lavinia RICCI, Italy (Sept-Dec. 2005).

Departures

Col. Peter Faber (US Air Force).
Dr André BANDEIRA (Portugal).

Arrivals

Col. Ricky COSBY (US Air Force – SC 106)
Ms Ligeia STUDER (US Civilian)

EXTERNAL ACTIVITIES

André BANDEIRA


Lionel PONSARD
NDC Activities with Russia, NATO-Russia Council, NATO Headquarters, 21 June 2005, Brussels, Belgium.

Carlo MASALA
Panel Chairman (Nonproliferation), Institute of International Affairs of the People’s Congress, 11-14 July 2005, Schengyan, China.

External Publications


NDC PUBLICATIONS

Next Issues

Volume 23
Quelle approche pour l’OTAN dans les Balkans à la lumière des évolutions de la sécurité dans la région?, by Gheorghe CIASCAI (PIP Fellowship Programme, Romania).

NDC OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 8
The Role of the Wider Black Sea Area in a Future European Security Space – 1st Part.

NDC OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9
The Role of the Wider Black Sea Area in a Future European Security Space – 2nd Part.

Previous Issues

RP 21, June 2005

Carlo MASALA, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: The Next Steps.

RP 20, June 2005
Heba NEGM, NATO and the Middle East Peace Process: Scenarios of Possibilities and Risks.

NDC OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 7, June 2005
Long-Term Possibilities for NATO-Russia Naval Security Cooperation, by Col. Igor TARAENKO (NATO-Russia Fellowship Program).

NDC OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 6, June 2005
Le Maghreb stratégique (première partie).