NATO@70

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NATO at 70:
No Time to Retire

Edited by
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Foreword by NATO Secretary General
Jens Stoltenberg

Preface by the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach

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Foreword

I wish to commend the effort by the NATO Defense College to reflect upon the 70th anniversary of the Alliance.

For seventy years, the NATO Alliance has protected our values, our countries and our people. Created less than five years after the end of the Second World War, the twelve founding nations knew only too well the devastation of conflict. So they forged a new path, where like-minded nations would stand together in unity, committed to each other's security and freedom. Allies have been at peace ever since.

For NATO's first 40 years, Allies deterred the Soviet Union. During that time, our collective strength and solidarity prevented invasion, conflict and war. The piece of the Berlin Wall on display at our headquarters in Brussels is a constant reminder of the fragility of our freedom and how we must defend our democracies each and every day.

After the collapse of Communism in 1989, the nations of the former Warsaw Pact sought to secure their new found freedom through NATO. This desire to join NATO has seen our membership rise from sixteen Allies to twenty nine, and soon to thirty. NATO membership protects our democracy, our liberty and the rule of law. It is also a spur to economic growth with new members enjoying unprecedented levels of prosperity. The historic success of NATO enlargement continues to attract aspirants for membership.

But the challenges Allies face did not end with the tearing down of a wall, so NATO continues to adapt. We brought an end to the wars in the Western Balkans, fought piracy in the Indian Ocean and supported the security forces of our partners around the world. When terrorists attacked the United States on 9/11, NATO invoked the collective defence clause of our founding Washington Treaty for the first time, stating that an attack on one was an attack on all. This led to NATO's biggest mission, in Afghanistan, to make sure that the country never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists.

NATO's story is one of constant adaptation in the face of dramatic change, and today we face the most complex security environment in our history. A more assertive Russia, instability across the Middle East and North Africa, cyber and hybrid attacks, and the continual threat of terrorism. All of this while the global balance of power is shifting and new, disruptive technologies continuously transform our societies. So NATO still continues its adaptation, as the papers in this NATO Defense College compendium can attest.

In December 2019, NATO leaders met in London to mark the 70th anniversary of our Alliance. It was an opportunity to reflect on seven decades of peace, prosperity and freedom, and to look ahead together at how we maintain our security.

As part of NATO's biggest increase in our collective defence since the Cold War, we now have multinational troops in the east of our Alliance, we have increased the size and readiness of our forces, and we have opened two new operational commands to improve military mobility in Europe and ensure open lines of communication across the Atlantic.

We have delivered on the NATO Readiness Initiative to field 30 air squadrons, 30 combat vessels, and 30 land battalions within 30 days. All NATO Allies, and NATO itself, are members of the Global Coalition Against Daesh, and we have a new action plan to increase our efforts in the fight against terrorism. NATO has updated our core standards for civilian telecommunications, including 5G, to improve the resilience of our networks. And we have declared space as an operational domain alongside land, air, sea, and cyber.

Finally, all Allies are continuing to step up their investment in our defence, not only in terms of cash, but also with new capabilities and contributions to NATO missions and operations. European Allies and Canada have increased defence spending for five years in a row. By the end of 2020 they will have added an extra USD130 billion to their defence budgets since 2016. That figure will reach USD400 billion by 2024. All of this is a clear sign of NATO's utility, and of the credibility of its posture. Our ironclad commitment to protect and defend one another guarantees freedom and democracy for almost one billion people, making NATO the most successful Alliance in history. NATO's 70th anniversary gives us cause for celebration, but we must never take the bond between our nations for granted. We must never take freedom and democracy for granted. We must defend them every single day.

Jens Stoltenberg

NATO Secretary General

Preface

"Always try to associate yourself with and learn as much as you can from those who know more than you do, who do better than you, who see more clearly than you", wrote General Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1967. As first Supreme Allied Commander Europe of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, General Eisenhower recognised the importance of educating military personnel and identified the need for a new international institution that would fill this gap in 1949. Similarly my first predecessor, General of the Army Omar Bradley was committed to professional study and education. Two years later in 1951, the NATO Defense College opened its doors in Paris.

For almost all of our 70 year history, the NATO Defense College has delivered first class education and provided the commitment for lifelong learning. To all who have served in the Faculty, the current and former Commandants, your work has created the College as it is today: forward-leaning, adapting to new challenges and embracing Allies, partners and friends on that journey.

2019 was a memorable year for NATO, not only for the numerous anniversaries that we have reached but for the work undertaken. We celebrated our 70th Anniversary, marking seven decades of continued evolution and adaptation and making NATO the most successful military alliance in History. As more Nations joined our organisation, this sphere of collective defence has spread to include more people and territory.

Today, NATO encompasses 29 Nations, soon to be 30, and protects almost 1 billion people. Last year, twelve NATO Allies observed their 20th, 15th and 10th Accession Anniversaries and all 29 NATO Nations reinforced the Open Door policy by signing the Accession Protocol for the Republic of North Macedonia. These expansions have helped to advance democracy, stability and prosperity in Europe as well as erase many of the barriers that used to divide our continent. And to bring us closer to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.

We commemorated 20 years since the beginning of the NATO-led Kosovo Force which provides peace and stability to the region and for all the people of Kosovo. We marked the 25th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 15th Anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative proving once more that the benefits of NATO extended further than just to its Allied Nations. We also observed another important anniversary – 60 years of the NATO Science and Peace for Security Programme which has grown into one of

NATO's major partnership tools, covering a wide range of issues, including cyber defence, response to terrorism, and energy security.

These anniversaries demonstrate NATO's capacity to respond and defend, to use available resources and accept the hand of friendship, to evolve and adapt as required. Over the course of the last 70 years, NATO has been able to fulfil effectively its three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security – because it has matured over time and continuously adapted to face emerging threats.

As we continue to strengthen our deterrence and defence, raising the readiness of our forces, increasing our ability to move them across the Atlantic and within Europe, and modernising our military command structure and headquarters, we are also looking at our strategy-making. Last May, the NATO Chiefs of Defence approved the first new NATO Military Strategy in almost 60 years. It sets out NATO's military goals, intended approaches, and resource requirements as well as its approach to current and future threats emanating from a more unpredictable world and a changed security environment. This includes a more assertive Russia, cyber and hybrid threats, instability across the Middle East and North Africa, and a continued terrorist threat.

Seventy years on, NATO remains as empowered today as in 1949. NATO's strength lies beyond its new capabilities, its continued adaptation or its ability to innovate – it lies with its people. Dedicated people who share NATO's values and desire for peace. No society or organisation can succeed unless it fosters the potential of all of its members. The creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in 2002 is testimony of NATO's resolve to boost education and training. The NATO Defense College, the NATO School Oberammergau, the NATO Centres of Excellence and our other institutions all provide opportunities for military and civilian staff members to fine tune their strategic thinking and build their professional skills. But it is important for NATO's education and training stakeholders to also adapt. We must ensure that the opportunities we offer reflect the realities of a changing world and whenever possible anticipate our future needs. NATO must remain at the forefront of education and training.

In 2019, NATO – under the auspice of the Joint Warfare Centre – held its first Human Capital Development Workshop to develop the different dimensions and lines of effort of human capital. Human capital, in the context of NATO, is much broader than human resources, and is identified as "The men and women fulfilling roles in the NATO command and force structures; the doctrine, organisation and leadership that guide and support them and the training, technology, materiel, and information that enable them". Under the leadership of General André Lanata, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, NATO

is designing a "Human Capital Development Roadmap" to optimise our most important resource: the men and women who are at the heart of our Alliance.

Beyond education and learning, the NATO Defense College has another important mission. For almost 70 years, the NATO Defense College has held up an essential mirror, reflecting on and analysing NATO's actions and adaptations. As the Alliance's premier academic institution, your researchers, fellows and Research Division as a whole provide insights, recommendations and timely analysis on a broad spectrum of current security-related issues of particular concern for the Alliance.

Over the last year, the NATO Defense College has published research on topics such as Innovation and Future Threats, Artificial Intelligence, Hybrid Threats, Projecting Stability, Russia's military posture in the Artic, NATO-EU relations, Energy Security, Nuclear Deterrence, Counter-Terrorism and the NATO Force Structure. These publications have not only allowed NATO to benefit from key insight but have also helped communicate the real value of NATO as well as build support with key audiences.

Through education, research and outreach the College is an indispensable element of NATO's constant innovation and adaptation. I therefore commend the NDC efforts in putting together this Volume on the occasion of NATO's 70th anniversary and in doing so continuing to strengthen the Alliance's intellectual and academic vitality.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach

Chairman of the Military Committee

Introduction

Thierry Tardy *

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in Washington on 4 April 1949 by twelve Western states, with the aim of preventing a return of war in Europe. In celebrating the Alliance's 70th anniversary throughout 2019, NATO's current 29 member states have, to a large extent, hailed its success. The Alliance has thrived, enlarged and endured, to the benefit of its now one billion citizens.

In December 2019, NATO Heads of State and Government, meeting in London in recognition of the Alliance's anniversary, took stock of its achievements, and reasserted a number of commitments. NATO "remains the foundation for our collective defence and the essential forum for security consultations and decisions among Allies"; it is a "defensive Alliance" that poses "no threat to any country". Western leaders also reiterated the Allies' commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, by which "an attack against one Ally shall be considered an attack against us all".[1]

That said, NATO is also facing a number of difficulties that have come to the surface over the last few years, ranging from member states' diverging security interests and values to uncertain US leadership and uneven implementation of burden-sharing. In part to address these challenges, member states agreed in London to launch a "forward-looking reflection process" under the auspices of the NATO Secretary General, drawing on "relevant expertise, to further strengthen NATO's political dimension including consultation".

Such is the background against which this Volume aims to examine the state of the Alliance 70 years after its inception. What is NATO for, in 2019? How much has it adapted, and how much does it still need to adapt so that it can continue to protect its member states, societies, and values? What are the challenges that NATO is facing today? To what extent are these challenges internal, and how far are they external? What are the challenges looming ahead, and how relevant will NATO be in its response to them?

The above are some of the questions that this Volume seeks to address. To do so,

* Thierry Tardy is the Director of the Research Division at the NATO Defense College.

1 London Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, London, 3-4 December 2019.

the NATO Defense College has invited a number of prominent scholars and NATO officials to offer their analysis of NATO's achievements and challenges. This was done throughout 2019, with papers published as *NDC Policy Briefs*, starting with former Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller in March, and ending with Assistant Secretary General for Defence Investment Camille Grand (with Matthew Gillis), in December. On the NATO side, former Director General of the International Military Staff LtGen Jan Broeks, Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges Antonio Missiroli, and Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning Patrick Turner also contributed chapters.

These texts were complemented by the contributions of Karl-Heinz Kamp (Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), Germany), Julian Lindley-French (Institute for Statecraft, UK), Bruno Tertrais (*Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique*, France), Kori Schake with Erica Pepe (International Institute for Strategic Studies), Tomáš Valášek (Carnegie-Europe), Sven Sakkov (International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia), and Thierry Tardy (NATO Defense College).

This *Research Paper* brings these texts together in a single Volume. In addition, the NDC was honored to get a Foreword by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, as well as a Preface by the Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach. Steven Mariano, NDC Dean, has provided the concluding remarks.

Taken together, these texts cover a broad range of issues: while a sense of achievement by an enduring alliance prevails in the various chapters, authors do not overlook the challenges that lie ahead, and that underline why NATO stands to maintain its relevance for some decades to come.

At least four sets of issues can be identified as the various authors take stock of achievements to date and of what will require attention in the years ahead.

First, authors tend to be in agreement on the overall success of the Alliance. NATO has, indeed, contributed to maintaining peace in Europe: by deterring the Soviet Union during the Cold War; by helping to end the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s; and, since 2014, by kitting itself out again for collective defence to counter a newly aggressive Russia. Over time, the Alliance has managed to "keep the Americans in" and to be an essential pillar of the liberal world order.

Second, NATO has managed to adapt at key moments in its 70-year long history. With the end of the Cold War, NATO embraced crisis management and enlarged to former Eastern bloc countries, some of which had been Soviet republics, to demonstrate relevance at a time when collective defence had become less central. Adaptation was further tested

in a post-9/11 context, when NATO invoked its Article 5 for the first (and only) time, before it launched its most demanding military operation ever, in Afghanistan. A third critical juncture came with the resurgence of an aggressive Russia and the occupation and annexation of Crimea in the spring of 2014; NATO then started to relearn the rules of collective defence, while showing an intent to contribute to the stability of its southern periphery.

Third, NATO is undeniably facing a number of challenges that undermine its overall cohesion and credibility. Much is said about member states' policies and their diverging security interests and values, and how those divergences impact NATO. What is at stake is the solidity of the transatlantic bond, the degree of US commitment to European security and, in return for this, the real state of play on European states' defence expenditure pledge and their military credibility. From Russia to Syria to the southern flank of the Alliance, diverging threat assessments by different NATO member states have revealed a degree of political disunity, largely brought to light by the leaders themselves in public events or through communications in the press. As one author in this volume puts it, while NATO as an operational organization is doing fine, the Alliance as a political entity is indeed encountering difficulties.

Fourth, quite a few authors reflect on future uncertainties: apart from those pertaining to the above mentioned dynamics of member states' policies and institutional preferences, the potential impact of developments in at least three areas is still far from clear. First, one source of concern is the digital age, and what artificial intelligence, big data and automation will mean for the conduct of warfare, as well as NATO's role in it. The debate is largely technological, in relation to capability development, interoperability and digital know-how across the spectrum of military activities; but automation will also have a broader impact on our own security, beyond the military dimension, and NATO will have to adapt to this as well. The second uncertainty is about "China's growing influence" (London Declaration, para. 6), presented as both an opportunity and a challenge. Whether NATO should play any role in responding to this growing influence is still unclear, and there are many political and operational obstacles to its doing so; what is certain, though, is that China's emergence cannot be ignored, especially as it manifests itself within the Atlantic area, be it in economic, political or security terms. The third, related challenge is for NATO to continue to adapt, in particular to potentially non-military threats (in the cyber and hybrid warfare domains), while preserving its comparative advantage in the military sphere.

As would be expected, none of the authors suggests that NATO will be needed to a lesser degree in the future than has been the case to date. There is agreement that NATO

will be all the more in demand as the world becomes increasingly uncertain and the Western model is challenged. In the end, the question is not so much whether NATO will reach its 80th anniversary: what really needs to be focused on is the kind of alliance that states and their peoples want to continue building, as the most effective protection possible in the face of the knowns and unknowns ahead.

1

NATO at 70: modernising for the future

Rose Gottemoeller *

When NATO's founding fathers came together in 1949 to sign the Washington Treaty, they committed to keeping their people safe and defending the values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. Over the past seventy years, the world has changed and the security situation has evolved – and so has the Alliance. But its *raison d'être*, famously captured in the d'Artagnan principle, "all for one, one for all", holds true to this very day.

With this unwavering commitment at its core, NATO has been able to navigate a changing security environment and tackle a range of security challenges over the decades. For seventy years, it has successfully kept our nations safe and free.

NATO's success lies in its ability to adapt to evolving circumstances, to unite around our common purpose and shared interests, as well as to modernise and keep up with the dizzying pace of social and technological change.

An adaptable Alliance

In the early years, NATO's security environment was shaped by a single and clearly defined security threat – the Soviet Union. But over the decades, as the threats to our security changed, NATO adapted, not once, but repeatedly. We intervened in the Balkans to end brutal wars in the 1990s. After 9/11, we launched our biggest ever combat operation to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. In 2008, we deployed ships off the coast of Somalia to help counter piracy and secure critical sea-lanes.

Today, NATO is adapting once more. This time, not only in response to a single threat, but to many: from Russia's aggressive actions, to conflict and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and a range of "hybrid" threats blurring the lines between peace and war. To keep up with a rapidly changing and increasingly challenging security environment, the Alliance is taking steps to defend its own territory and populations across the Euro-

* Rose Gottemoeller was Deputy Secretary General of NATO when she authored this text.
This text was first published as an *NDC Policy Brief* in March 2019.

Atlantic area, but also and at the same time, to support its neighbours in their efforts to manage crises.

To deal with a more assertive Russia, NATO has strengthened its presence in the eastern part of the Alliance – from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In the aftermath of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, NATO swiftly implemented the largest reinforcement of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War. We deployed 5,000 troops across Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. We tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000, including a high readiness force that can deploy within days. We also enhanced air policing in the Baltic and Black Sea regions and stepped up our military exercises.

Simultaneously, in response to violent instability in the Middle East and North Africa, and especially the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)/Da'esh, NATO enhanced its role in the fight against international terrorism and increased its defence capacity building support to partner countries in the region – notably in Jordan and Tunisia. At the Brussels Summit in July 2018, NATO leaders agreed to launch a mission in Iraq to help train the Iraqi forces and make sure ISIL never returns.

With cyber-attacks becoming more frequent and more disruptive, NATO has also upped its game in the cyber sphere. At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, cyberspace was officially recognized as a new "domain" of operations, alongside land, sea and air. In other words, NATO extended its resolve to deter aggression against its Allies from the physical world to the virtual one. This was yet another demonstration of an Alliance adapting to twenty-first century threats.

A united Alliance

Preserving peace and security is not a job that any one country can take on alone. Together, NATO Allies have successfully protected and defended one another for the past seven decades.

NATO is a family of 29 – soon to be 30 – Allies and a network of over 40 partners. Just like any family, there are disagreements among its members – as there always have been. The Suez Crisis in 1956 was one of the strongest disagreements between Allies. France's withdrawal from NATO's command structure in 1966 was another hurdle in NATO's history. In the end, the Alliance had to move its Headquarters from Paris to Brussels (and the NATO Defense College to Rome). There were transatlantic rifts over energy deals with the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and over Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Allies had a fierce debate over the Iraq War in 2003, which led many observers to argue that the security environment would push Allies apart rather than closer together. These disagreements were

real. They challenged the Alliance, but the transatlantic bond never weakened. Ultimately, unity prevailed.

As an alliance of democracies, unity does not mean uniformity. Governments change, and balancing different interests and priorities has never been easy. NATO membership has always come with obligations as well as benefits, and the tendency to prefer the latter to the former is true of countries as well as individuals. But the key is to work through differences and find a common way forward. NATO's unique quality is that it has always managed to forge this common path.

History has shown that Allies overcome their disagreements when the time comes to take action. The same is true today. For when faced with a threat, Allies discuss together, decide together, act together and deliver results together. Just last July at the Brussels Summit, against the backdrop of growing differences between Europe and North America on issues such as trade, climate change and the Iran nuclear deal, Allies came together and took over one hundred decisions to further strengthen their security and defence ties.

They agreed to increase the readiness of their forces, to boost efforts in the fight against terrorism, and to strengthen responses against cyber and hybrid attacks. Acknowledging that these increased efforts to preserve peace and security do not come for free, Allies agreed to spend more and better on defence. They have been increasing the amount they spend on defence since 2014. The majority of Allies have plans in place to spend 2 percent of their Gross Domestic Product on defence by 2024. Last July, they agreed to redouble their efforts to share the burden more fairly.

In these efforts, the United States stands firm with Europe. It has strengthened its commitment to Europe with more troops, more equipment and more exercises. At the same time, the European Allies and Canada are spending more on their defence, with an extra USD41 billion in real terms over the past two years. By the end of 2020, this figure should increase to USD100 billion.

A modern Alliance

In 2018, the NATO Headquarters moved into its new home – a modern and "green" building with state-of-the-art facilities. The new Headquarters in Brussels reflects our modern, twenty-first century Alliance: representative of the people it protects, equipped to respond to today's threats and prepared to tackle future challenges.

Those who worked at NATO in the 1950s would hardly recognize this new workplace. The cigarette smoke in the corridors has evaporated, flat-screen computers have replaced

noisy typewriters, and classified documents circulate by email instead of pneumatic tubes. Above all, NATO has become a much more diverse organisation, with more women both in management and in uniform, as well as many more languages spoken in the cafeteria. Importantly, the average age at NATO Headquarters has dropped substantially with the recruitment of a younger workforce.

NATO is modernising its military structures too. The Command Structure, the military backbone of the Alliance, is currently undergoing a major update to be better prepared to respond to any threat at any time. A cyberspace Operations Centre was established in Mons, Belgium, last August to coordinate NATO operations in cyberspace. Two other commands will soon be operational: one in Norfolk, Virginia, in the United States, to protect the transatlantic sea lines of communication; and one in Ulm, Germany, to support the rapid movement of troops and equipment into, across, and out of Europe. These commands will help our forces become more mobile, and help ensure NATO has the right forces in the right place at the right time, ready to respond at a moment's notice to any threat.

Modern structures need modern tools. For NATO to keep up with the rapid pace of technological change and ensure it has the right tools and capabilities to carry out its mission, it must continuously innovate. If the Alliance wants to maintain a strategic military advantage over those who seek to threaten or weaken it, this is not a choice, it is a necessity.

Exercise Trident Juncture 18, which took place in Norway in October-November 2018 and was NATO's biggest exercise since the Cold War, showcased our ability to innovate. For example, we tested one of the world's smallest drones capable of seeing in the dark. Cutting-edge 3D printing facilities were used during the exercise to make spare parts that could be distributed immediately without having to wait for them to arrive from distant suppliers. These technologies are crucial to improving NATO's response times and our ability to protect our troops and people.

Way forward

At seventy, NATO is in good shape. We remain the world's most powerful military Alliance and an anchor of stability in turbulent waters. We are in a period of great power competition and the very values that underpin our liberal world order – freedom, democracy, the rule of law – are under strain. It is NATO's job to steer us through this new, more tense and uncertain environment.

As it enters a new decade of existence, there are voices questioning the purpose of NATO and the strength of the transatlantic bond. Over the years, Allies have always tackled the debate about the relevance of NATO head on. And we have never taken the

transatlantic bond for granted. In the words of NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, "nowhere is it written that the transatlantic bond will always thrive. That doesn't, however, mean that its breakdown is inevitable. We can maintain it, and all the mutual benefits we derive from it".[1] We must continue to answer the tough questions to avoid complacency and ensure NATO's continued relevance.

Looking ahead, NATO is focusing on the following set of objectives.

First, unity: Allies must continue to stick together. We face many complex and interrelated threats – none of which can be expected to vanish overnight. They come from near and far, and from multiple directions – by land, sea, air and cyberspace. A lone individual armed with a machine-gun can spread terror within seconds. A single cyber-attack has the potential to bring the world's most powerful countries to their knees. There is no better way to stand-up to these threats than standing together. Now is not the time to go it alone. Our unity is the basis of deterrence and makes us attractive to partners. Together, we are the motor of global security governance, but divided, we lose power and influence.

Second, burden sharing: we have made good progress, but there is more work to do. Sharing the burden is about spending more on defence and reaching the 2 percent target, but it is also about avoiding fragmentation and ensuring that European defence initiatives reinforce and complement NATO's efforts. Enhanced European defence cooperation is crucial for the security of Europe and can contribute to fairer burden sharing within NATO, but it should not be at the expense of such cooperation at NATO.

Third, innovation: we must continue to prepare for the unexpected. For this, NATO must accelerate its innovation agenda and be more ambitious in its efforts to modernize. We are only starting to get to grips with some of the biggest technological developments of the twenty-first century, and we still need to absorb the impact that artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing are having on our security. We must continue to work closely with industry, and all Allies must honour their commitment to acquire more modern and sophisticated equipment to enable their armed forces to perform better and faster. We have not lost our technological edge, but it is under threat and requires more focused high-level political attention.

Fourth, norms: the world order survives on norms. NATO traditionally has championed non-military forms of security, including political dialogue, arms control and confidence-building measures. More recently, NATO has attached great importance to women, peace and security, protection of children in armed conflict and also civilians. And NATO is strongly committed to international laws to make cyber space more regulated and more

1 Jens Stoltenberg, "Europe and North America need to stay united – now more than ever", *The Guardian*, 19 June 2018.

secure. There is more we can do, together with our network of like-minded partners, to defend our norms and protect the rules-based international order from those who deliberately try to undermine it.

Fifth and last, we need to seek new opportunities. We may be facing some of the greatest security challenges in a generation, but we cannot simply accept that it is all doom and gloom. The breakdown of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty poses a significant security threat for us all. We are trying to save the Treaty and calling on Russia to come back to full and verifiable compliance. But we must also be prepared for a world without the Treaty and accept that this could pave the way for new discussions on strategic stability and the future of arms control. Such discussions would likely take time and require patience, but they are in all parties' interests. We should also grasp the opportunities of closer relations with China, including on arms control. We have worked together to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, and our militaries are in regular contact. Notwithstanding the challenges a rising China poses to the rules-based international order, we should be open to forging cooperation in areas of common interest, including, for instance, on new technologies. These technologies also offer opportunities. They can be disruptive and damaging, but they can also present important new ways to ensure our collective security.

The founders of the North Atlantic Alliance would never have predicted that the security environment would evolve as radically and as rapidly as it has. Nor would they ever have imagined that NATO would adapt as meaningfully and as swiftly as it has. Although there is no crystal ball to predict what lies ahead, we can look back and learn the lessons from history. The past seven decades have shown us what NATO is capable of. As we look to the future, we will remain a pillar of stability in an uncertain world: strong, modern, and united.

2

NATO's coming existential challenge

Karl-Heinz Kamp *

Seven decades after it was established, the North Atlantic Alliance is doing fairly well and fully deserves being described as the most successful security organization in modern history. By constantly evolving and adapting, NATO managed to maintain its relevance on both sides of the Atlantic in fundamentally different security environments. It preserved the territorial integrity of its members during the Cold War and was crucial for bringing down the Iron Curtain. It helped to bring peace to the Balkans and prevented Afghanistan from once again becoming a breeding ground for jihadist terrorism. Since Russia's return to revanchist policies in 2014, NATO again guarantees the freedom and security of its members in the East.

In the long term though, NATO faces an almost existential problem, as it will be difficult to maintain its relevance for the United States as the dominant power within the Alliance. This will be less a result of the current president's erratic policy than of the geostrategic reorientation of the US away from Russia and towards China. NATO will also have to fundamentally alter its geographic orientation to avoid falling into oblivion.

Successful now and in the next couple of years

Until half a decade ago, NATO's history had often been divided into three phases (this division goes back to Michael Rühle). During its first phase, which lasted from its establishment until the end of the East-West conflict, NATO was an instrument of Western defence and self-determination against the Soviet Union. In the second phase – from 1989 to 2001 – NATO filled the power vacuum left by the bygone Warsaw Pact and supported the democratization of Eastern Europe. The third phase began with the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York and saw NATO evolving into a global security actor, fighting the Taliban thousands of kilometres away from Alliance territory. With Moscow's illegal

* Karl-Heinz Kamp was President of the Federal Academy for Security Policy (BAKS), Berlin, when he authored this text.
This text was first published as an *NDC Policy Brief* in March 2019.

annexation of Crimea in 2014, the fourth phase of Alliance history started. Since then, NATO is back in the "Article 5 World" – a security environment in which the commitments of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty need to be bolstered by a credible deterrence and defence posture.

NATO adapted very swiftly to the new requirements of the "Article 5 World" – possibly much quicker than Vladimir Putin had expected when he launched a war against Ukraine. As a result of the milestone summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016), NATO significantly improved its readiness for territorial defence – not only in the East.[1] Numbers of the NATO Response Force (NRF), established in 2002, have increased three-fold to a joint force of some 40,000 soldiers. Its readiness has been significantly improved through reinforcement with 5,000 soldiers from the multinational Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is on permanent standby and ready to move in a few days. Under the acronym EFP (Enhanced Forward Presence), four combat-ready battlegroups are operational since 2017 in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, led by the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany and the US respectively. In addition to the deployment of boots on the ground, NATO has significantly increased the number and size of multinational exercises, and has developed new defence plans. Moreover, the Alliance has streamlined its decision-making processes in order to achieve an agreement on the deployment of rapid response forces within 8 to 12 hours.

Even nuclear deterrence, contested by the public in some NATO countries, has been substantially augmented. A new "nuclear mindset" has emerged among all 29 member states, leading to a broad consensus on the threat posed by Russia and on the fact that NATO remains a nuclear Alliance. Response times of NATO's nuclear aircraft have been reduced and US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe will be thoroughly modernized. Besides, nuclear exercises take place more often and the number of non-nuclear NATO members that could provide conventional support in case of an (unlikely) nuclear strike mission has been expanded.

In addition, NATO kept up all the elements of its "360-degree approach" to security, including activities to counter global terrorism or projecting stability beyond its own borders.

1 For more details see H. Brauss, *NATO beyond 70*, International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia, 2018.

The United States remain engaged

It goes without saying that NATO's success over the last seven decades crucially depended on the commitment of the United States as the ultimate and indeed "indispensable" (as former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once put it) security-provider to the European Allies. It is worth noting that US commitments have been kept up after the tidal change in 2014, and more importantly, also since 2017 when President Trump took office.

Such a positive description of the United States' role in NATO might surprise all those who point out that Washington is afflicted with a president who openly detests NATO and does not miss any opportunity to express his disrespect for alliances and allies. Trump's embarrassing performances at NATO top-level meetings are proverbial and in the meantime, there has been discussion on doing away with summit meetings, in order to avoid occurrences like those in Brussels in July 2018.

However, on closer inspection, Trump's morning tweets against America's international commitments are more a testimony of the president's ignorance of international politics than of the lack of US commitment to NATO. The opposite is true: since Donald Trump's inauguration, US commitment to NATO in Eastern Europe has even increased.

Since 2014 the United States have contributed to all "three Cs" – capabilities, contributions and cash – in the defence sector. With regard to *cash*, the Trump administration multiplied the emergency response support for Eastern European NATO members against the Russian threat. Immediately after Russia attacked Ukraine, President Obama requested USD1 billion for the fiscal year of 2015 in support of the "European Reassurance Initiative" (ERI), a military support programme. In 2016, this amount was slightly cut to USD800 million. The Trump administration quadrupled the amount to USD3.4 billion in 2017 and increased it further to 4.7 billion in 2018. For the fiscal year of 2019, USD6.5 billion have even been requested for the project which, in the meantime, was renamed to "European Deterrence Initiative" (EDI)[2].

With respect to *contributions* and *capabilities,* the US has shown its commitment to NATO by strengthening the "Eastern front" through rotational deployment of combat brigades, prepositioning weapons and ammunition on a significant scale, modernizing airfields, increasing naval capabilities in the North (particularly anti-submarine warfare) and generally improving military infrastructure. All this is constantly tested and improved by major military exercises, which have a clear deterrent effect as they signal resolve and readiness to any potential aggressor.

2 "The European deterrence initiative: a budgetary overview", Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 8 August 2018.

The resignation in December 2018 of Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, one of the last "adults" in the administration and a steadfast defender of America's international role, raised concerns that US support for NATO could dwindle. These concerns, though, underestimate the strong and bipartisan political support for NATO in the Congress in Washington, which prevents the president from implementing isolationist ideas, at least with regard to the Alliance. In order to refute presidential tweets, indicating that Trump would leave NATO if its members did not agree to what the president defines as fair burden-sharing, Congress always makes the adoption of the defence budget dependent on US commitment to NATO. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the fiscal year of 2019 explicitly mentions that US policy is to "… fulfil the ironclad commitment of the United States to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty … as part of a broader, long-term strategy backed by all elements of United States national power to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression".[3] This will not prevent the president from unexpectedly withdrawing US troops from the Middle East or from Afghanistan, but it will prevent him from fully wrecking the institutional framework of the European security order.

The true danger lurking

Despite concerns about the future course of the Trump administration, NATO is significantly stronger today than five years ago, when it was looking for a new *raison d'être*. There is, however, one major challenge to NATO and American engagement in Europe which lies less in the current US president's volatility than in a fundamental shift of international power distribution and a changing American worldview.

As US military improvements in Eastern Europe and Congressional statements such as the NDAA indicate, political and military support for NATO is largely based on the United States' concerns regarding Moscow. Russia is perceived as a revisionist power, ready to break international law to pursue its power ambitions. Lacking the resources to mount an open challenge to the United States, Russia uses the entire range of statecraft, including disinformation, cyber-attacks and interference with domestic elections to take action against what it perceives as the "great enemy" in the West. Moscow invests its scarce resources selectively to destabilize countries like Ukraine, to drive a wedge in alliances such as NATO or to leave a lasting footprint in the Middle East, which is clearly directed against US interests.

At the same time, there is a broad perception among US political elites of Russia

3 US Congress, John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2019.

being a power in decline. The country missed decades of political, economic and societal modernization and seems already now unable to live up to its self-image as a major international player. Russia has a significantly smaller GDP than Italy, has only two competitive products on the world market (energy and weapons), while maintaining political and economic structures based on rent income and corruption instead of innovation and rule of law. The Russian armed forces might be able to attack or bully smaller neighbours, but they are hardly capable of taking decisive action on a global scale – and the situation is likely to further deteriorate as the reduction of the Russian defence budget for 2018 indicated. With its still relevant military capabilities, a huge nuclear arsenal and a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, Russia will certainly always have a "nuisance capability" for the United States. However, it will be less and less able to shape international politics on a decisive scale. This does not imply that a declining Russia will be easier to handle, as it might partly disintegrate and tempt the leadership to take irrational decisions. Nevertheless, its overall power to pursue what it considers Russian interests will profoundly decline.

In contrast, China is perceived as a rising power with breathtaking economic development, which becomes increasingly translated into military capabilities. Hence, China is on its way to become a true peer to Washington, not only challenging the US role in the Pacific but also being ready to replace the United States in the international order.

The overall view of Russia being in decline and China being on the rise is more or less shared by almost all European NATO Allies. Furthermore, there is a broad consensus that both trends might differ in speed or intensity, but that they are very unlikely to be reversed. Nevertheless, NATO member states have not given a lot of thought to the consequences such developments might have for Europe in general and for the Atlantic Alliance in particular.

Europe loses relevance

If Russia is no longer perceived as a global-strategic challenge, but as a regional problem that can be contained with limited means, then Europe will lose its relevance for the United States. Extrapolating the trend of Russian decline on a five- or ten-year scale, Washington might come to the conclusion that a number of well-equipped US combat brigades stationed on a bilateral basis in Eastern Europe, added to some maritime capabilities in the High North should suffice to contain potential Russian aggression against its neighbours. NATO would hardly be needed anymore from a US viewpoint, as neither would those European Allies geographically located at a distance from the Russian border. Nor would NATO have a specific effect of nuclear deterrence on a declining Russia. Washington will

dispose of about 6,500 nuclear weapons of all kinds and – according to the latest 2018 Nuclear Posture Review – intends to procure sea-launched low-yield nuclear weapons to deter, in particular, Russian nuclear threats.

Even if NATO was not to be formally dissolved, it would become an empty shell, depending on how swiftly and how profoundly the "scenario of decline" would play out. Washington could deal with those European Allies it considers relevant in terms of bilateral relationships without having to struggle with a consensus-based organization of 29 member states. In fact, countries such as Poland have frequently aspired to privileged bilateral relations with Washington, as a US security guarantee seemed for many in Warsaw more reliable than an institutional commitment made by European states. It might also be tempting for the US to redirect the resources previously used in Europe to the Asia-Pacific region to cope with the rise of China as the true peer in the quest for global dominance and control over the international order. In that sense, Washington would put into practice those measures President Obama had announced with the "pivot to Asia" years earlier, but never fully implemented.[4]

In this new US-Chinese bilateralism, NATO could assert its relevance for the US only, if it contributed to containing China's potential global ambitions and to preventing Beijing from replacing the liberal, rules-based order (which had always been supported by the US – prior to Donald Trump) with its own concept of international relations. A NATO, which is able to contribute to deterring China, would not only be beneficial to the US but also to the European Allies. This holds all the more true as, for years, NATO has been establishing privileged partnerships with "Western" countries (the so-called "partners around the globe") in the region, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan or South Korea.

NATO's engagement in the Asia-Pacific region could have various levels of intensity. The easiest steps would be to show more interest in the region and be closely informed about potentially critical developments. This is long overdue since European NATO members might be forced to take sides for one of the protagonists should a crisis escalate into an outright conflict.

A second level would imply greater readiness of NATO members for military burden-sharing, also with respect to Asia. If the US is the only NATO member with significant power-projection capabilities in Asia, then Europeans need to show more military engagement in their own neighbourhood to free US military capabilities for operations in areas out of reach for most NATO Allies.

In the long run, though, provided that the assumption of a fundamental international

4 See H. Binnendijk (ed.), *A Transatlantic pivot to Asia*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2014.

power shift towards a new bilateralism proves correct, major European NATO members will have to build up military – primarily naval – capabilities, to operate in the Asia-Pacific as the region of intense competition for international leadership. This would not only be necessary from the NATO side but also from the perspective of the EU with its ambitions to become a true global player.

Today, it might seem unlikely to many Alliance members that NATO could ever expand its portfolio as far as to the Asian-Pacific region. Most Europeans are still struggling with re-establishing their capabilities for territorial defence and are hardly inclined to focus on new challenges. However, fundamental political changes require fundamentally new approaches.

NATO has already demonstrated in the past how quickly it can adjust to new requirements. For decades, most European Allies claimed that NATO should never get militarily engaged in so-called "out-of-area" contingencies outside Europe and should never take any casualties – except for self-defence. After the drama of "9/11" turned international security upside down over night, NATO changed gears and managed to fight a long and bloody war in Afghanistan – 5,500 km away from Brussels. Without this ability to rapidly evolve to new security landscapes, NATO would arguably have lost its relevance with the fall of the Berlin Wall some three decades ago.

3

"NATO@70": still adapting after all these years

Julian Lindley-French *

In April 1949, at the signing of the foundation document of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Treaty of Washington, the Western Allies had twelve active divisions. They believed, erroneously as it turned out, that Stalin's Red Army had 175 divisions on the other side of the River Elbe which marked the then inner-German border. At the time the West consoled itself with the monopoly that the United States had on atomic weaponry. Such complacency ended on 29 August 1949 with a nuclear shock when the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. The new NATO was also tied inextricably to Europe's then recent past. Soon after the Treaty of Washington was signed the French newspaper *Le Monde* suggested that the creation of NATO represent a big step down the road to German rearmament: "The rearmament of Germany is present in the Atlantic Pact as the seed in the egg".[1]

April 1949 thus encapsulated both the ambition and the tensions that were to mark the three strands of post-World War Two European security and defence: transatlantic relations, the German Question and the road to European Union and how to both engage Russia and defend against it. Seventy years on, albeit in forms markedly different to 1949, those same issues continue to be central to the future defence of Europe and the role of the Alliance therein.

This chapter will thus address three questions: what has NATO achieved over seventy years? What are the key current challenges NATO faces? What are the most likely evolutions of the Alliance looking forward?

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This text was first published as an *NDC Policy Brief* in April 2019.

1 J. Lindley-French, *A chronology of European security and defence 1945-2007*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Always adapting: what has NATO achieved over seventy years?

In simplistic terms NATO has succeeded because the Western Allies are still here and at peace, there are more of them, and they are still by and large together. That statement might appear semantic but those who lived through the tumultuous tensions of the 1950s and early 1960s would see it as anything but. What Americans and Canadians afforded Europeans through those difficult years was not simply strategic concepts, collective deterrence and defence, vital though they are. Through the Alliance both Ottawa and Washington afforded a broke and shattered Europe the chance to retreat from Empire with relative grace, although there were notable tragic exceptions most notably in India and Algeria, and to rebuild Europe under a protective umbrella. Today, transatlantic relations are still the cornerstone of European peace with NATO the unifying and galvanising institutional heart of that major part of Europe which is now free and whole.

Throughout its existence the Alliance was always far more than a North American protectorate of huddled, fearful, broke Europeans. It was a true alliance from the start with the hard scars of politics to show for it. Deep arguments about the cost and purpose of the Alliance were the stuff of NATO from the very start. Even as the ink was drying the three NATO powers, the US, UK and France, were locked in a fractious debate about American demands that the dismantling of German industry and infrastructure by way of war reparations should cease.

In 1950 the Korean War began, and with it US demands for German rearmament, specifically the need for German manpower to be committed to the defence of Europe, for fear the war on the Korean Peninsula would weaken that defence. Not only did the debate lead to the outbreak of the first great Alliance argument over burden-sharing, it also led to the first attempt to create a European Army. The European Defence Community (EDC) of 1952-1954 was an attempt to embed German forces within a properly integrated European structure. The "EDC" was killed first by the British in 1953, when Winston Churchill famously said, "We are with them, but not of them" (*plus ça change?*), and then by the French in August 1954 when Paris rejected the idea of suborning the French armed forces within an integrated European structure. Paradoxically, and only after a commitment by Britain to recreate the British Army of the Rhine, the failure of the EDC led directly to German rearmament and the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO in May 1955. Within a decade "West Germany" was to become the biggest source of manpower for the European defence of the Alliance.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the political dynamism of the Alliance was apparent as NATO adapted to change both within and beyond the Alliance. The Kennedy administration attempted to create a Multilateral Nuclear Force (or MLF) to enable the Allies at least some access to nuclear decision-making underlining growing Allied concerns about the extent of America's commitment to the *ultima ratio* defence of Europe. The MLF also sat in stark contrast to British and French determination to be independent nuclear powers. The implicit question of to what extent European powers could be independent of Washington led in 1966 to French President Charles de Gaulle withdrawing France from the integrated command structure of the Alliance. It also led to the expulsion of NATO's headquarters from Paris[2] to "temporary" accommodation in Brussels, which is just now being vacated.

The military core of NATO also underwent change. The 1950s strategic concept of *Massive Retaliation* in the event of a Soviet invasion, including the first use of nuclear weapons, was changed in 1967 to *Flexible Response*, a more graduated escalation. Not only did this reflect a change in defence postures and technology, but also East-West relations, the transatlantic mood and the growing political influence of the Federal Republic of Germany as it pursued its autonomous policy of *détente* with the Eastern Bloc, specifically that "other" Germany, the German Democratic Republic.

During the 1970s the Euromissiles crisis saw Moscow deploy nuclear weapons that could only strike European cities (but neither American nor Canadian) in an attempt to decouple the US from the defence of Europe. In the wake of the disastrous Vietnam War many Europeans had begun to question the US commitment to the defence of Europe. Moscow failed, but the crisis tested the Alliance to the full. It also led in 1987 to the landmark Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which President Trump is today threatening to abrogate in the wake of Moscow's breaching of the agreement with the new *Novator* missile system. NATO is nothing if not its history.

In 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell and the Cold War began its long goodbye, NATO was still there adapting to a new set of realities because sustainable peace without the Alliance was still inconceivable. At the time some questioned the future purpose of the Alliance now that the Soviet Union no longer posed a threat to Europe. However, with the commencement of the Wars of the Yugoslav succession in 1991 and the demand from newly-independent states in Central and Eastern Europe to make their own defence-strategic choices, the need for an adapted Alliance was never greater. NATO rapidly and successfully transformed itself from warfighting deterrent into a welcoming mechanism to

2 Including the NATO Defense College, that moved to Rome.

enable the new democracies and their armed forces to be integrated into the community of free-states that is the Alliance.

With the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 NATO's reality again changed and for the first time the Alliance invoked Article 5 and collective defence in support of the American people in an overt act of burden-sharing. By 2001 NATO had become *the* multinational force generator and commander and the place where free peoples discuss their security and defence in a complex world.

Adapting again: what are the key current challenges NATO faces?

Today NATO is adapting again. The Alliance has taken some important steps towards adapting NATO to meet future threats with the modernising of Article 5 collective defence perhaps the key adaptation. There is now a direction of strategic travel that was first established at the September 2014 NATO Wales Summit, not least because of growing tensions with Russia following the March 2014 seizure of Crimea by Moscow and Russian incursions into eastern Ukraine. The 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit reinforced the political and strategic momentum generated by Wales and, in spite of controversies, the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit continued to see progress.

The Enhanced Forward Presence and Tailored Forward Presence in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe were key Allied commitments to reassurance and resilience. The Distinctive Partnership with, and Comprehensive Package of Assistance for, Ukraine was an important commitment in support of Kiev. In addition, in the fight against violent extremism the commitment of Alliance airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) against Islamic State is proof that NATO is seeking to make a 360-degree Alliance a reality, as is the Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan.

The harmonisation of force development, resilience, and strategies to counter hybrid warfare by both NATO and the EU suggest the first meaningful moves towards a genuine and working strategic partnership between the two institutions. This embryonic strategic awakening was also suggested by the Cyber Defense Pledge and the establishment of the Joint Intelligence and Security Division.

Critically, the recent NATO Readiness Initiative, with the so-called "Four Thirties" approach also suggested the Alliance is beginning to get to grips with the force levels and structures credible 21st century deterrence demands by enabling rapid reinforcement of forward deployed forces in an emergency. The proposed force is a kind of beefed-up version of the old Allied Command Europe Mobile Force which was disbanded in 2002

(due to British defence cuts) and had acted as a strategic mobile reserve able to move quickly to any hot-spot. It is vital that NATO forces are held at sufficient readiness in sufficient mass to plug the dangerous extant gap between spearhead forces, follow-on forces (NATO Response Force), and the bulk of the NATO force structure much of which would take up to 120 days to mobilise in an emergency.

What makes NATO's current adaptation so pressing is that it takes place against the backdrop of American over-stretch and an aggressively assertive Russia. And, not unlike the Alliance during the Korean War, Washington is again being forced to consider the strategic implications of the rise of China. The European Allies need to understand that and fast for 21st century burden-sharing will require them to do far more for their own defence than hitherto. A far greater European effort will be needed if the Americans are to maintain their security guarantee to Europe through the Alliance. How best to organise that effort – within or beyond the Alliance – will be the most political of all the questions the Allies will face, particularly with the still militarily-capable British leaving the EU.

Future adaption: what are the most likely evolutions of the Alliance looking forward?

The complexity of NATO's future adaptation challenge must not be under-estimated. The modernisation of Russia's armed forces is part of a new form of complex strategic coercion that employs systematic pressure across 5Ds of disinformation, destabilisation, disruption, deception and implied destruction. Moscow's enduring aim is to use the implicit threat of force to keep the Western allies permanently strategically, politically and militarily off-balance and the threat of overwhelming force as a form of strategic extortion racket focused on those at the margins of the Alliance. As a consequence, future adaptation and the Alliance concept of deterrence and defence will require an entirely new and innovative concept of protection and projection.

The nature of future war must also be seen within the context of the emerging complex strategic coercion that Russia is pioneering. Technology-led cross-domain warfare will see the battlespace become an integrated air, sea, land, space, cyber, information (including electronic warfare) and knowledge super-domain for the conduct of operations. Faced with such threats transatlantic political cohesion and Alliance military interoperability will be vital. The Alliance and its member states must be in the vanguard of the Revolution in Military Technology that is now underway. Artificial intelligence, quantum computing and machine-learning, nano-technologies, drone and other semi or fully autonomous delivery systems are now appearing in a battlespace that stretches from the depths of the oceans

to outer-space, across all landmasses, and within and between changing societies and communities.

Adapting NATO to meet the strategic challenges of the twenty-first century must thus be the priority for "NATO@70". If not, there is a very real danger the Alliance will lack the nimbleness to meet strategic change and technological developments, and ultimately fail as a consequence. There is also a danger that Alliance cohesion will progressively fade if such ambitions are not properly enunciated through a new Strategic Concept that enshrines at its heart a new form of flexible response. Above all, European words must be matched by European deeds through further organisational and internal reform to enable a properly agile and modernised Alliance that would give meaning to the 360-degree approach and enable the Allies to strike a balance between technology, capability and affordability.

Still adapting after all these years

In December 1967 former Belgian Prime Minister Pierre Harmel delivered his seminal report to the North Atlantic Council on the *Future Tasks of the Alliance*. The report called for a new politico-military foundation to be established based on the equitable sharing of risk and cost, and the pursuit of a two-track strategy based on preservation of defence and deterrence on the one hand, and dialogue with Moscow on the other.[3] Harmel also re-affirmed that NATO is, and will always be, a defensive alliance. However, any such defence must be sound, credible, well-resourced and proportionate to the threats the Alliance faces. To meet that challenge NATO must be prepared militarily, fit and demonstrably able to act across the seven domains of 21st century conflict: air, sea, land, cyber, space, information and knowledge.

Back in 1952 the first NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay stated that "I am convinced that the present solution [NATO] is only a partial one, aimed at guarding the heart. It must grow until the whole free world gets under one umbrella".[4]

This was far more than a comment on NATO's membership. It was a call to arms to ensure the Alliance never stands still and that it constantly and continuously adapts to meet the challenges of the age. As the West ceases to be a place and becomes ever more a world idea of freedom in a hyper-competitive world the need for a truly strategic NATO has never been greater. So, what has NATO achieved? It has not only stood the test of time, it made that time what it was and what, for all those who believe in the defence of freedom, it needed to be. Happy Birthday, NATO!

3 See "The GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Report", 2017.

4 See R. Smith, *The NATO International Staff/ Secretariat 1952-1957*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967.

4

NATO is doing fine, but the Atlantic Alliance is in trouble

Bruno Tertrais *

Twenty years ago, as the Atlantic Alliance was getting ready to celebrate its 50th anniversary, this author published a piece entitled "Will NATO still exist in 2009?".[1] It argued that NATO's lost sense of mission after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, disagreements over peacekeeping, and a growing US disinterest for Europe legitimately raised the question of the Alliance's ability to survive ten years from then.

Today NATO's Article 5 missions are once again taking center stage and the relevance of the Alliance is hardly questioned. But questions are still being raised about its political solidity. Is it more legitimate today to wonder about NATO's existence ten years from now than it was in 1999? To a point, no. There is no longer a significant debate about NATO's relevance. However, there are severe tensions in the transatlantic relation, which Russia's aggressiveness is unlikely to dampen. NATO has remarkably adapted and has even been rejuvenated: but the Atlantic Alliance remains in trouble. And this, in turn, could have consequences on NATO's ability to deter and act.

Did NATO win the Cold War?

The Alliance's ability to survive and thrive for seven decades is in itself a remarkable achievement. No country has ever withdrawn from it, and only two members, France (between 1967 and 2009) and Greece (between 1974 and 1980) temporarily left the integrated military structure. Quite the contrary: its membership has grown from twelve at the end of the Cold War to 29 today (soon 30), including six former Warsaw Pact members and three former Soviet republics. One key reason for this exceptionally enduring nature of NATO is probably the fact that, contrary to what has been the case for most military

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1 B. Tertrais, "L'OTAN existera-t-elle encore en 2009?", *La Revue internationale et stratégique*, No.32, Winter 1998, pp.121-129.

alliances in history, its members are liberal democracies and not rivals for hegemony.

Did NATO prevent World War Three? One will never know. There is little if any evidence that the Warsaw Pact actively sought to enlarge its territory to the West. And it is possible that the mere possession of nuclear weapons was enough to induce a sense of caution about the risks of direct military aggression. That may have been true in a more general way: NATO's unity and solidarity despite internal crises may have contributed to the relative absence of risk-taking by Moscow when it came to the face-off with the West. It is impossible to know for sure.

Another trickier question – also involving counterfactuals – is whether NATO "won the Cold War". If the question pertains to the political and ideological competition between two worldviews, the answer is clear. But did NATO's existence and policies help achieve the dismantlement of the Eastern bloc and the collapse of the Soviet Union; and, if so, to what extent? The answer is not self-evident. The arms competition was mostly US-, not NATO-driven. The Afghan resistance and the fall of oil prices in the 1980s – which dramatically hurt the Soviet Union – were US-Saudi enterprises, not Alliance ones. The power of liberal ideas and human rights, which did so much to inspire resistance and demand for reform in the Soviet bloc, did not have much to do with the Alliance's defense strategy: the Helsinki human rights charter was probably more important than the Washington Treaty. And Germany's *Ostpolitik* may have done as much to ensure the *status quo* in Europe – and lay the groundwork for unification – as NATO nuclear weapons did.

A clearer success of NATO may be European integration. Again, counterfactuals are never easy or immune to critique, but it is hard to imagine that twelve Western European countries (the number of European Community (EC) members by the end of the Cold War) would have been able to manage such a successful enterprise without a sense of being sheltered from external aggression and participating in a common defense system (which was the case at the time for all EC members except Ireland).

Another success of NATO is to have avoided, after the Second World War, the "renationalization" of defense policies. By creating a sense of military community – through standardization, combined commands, common planning, exercises, etc. – NATO reduced the risks of nationalist defense policies (something that, incidentally, was appreciated by the Soviets regarding Germany). It probably played some passive role in ensuring that Greece and Turkey never went to open war – hence playing the role of a *de facto* collective security organization beyond its collective defense role. It also provided an anchor for the US presence in Europe, while ensuring to the US Congress that Washington's freedom of action and leadership would be maintained, notably though the dual-hatting of US

commanders and the tradition of assigning the role of SACEUR to an American officer.

To be sure, the mere existence of the organization created a classic dilemma: the Alliance is only as good as the sum of its parts, but belonging to a collective defense organization can reduce the incentive for military spending. When France left the integrated military structure in 1967, its national defense expenditure went up; but could NATO have been as efficient a military organization – including for deterrence purposes – if it had then been made up of sixteen different "Frances", i.e. without any kind of defense integration?

The false narrative of enlargement

Nevertheless, NATO's role as a common anchor for defense policies played an important role once again after the end of the Cold War – by ensuring that newly united Germany stayed firmly in the Western family – and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact – by welcoming some of its former members and reassuring them against the possible resurgence of a Russian threat.

There is controversy about NATO's enlargement to the East. It has been suggested that the Alliance thereby "provoked" Russia and reneged on a promise made by Western leaders. There never was such promise, and this narrative is at best a misunderstanding, at worst a rewriting of history.

In 1990, the United States and Germany assured Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO forces would not be stationed in the Eastern Länder after unification – a commitment that was enshrined in the "Four plus Two" treaty and respected. At that time, several Western leaders did declare that they would not seek Eastern European countries to join the Alliance, or that they did not think it could happen. But at that time the Warsaw Pact still existed, and none of its members had declared their interest in joining. And, most importantly, no solemn NATO promise was ever made to "not enlarge to the East".

On the contrary, one should credit the Alliance with having gone to some lengths to reassure Russia when NATO enlargement became a subject of discussion after 1993, hence disarming the "provocation" argument. In 1996, NATO stated that it had "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.[2] In 1997, it stated that it had no reason to seek the "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces".[3] A few days later, at the March 1997 Helsinki summit, Russian president Boris Yeltsin asked his US counterpart Bill Clinton to refuse any admission of a former

2 Final Communiqué issued at the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Brussels, 10 December 1996, para. 21.

3 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, 14 March 1997, PR(97)27.

Soviet Republic to the Alliance. Clinton declined. President Yeltsin later recognized that he "failed" to persuade him, and did not seem to make it a cause for crisis.[4]

No record of NATO's achievements would be complete without noting its important role for peace support operations. The Alliance's military integration provided a toolbox for coalition operations in the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, in Central Asia (Afghanistan) and in Northern Africa (Libya). Whether one agrees or not that these operations were warranted or beneficial, and even when taking into account the numerous caveats that many countries included in their rules of engagement, it is clear that NATO provided an immediately available set of structures and procedures that made common operations much more rapid and cost-effective than would have been the case if such *ad hoc* coalitions had to be set up from scratch.

Contemporary challenges and scenarios for the future

The Atlantic Alliance was based on a combination of common values and interests. The former were, to a large extent, subordinate to the latter. Greece, Portugal and Turkey remained members when they were military dictatorships. And the defense of democratic values was never the sole reason behind the US engagement in Europe: a major war in Europe would have dramatically affected US interests and prosperity; and America has always benefitted from NATO for its defense industry, as well as for intelligence collection, or detection and warning.

What is troubling in today's context is that both the commonality of values *and* the commonality of interests are being questioned. Many Europeans do not see what they have in common with Donald Trump's America, or with Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Turkey. Several Alliance members are receptive to Russia's policies and open to its influence. The persistent nature of the terrorist threat and the resurgence of Russia's aggressiveness have created a divergence in priorities within the North Atlantic Council, hidden behind the fig-leaf concept of "360-degree defense".

Moreover, and even though predictions about enlargement making consensus more difficult have never really materialized, the number of Alliance members is now 2.5 times greater than in 1949, with most of those who joined since 1991 bringing relatively small contributions to the common defense effort (Poland being a notable exception), and it is hard to claim that this makes NATO more efficient as a military organization.

This lack of unity matters for deterrence. Russia could bank on the fact that NATO

4 See R. D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's door: how the Alliance remade itself for a new era*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2004, pp.202-204.

would be unable to trigger Article 5 in times of crisis. And it is true that if faced with a very limited Russian armed attack, the precedent of 9/11 might not apply: it could be more difficult to achieve unity in the North Atlantic Council than for supporting the United States in its defense against terrorism when knowing that declaring Article 5 could lead the Alliance to full-scale war with Moscow; some member countries might try to "give a chance to diplomacy" and prevent consensus.

There are, however, more reassuring aspects of NATO's current evolution. NATO has made it clear in 2014 that some cyber-attacks could be categorized as "armed attacks", thus making it possible to trigger Article 5 in such contingencies.

Recent common decisions have improved readiness and deterrence, through enhanced presence in the East and large-scale exercises. While the Alliance's military posture to defend Europe is still unsatisfying – notably from the point of view of the speed of reinforcements through the continent – the NATO Readiness Initiative adopted in 2018 will help going beyond a "trip-wire" at Russia's border.

NATO in 2029

A commonly-held view is that "on the eve of its 70th anniversary NATO finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having to contend with both external and internal challenges".[5] This is true but, as such, could easily have been written in, say, 1958, 1978, or 1998. As David Yost, a leading US security expert, has written, "to assume that NATO was more united during the Cold War than it has been since would not be true to the historical record".[6] External challenges will always be there, and internal ones are normal in alliances of liberal democracies – a feature that, precisely, account in part for the enduring nature of NATO.

Questions about the enduring nature of the US commitment to NATO often fail to see the bigger picture: the reinforcement of the US military presence in Europe since Crimea; the importance for US defense markets of allies which often "buy American" as much (if not more) for political reasons as military ones; and the remarkable continued support for NATO by the US Congress and public opinion. Indeed, the proportion of Americans who believe the United States should maintain or increase its commitment to the Alliance has grown since the end of the Cold War, and this result has not been affected by Trump's policies.[7]

5 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic survey 2018: the annual assessment of geopolitics*, London, Nov. 2018, p. 311.

6 D.S. Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, Washington, DC, USIP Press, 2014, p. 23.

7 *America Engaged*, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2 October 2018.

So the likely scenario for 2029 is that NATO will still exist. It may have been further enlarged to Nordic or Balkan countries – and perhaps even to Georgia and/or Ukraine, though there will unlikely be a consensus for admitting these countries as long as they are in open conflict with Moscow. NATO will also contribute, to some degree, to counter-terrorism and stabilization missions in the Middle East and North Africa – in particular in case of a 9/11-type event in Europe that could be traced to an entity in the region – but, as long as Russia will remain a significant potential threat to Europe, deterrence of Moscow is likely to remain dominant.

Still, uncertainties about what the future holds for NATO may be more significant than they were in 1999. When he was in office, James Mattis was able to patiently persuade President Trump to moderate his stance on NATO. He once reportedly told him: "If you did not have NATO you would have to invent it. (...) There's no way Russia could win a war if they took on NATO".[8] This is all true, but the Russian threat acts less as a factor of cohesion than the Soviet one did – because it is less severe, but also because it is often less pervasive.

And accidents could happen. The White House could suddenly order a change in its military or nuclear posture on the continent for reasons that have nothing to do with security. Disagreements on trade issues, for instance, or on Western strategies in the Middle East, could lead to a severe degradation of transatlantic relations with an indirect impact on NATO. A conflict with Iran or a serious crisis in East Asia (China, North Korea) could lead to severe disagreements on what the United States expects from its allies.

The question of NATO's attitude if there ever was a US-China (or North Korea) conflict is also posed. Article 5 could not be triggered if the United States was the victim of an "armed attack" in such a conflict – except in the event of an escalation in the area described in Article 6 ("Europe and North America"). But some NATO members could be willing to support the United States militarily, or the Alliance itself could feel compelled to declare its political support for Washington – which, in turn, could involve NATO, whether it likes it or not.

Another possible effect for NATO of a major Asia contingency, especially if it was durable, could be a request by Washington to Europeans to the effect of dramatically and quickly speeding up their own capabilities and deployments for the defense of Europe or the stability of the Middle East to replace, at least temporarily, US assets. It is true that "Should tensions between the United States and China continue to rise, the European NATO members (…) must be strong enough to ensure that they can credibly deter Russia

8 Quoted in B. Woodward, *Fear. Trump in the White House*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2018, p. 78.

from seeing America's preoccupation with Asia as an irresistible opportunity to press its geostrategic advantage in Europe".[9]

Other crises may trouble the Alliance. Turkey, the perennial anchor of NATO in South-Eastern Europe, could make sudden and dramatic decisions regarding its cooperation with the United States or the rest of the Alliance. And Moscow could manage to influence the political culture and decision-making of a European ally to the point of paralyzing consensus at the NAC.

To sum up, while NATO is solid, the challenges it faces are serious and could have an important impact on the organization's ability to function normally, in particular to ensure deterrence of Russia. NATO is doing fine for now – but the Atlantic Alliance remains in trouble.

9 A. Michta, "Shoring up NATO is in Europe's own interest", *The American Interest*, 28 Dec. 2018.

5

70 years of NATO: the strength of the past, looking into the future

Kori Schake, with Erica Pepe *

Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, famously said the purpose of the Alliance was "to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down".[1] Across its seventy years, NATO has succeeded at the first two, and gloriously failed at the third, instead rehabilitating Germany as an anchor of liberal values and a major military power webbed closely into cooperation with like-minded countries.

As we are currently experiencing, all three of those elements are hard-won successes, and have to be won over and over. That is not a failing or a danger, it is the simple fact of reaching and sustaining agreement among sovereign states, facing grave and changing threats across time. As the American poet Walt Whitman wrote, "must not Nature be persuaded many times?"[2]

That NATO has proven so malleable as circumstances change is a great tribute to the statesmen and soldiers who have stood its helm across the 70 years. It is also a frank acknowledgement that the NATO Allies believe we continue to need each other's help to make our countries secure.

The Russians out

For the United States, the Soviet threat of conquest was always the animating purpose for NATO, organizing Europe was always the mean of achieving that goal. The Soviet intention to both subjugate and penalize the territories it wrested from Nazi Germany in World War II was clear enough, in August of 1945 that Harry Truman weighted the signal

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1 D. Reynolds (ed.), "Introduction", in *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*, Yale University, 1994, p. 13, citing P. Hennessy, *Whitehall*, London, 1989, p.412.

2 W. Whitman, *Starting from Paumanok* in *Leaves of Grass*, New York University Press, 1980, p.287.

it would send the Soviets in his decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Soviet domination of Eastern Europe then cast a long shadow into Western Europe, and even across the Atlantic. If there had been no threat of Soviet aggression, there would have been no NATO. If the Soviets had not been seen as an insidious threat to free societies, the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine would never have been developed. If the Soviet military threat were not judged existential, NATO would not have created an integrated military command structure, and built the Federal Republic of Germany's Bundeswehr. If Soviet expansion to NATO's south had not alarmed Allies, NATO would not have admitted Greece and Turkey in the early 1950s. If the quantity of Soviet conventional forces were not so overwhelming, NATO would not have embraced nuclear deterrence or developed innovative military technologies that enabled operational concepts like the 1980s' follow-on-forces attack. If the Soviet "peace policy" of the mid-1950s were not so tempting to Western publics, NATO would not have gotten into the arms control business. If Russia had not taken that aggressive path in Ukraine in recent years, NATO would not have expanded to include new members, built new competencies like the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, or deployed forces onto the territory of Poland and the Baltic States (as per decision at the Warsaw NATO Summit, 8-9 July 2016).

Russia under Vladimir Putin has tried to characterize NATO as a threat; that is only conceivable in the context of a Russia that seeks weak, fractured, intimidated countries on its borders. What NATO offered Russia at the end of the Cold War was inclusion on equal terms into the European order, provided that Russia respected the independence of sovereign states to choose their relationships. Russia's desire to dictate the terms of other countries' allegiances is what collapsed hopes for a different relationship between NATO and Russia.

Russia now seeks to subvert the power of the West, using the openness of NATO Allies as weapons against their domestic vibrancy and Allied solidarity. This poses an enormous challenge for the countries of the Alliance. The surprise is not that Russia is seeking to undermine Alliance cohesion, or that Allies have to be rallied to common purpose, but that Alliance solidarity is so durable in the face of Russian subterfuge.

The Americans in

When the Truman Administration entered into negotiations with Canada, Britain, France and the other Brussels Treaty signatories[3] about an alliance to stabilize post-war Europe, it was reluctant to contemplate an extensive US military involvement in the protection of Europe.[4] The Washington Treaty establishing NATO not only limited the geographic scope of the Alliance, but also left generous ambiguity about what states were actually committed to in the event of an attack. The Organization's Article 6 circumscribes the Treaty area to Europe and North America, excluding most of the then-colonial holdings of Britain and France, which the US feared being dragged into protecting. So it is a heavy irony that the United States has been the motive force in pulling NATO "out of area". NATO's Article 5 reads that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all" but requires member states only to take action "as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force".

The liberal international order, that the US and its Allies created from the ashes of World War II, was less a design of grand strategy than a grudging, step by step experimentation with the minimum it would take to cement cooperation adequate to prevent Soviet domination of Europe. Initially, the US hoped the Treaty would suffice. Alarm at the cataclysm of the Korean War convinced the Allies that political coordination needed to be undergirded by military preparations, and so an integrated military command, the Allied Command Europe and its headquarters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), was added onto the Alliance in 1951.

Military integration was acknowledged impossible without American participation, given the still destitute state of most European allies. When General Dwight Eisenhower testified to Congress in favour of stationing US troops in Europe, on 1-2 February 1951, he advocated it for a limited time, just until European nations regained their strength and could field sufficiently powerful military forces to counter the Soviet threat.[5]

The cost in American lives defending Europe against the Soviet threat was a constant source of friction throughout the Cold War, revealed most clearly in debates about nuclear strategy. Since the first NATO strategy document of December 1949,[6] Allies have put emphasis on pursuing the maximum efficiency with the minimum necessary expenditures

3 The Brussels Treaty was signed in March 1948 by Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

4 S. R. Sloan, *NATO's future toward a new Transatlantic bargain*, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1985, p.5.

5 The US Congress approved the deployment of troops with the resolutions S/Res.99 and S/Con/Res.18 in April 1951.

6 Note by the Secretary to the North Atlantic Defense Committee on the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, DC 6/1, 1 December 1949.

of manpower, money and materials. In order to gain greater effectiveness from a limited military budget, the Eisenhower Administration shifted principal reliance onto nuclear weapons, something Europeans accepted only as the alternative to American abandonment.

American desire to reduce the costs of securing Europe led the "new look" policy of utilizing tactical nuclear weapons to substitute for conventional forces. The new approach was integrated into the NATO strategic document MC 48, of November 1954, which explicitly stated that the superiority in atomic weapons had become the most important factor in a major war; an idea successively reinforced by the Overall Strategic Concept MC 14/2, of May 1957, which placed heavy emphasis upon the use of nuclear weapons. Fear of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union once they had intercontinental delivery systems, with the launch of Sputnik, in November 1957, led the US to push a strategy of "flexible response" that raised the threshold of nuclear use. Europeans fretted about American efforts to shift the burden of fighting the Soviet Union onto European forces and territory.

Only in January 1968, the Alliance reached consensus for the approval of a new Strategic Concept (MC 14/3), introducing a more flexible nuclear strategy and the notion of escalation, which precipitated France's withdrawal from the military command and remains in effect.

In fact, burden-sharing has been as central to NATO as has the first Soviet, then, Russian threat. The Mansfield Amendments of the early 1970s, which called for a 50 percent reduction in the number of US troops deployed in Europe, assuming that Allies should have made more efforts to assume the burden of their own defence, conveyed American exasperation that NATO Allies did not judge the Vietnam war as a war for Western values. That exasperation has only increased as America's European Allies grew more prosperous – President Trump may be ruder and more transactional than his predecessors, but they shared his view that Europe had shifted a disproportionate burden of its own defence onto American shoulders.

As IISS data shows, the US spends USD35 billion of its USD643 billion defence budget directly on European defence, more than the total defence spending of any NATO country other than Britain, France, and Germany (see graph on next page). In order to reach the target of 2 percent of GDP, European allies would need to find an extra USD102 billion on top of their current defence spending.[7] As the former US Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, plaintively put it at the NATO Defence Ministerial meeting in February 2017, "Americans cannot care more for your children's future security than you do".

7 *The Military Balance 2019*, IISS, London, 2019, p.5.



Source: IISS, London

The Germans down

Catherine Kelleher, the author of *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* has said that in 1945, "it wasn't clear who Germany's friends were; but if you picked your friends, it became clear who your enemies were". By 1949, with Soviet pressure on Four Power rights in Berlin contrasting with more liberal policies by the Western occupying powers in Germany, the part of Germany that got to choose tacked West. Extravagant efforts by the West, and particularly Americans, to sustain Berlin through the 1948-1949 Soviet blockade rewarded the westward orientation of Germans in the zones of occupation.

It did not cement West Germany or other European states wracked by wartime devastation in the West, however. One of NATO's central challenges has always been how to keep West Germany voluntarily allied with the West, rather than becoming neutral.

What a unified Germany has become is the moral centre of gravity of the NATO Alliance. It is Germany that thinks most carefully about the ethical challenges. It is Germany whose participation in military operations provides the broadest validation for other Western powers. It is Germany who challenges the fear of free societies about terrorism emanating from migrants. It is Germany who, alongside the other NATO Allies, invoked Article 5 for the first time in 2001 when the United States was attacked. And it is Germany who tentatively committed troops to the mission in Afghanistan and have stood alongside the US and other NATO Allies there for nearly two decades. Surely it is the greatest achievement of the NATO Alliance that a reformed Germany has become the ethical bellwether of Europe where using military force is concerned.

Current and future challenges

Another part of NATO's genius has been sincerely committing to contradictory principles. The apogee of this impressive quality was the *Harmel Report* of 1967, which cemented Alliance commitment to nuclear weapons as their ultimate protection while also advocating their elimination. The so-called "dual-track" decision of deterrence and *détente* allowed NATO to build its military strength while sustaining both allied cohesion and popular support. It is the model for how free societies band together and manage disagreements. NATO nuclear deterrence, a core element of the Alliance collective defence since the foundation, changed over the years but continued to play a critical role in NATO's defence posture even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as shown in the three post-Cold War Alliance's Strategic Concepts in 1991, 1999, and 2010.

Our challenge has always been how to create and sustain cohesion of the West. It was the hardest part of NATO's work, and it remains so.

Our current problems – Russia developing tools to undercut democracy in Western states, a rising China surreptitiously buying in to European infrastructure for intelligence purposes, the US recklessly challenging the liberal order, populism within our own countries because of rapid technological innovation and economic dislocation, terrorism, brutality in adjacent areas that create migrancy, are unquestionably daunting. But we should not lose sight that they are easier than the challenges NATO's founders and our predecessors faced. We ought not talk ourselves into believing protecting our societies is too burdensome.

We also ought not to talk ourselves into believing the middle powers of the NATO

Alliance – that is, all but the United States – are too enfeebled to protect and advance our common interests. Especially at a time when the United States is consumed with domestic debates, relying on the Congress rather than the President to champion the cause of free peoples, NATO's Canadian and European Allies have the ability and the interest in sustaining the liberal international order, which NATO has been such an important part of creating.

Most NATO statesmen of the past seventy years would gladly trade their problems for ours. The 1950s leaders of the Alliance had to confront a Soviet threat they feared losing a war against in a series of crisis confrontations. The 1970s Allies had to navigate a United States impeaching its President, destroying the Bretton Woods financial arrangements, and losing the Vietnam War while having race riots in its military ranks. The 1980s leaders of Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy had to convince their publics to accept deployment and potential use of nuclear missiles. The 1990s leaders had to manage a declining Russia, the Balkan wars, and demands for inclusion by deserving democratic states newly liberated from Soviet dominion. The 2000s leaders had the problems of terrorism and a disgruntled Russia seeking to destabilize our democracies.

NATO has never been easy. It has just always been a better solution than any of us could find outside the Alliance. As Scott Fitzgerald writes concluding *The Great Gatsby*, "So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past". Know, though, at this 70th anniversary of the Alliance, that NATO's founders would be both surprised and proud to see how well the loose coalition of frightened and like-minded states persevered in the face of danger.

6

NATO at 70: enter the technological age

Tomáš Valášek *

As NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary, it has returned nearly all the way to its original deterrence and defence roots. While it remains in the business of collective security and crisis management, for the past five years – since Russia's aggression against Ukraine – Article 5 tasks have come to dominate the agenda of the commanders, planners and policy makers.

As for the years ahead, the challenges come in three forms. The first is to finish the transition to common defence. 2019 is not 1949; the nature of the technologies that determine winners and losers has changed. And while NATO has adapted admirably in many ways, it has work left to do, particularly in addressing cyber vulnerabilities.

The second challenge is also related to technologies, and it is to start preparing for the next generation of partly or fully automated warfare, which will make use of artificial intelligence (AI). The research and development is well under way, on the part of the Allies as well as potential adversaries. A lot less thinking is taking place with regard to how defence politics – the way Allies agree on plans and guide operations – will be affected. That is a mistake. The changes which automation will bring to NATO deliberations will be no less dramatic than those which will happen on the battlefield.

The third challenge is more immediate and political in nature: it is to keep the Alliance unified in the face of unprecedented soul-searching on the part of the biggest Ally, the United States. And while by virtue of its size and dominance Washington tends to be self-referential, reactions from the rest of NATO member states do make a difference, both positive and negative. Their track record over the past two years has been mixed.

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Cyber challenges

The critical systems that make it possible for people to travel safely by air and train; run nuclear and hydroelectric plants and electricity grids; and manage modern hospitals are all increasingly automated and networked. This has led to great savings but has also introduced new risks. What is automated and networked can also be attacked and abused. Instead of using bombs and missiles, malicious actors can now in theory inflict consequential damage using little more than complicated codes and computers.

The argument is not that cyber attacks cause greater damage than military strikes; it is that they offer a relatively uncomplicated tool of coercion. The adversaries' goal would not be to decimate populations, but rather to divide NATO. Militarily, even the strongest adversaries such as Russia would struggle to prevail against the combined forces of the 29. So they will seek to bring that number down by putting pressure on governments of NATO member states not to come to each other's aid. By cyber attacking our critical networks in times of confrontation, they will seek to force the capitals into an impossible choice: do they abandon their NATO Allies, or do they expose their own populations to misery?

NATO member states are already responding to the challenge by developing the means to strike back at the attacker (thus deterring challengers from attempting mischief in the first place). The Alliance has also recognized that cyber attacks can constitute an Article 5 situation, and is building a new Cyber Operations Centre that will defend allied military networks. But it remains vulnerable against attacks on civilian networks governing critical infrastructure. While public and private utilities have taken steps to increase their capacity to resist cyber attacks, the effects of these remedial measures to date have been mixed. More needs to be done, as signatories to the 2018 Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace recognized.[1]

Frustratingly for NATO, whose deterrence ability depends on getting cyber security right, the responses mostly lie at the national level (such as making cyber hygiene – the basics of cyber security – a mandatory part of curricula, starting with young children) and in the European Union (EU), which has the power to pass binding legislation on the subject. The good news is that the EU is on the task; its 2016 directive obligated member states to better secure the networks governing their energy, water, transport, finance, and health systems.[2] States must have national emergency response teams, hold cyber exercises, and supervise the protection of critical sectors. This has led to improvements, but serious breaches continue to occur, such as the WannaCry cyber attack that crippled the United

1 See "Cybersecurity: Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace", Paris, 12 November 2018.

2 European Parliament, "The Directive on security of network and information systems", 6 July 2016.

Kingdom's national health care system in May 2017.

More needs to be done. Many producers of information and communication technologies (ICT) equipment, particularly for households, continue to treat security as an afterthought or unnecessary expense. Naivety about digital risks is common. The incentives are also misaligned: protection costs money, while risks to the infrastructure are not easily quantified. This needs to change: security has to be part of the products' design. Voluntary standards alone will not bring about change. Mandatory standards and criminal penalties would be needed. In the interim, a mandatory labelling policy indicating how secure ICT equipment is (similar to energy efficiency labels on light bulbs or washing machines) would steer consumers toward buying safer equipment.

Again, the power to impose changes listed above will mostly lie with national governments and – for most of the NATO Allies – with the EU. But NATO can help by raising the vulnerabilities to the eye-level of ministers and heads of state, who hold the power to lean on their national administrations and (for 22 out of the 29) to shape EU legislation. The 2016 Cyber Defence Pledge[3] was a good start, but it will take a sustained effort to attract the necessary attention of senior officials. Better integration of realistic cyber scenarios into top-level exercises would also make a difference.

The impact of automation

Cyber security may be the most pressing technological challenge to NATO, but the increasing automation of warfare may present a more consequential, if long-term, change to NATO's way of doing business.

Why, and how? The Alliance has prospered over decades, in part because it had devised ways to make every member state involved. The Allies share responsibility for setting nuclear policy and they fight wars side-by-side. The member states decide on all matters, small or important, by consensus. This is neither the fastest nor the most militarily useful way of doing things. But it fosters a sense of community, which in turn allows NATO member states to weather occasional disagreements and make difficult decisions as one.

The integration of AI into warfare now promises to revolutionize this delicate political construct. Barring a world-wide ban, many conflicts of the future will be fought by swarms of armed drones, guided by adaptable, self-learning algorithms. The absence of a human in decision-making will allow them to fight and make tactical decisions at speeds not previously seen in wars.

3 See "Cyber Defence Pledge", Declaration by Allied Heads of State and Government, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

This revolution in military affairs will have several knock-on effects on how Allies deliberate and decide.

Only about half the Allies are developing the technology – and even fewer will field it initially – which raises the question of how one continues to implement (relatively) fair burden-sharing. Unlike nuclear weapons, the tools of automated warfare will likely be regularly used in warfare. Every time they are, they expose the uneven nature of contributions over and over, potentially eroding solidarity.

It is also unclear what happens to trust among Allies when unforeseen and unintended application of force by AI causes a political backlash. The peculiarity of AI is that the machines learn from experience and adapt their behaviour even as the operation unfolds, in ways that not even the designer can fully anticipate. This raises the possibility of machines "misbehaving". The risks rise further when several such complex systems interact – as will likely be the case for multinational NATO missions. Our adversaries will almost certainly try to fan and exploit popular concern about "killer robots". Allied governments could be slow to deploy the technology for fear of backlash, which potential non-democratic adversaries will not share.

Once the Alliance launches a mission using tools of automated warfare, Allies will also find it difficult to exercise effective political oversight. In automated warfare, engagements happen at speeds that may not allow for step-by-step approval of escalatory steps. The opportunities to meaningfully demand political authorization for potentially sensitive steps shrink greatly. This may require Allies to agree to exercise a far looser political control than they have grown accustomed to.

A number of different strategies can be used to reduce or eliminate the risks above. Allied governments can address concerns about fair burden-sharing by carving out a role in autonomous warfare for nations not possessing the technology, much as they have done in the case of nuclear missions. The latter group of nations could play an important role in testing and verifying the underlying assumptions and algorithms, among other roles.

Allies can also soothe fears of machines "misbehaving" by proactively explaining the risks and the benefits of the underlying technology to their publics and, just as importantly, to one another. States who have made the most technological advances in the field bear special responsibility in this regard. The elimination of the human from part of the decision ladder should not be seen only as cause of concern: people are prone to errors and AI, properly harnessed, could help reduce civilian casualties.

Lastly, Allies can ease concerns about weak political oversight of automated warfare through rigorous simulation. Before giving their approval, member states may in the future

demand to test, via computer simulation at NAC sessions, whether the instructions which their commanders give to the machines accurately reflect the political intent.

Needless to say, this form of political consultation would represent a dramatic change from the way missions are analysed and approved today, and would require considerable preparation and investments. But the bottom line is that the impact of automated warfare on Alliance politics, while poorly understood, need not be destabilizing.

What NATO unity?

For NATO to get to the futures discussed above, it first needs to weather its current political storms.

None looms larger than the question of US commitment to NATO. Previous presidents have entered the office with different feelings about NATO; some regarded it a side-show while America's most pressing defence business lay further afield; others came to the office thinking little of NATO but came to rely on it a great deal to quell armed violence in Europe. All, however, fundamentally believed that the United States can have win-win relations with its allies, wherever they are. And even if the maintenance of those relationships, as seen from Washington, often consumes more effort than the past administrations would have preferred to expend, the returns in the end justified the investments.

Donald Trump is different. He appears to hold a fundamentally zero-sum view of international affairs, in which every dollar and cent invested abroad is a net loss to the United States. This goes against the very heart of the NATO bargain, which presupposes US troops in, and the country's commitment to the defence of, Europe. This is not a new belief discovered on the campaign trail. The president has been expressing similar views consistently since at least the late 1980s, and is therefore unlikely to change his mind.

While the rest of the administration has worked successfully to keep the day-to-day reality of US policy remarkably unaffected in the face of the president's stated preference, the European Allies are worried. The fear is not necessarily that the president would seek a withdrawal from NATO, despite publicized rumblings on this subject, but rather that he would not act if called upon in an Article 5 situation.

Different Allies have been pursuing different policies in response. Some like Poland have sought to fortify the transatlantic link by appealing to the president in the language that he understands and responds to, that of transactional politics. Yet others have launched a quest for a plan B; a European common defence. This is an understandable instinct under the circumstances, but not without risks of its own, which European Allies would be smart to minimize.

A prudent reflection on how to provide autonomously for the defence of Europe should observe three caveats. First, do no harm. Defence autonomy remains a far inferior option militarily to the continued transatlantic link, for reasons well laid out in a European Leadership Network paper.[4] The inquiry into what autonomy might look like must therefore not turn the notion into a self-fulfilling prophecy; it should be conducted discreetly, rather than publicly.

Second, the reflection needs to address the security worries of all European Allies. If it focuses too heavily on the concerns of one group of European Allies, it risks causing a pushback from the rest, with those divisions inevitably spilling into NATO work.

Third, none of this should come at the expense of investing in NATO – whether in the form of nationally-owned capabilities critical for NATO missions, participation in operations, investment in commonly-owned assets or diplomatic efforts. A pullback in those areas risks undermining the arguments and authority of those in Washington who continue to make the case, against current headwinds, that NATO remains important for US security.

This approach may strike some in Europe as too timid. One school of thought on the continent holds that the US is on a long-term path to cut itself loose from its European obligation, and that Trump represents a culmination of, rather than a deviation from, the natural course of things. A shift away from NATO, seen from this perspective, is both inevitable and overdue.

The evidence for this view is thin. While the burden-sharing debate is as old as NATO and will certainly last beyond this administration, the zero-sum attitude to alliances is new, and seemingly at odds with the US Congress and voters. Both Houses voted a number of times with overwhelming margins to express support for NATO. Surveys also shows historically high levels of popular backing for continued engagement in the Alliance and for keeping US forces in Europe.[5]

Conclusion: Eurasia as the other looming challenge

The challenge that Donald Trump poses for European security, as well as the other two risks discussed above, are unique in some regards, but little in their nature suggests the inevitability of failure. NATO bears scars of many disagreements over its 70 years that seemed unbridgeable at the time. It stands to reason that as the West moves into a relatively

4 A. Billon-Galland and A. Thomson, "European Strategic Autonomy: Stop Talking, Start Planning", *European Defense Policy Brief*, European Leadership Network, May 2018.

5 See Pew Research Center, *Global Attitudes Survey*, Spring 2017.

new situation of parity or even inferiority *vis-à-vis* rising Asia, and China in particular, the reasons for tight transatlantic defence collaboration, if anything, multiply.

The security implications to Europe of the shifting balance of power are coming into focus. China is becoming a pivotal player in Europe's southern periphery from where most economic migrants come. It is a *de facto* standard-setter in ICT that is critical to NATO's political and military resilience. It holds the power to help Europe's poorer countries rebuild their infrastructure, but also to lock them into unsustainable debt that could give Beijing the leverage to shape their foreign and security policy.

Dealing with all those challenges will require a unity of purpose and a scale that NATO uniquely provides. That thought ought to provide the clarity and perspective that is needed to overcome the differences of today.

7

Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO's North-Eastern border

Sven Sakkov *

The deteriorating European security context

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of Europe went on a "strategic holiday". The West had won and the future was bright. Even the fact that at its weakest the Russian Federation was still able to create frozen conflicts at its borders did not dent this optimism. Defence spending in Europe was plummeting throughout the 1990s, and all the way to 2014. NATO's prevailing paradigm changed from being a collective defence organisation more to something of a collective security actor, with many main missions and a plethora of partnerships.

After the shock of 9/11, the Alliance focused on counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Military capabilities required to fight a modern near-peer adversary atrophied even further. In this context, some Allies did not take their eyes off Russia – primarily Poland and the Baltic States. Yet they were perceived by major Western Allies as nuisances requiring psychological counselling, as countries who had been traumatised by their harsh history and hence had become incapable of embracing this new reality of partnership with Russia. Even the Russian military aggression against Georgia in 2008 did not change that *Zeitgeist*. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her "reset" button to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov just seven months after Russian tanks rolled into Georgia.

Then the NATO Summit in Lisbon in 2010 endorsed a new Strategic Concept, which declared that "NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia,

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and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia".[1] This concept is still in force. There was no other way for the Russian leadership to interpret it – the West is weak, Russia can attack its neighbours, conquer their territory, and after a couple of months of slightly deteriorated relations with the West everything will go back to normal.

Understanding that the West was weak was further fueled by President Obama's reneging on his own red lines in Syria. The US was in retreat and that created space for Russia's nefarious activities.

Then came 2014, the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea and the start of a still ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine in the Donbass. Lessons the West should have learnt in 2008 now started to sink in. Crimea and Donbass were followed by Russian interference in the Syrian civil war, meddling in US presidential elections, an attempted coup in Montenegro and use of a chemical agent in Salisbury in the UK. There is a rogue state at Europe's doorsteps. And it comes with nuclear weapons.

The challenge faced by Europe seems clear. Alas, many European governments would rather turn their head away. Let's take two examples. According to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO and Russia promised to base their relations on shared commitment to a set of principles like democracy, transparency, political pluralism, rule of law, "respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders".[2] Of those seven sets of principles Russia has violated six, the odd one being about supporting, on a case-by-case basis, UN or OSCE peacekeeping operations.

The second example concerns Germany's insistence on moving forward with the Nordstream 2 gas pipe-line project, despite the vocal opposition of Poland, the Baltic States, the United States and Ukraine. And despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly used energy as a weapon in its foreign policy arsenal.

The European security equation is further complicated by the current US President. While American actions concerning shoring up defence of Europe and deterrence of Russia have been positive during Trump's presidency, the same cannot be said about the declaratory part of deterrence. During the campaign Donald Trump called NATO obsolete, and after his election it took him a while to reaffirm NATO's collective defence clause. At his first NATO Summit in May 2017 he reportedly omitted this part of his

1 "Active Engagement, Modern Defence. Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", NATO, 2010.

2 "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France", NATO, 1997.

prepared speech,[3] and it took him five months to finally commit to Article 5.[4] While there are areas of diplomacy where a degree of ambiguity might be desirable, the collective defence clause of NATO is not among them. In this the President of the United States must be unambiguous. If not, it is the bedrock of allied security that will be eroded.

What is so special about the Baltic States?

NATO has 1,163 km of land border with Russia, 967 of which are borders of Poland and the Baltic States. One should add the 1,268 km of borders between Latvia, Lithuania and Poland on the one side and Russia's ally Belarus on the other. This is the only region besides the far north where NATO and Russia touch each other.

Political relations between the Baltic States and Russia have been patchy to say the least. The Soviet Union occupied and annexed these countries in 1940 and then again in 1944. The latter occupation lasted until 1991, or 1994 if you count the withdrawal of Russian troops. Russian leaders have repeatedly claimed that they have a right and obligation to defend Russians wherever they live.[5] Twenty-seven percent of Latvian residents are ethnic Russian, as are 25 percent of people living in Estonia. This creates a potential pretext for Russia to exploit against the Baltic States.

Militarily, the Baltic States do not have much strategic depth and they are poorly connected to the rest of NATO.

Compared to the Russian Western Military District (WMD), the defence forces of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are puny and only lightly armed. In February 2014, Russia used snap readiness exercise involving 150,000 personnel to cover the start of invading Crimea.[6] Such unexpected military exercises are destabilizing, because there is always a risk that one day a snap exercise could turn into a real operation against one of Russia's neighbours.

Because of the size of Russian troops in the WMD, snap exercises and the nature of decision-making in the Kremlin, Russia enjoys in the Baltic States a considerable time and space advantage over NATO. The Baltic States are militarily weak, while the bulk of NATO forces are far away. And the decision-making process in Russia is fast; in contrast, decision-making in NATO's individual countries take considerably longer while a consensus on

3 S. Glasser, "The 27 words Trump wouldn't say", *Politico*, 6 June 2017.

4 L. Nelson, "Trump publicly commits to NATO mutual-defense provision", *Politico*, 9 June 2017.

5 R. Coalson, "Putin pledges to protect all ethnic Russians anywhere. So, where are they?", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 10 April 2014.

6 J. Norberg, "The use of Russia's military in the Crimean crisis", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 13 March 2014.

steps to be taken needs to be found at the North Atlantic Council. It needs to be spelled out, though, that the collective defence clause of NATO's founding treaty talks about both individual and collective steps to be taken in light of armed attack on an ally. That means the US has taken upon itself a treaty commitment to come to the defence of a NATO ally, regardless of whether the organisation as a whole has come to any decision in that regard.

So-called hybrid threats and hybrid scenarios have been hyped up during the last five years. The situation in and around Crimea was specific – Ukraine had a revolution, president was toppled and fled, Ukrainian armed forces had been hollowed out. The Baltic States are NATO members, hence any plausible hybrid scenario from the Russian side would involve much higher risks. And, having learnt from the Ukrainian experience, the Baltic States will likely escalate their response to a hybrid scenario quickly. The then Estonian Chief of Defence General Riho Terras told the *Financial Times* in May 2014: "If Russian agents or special forces enter Estonian territory you should shoot the first one to appear. (…) you should not allow them to enter", and he continued, "Estonia is a functioning society, we are not like Ukraine (…) but we need to be very well aware of what is happening in Russia and be ready".[7]

What does Putin want?

Starting with Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, it has been evident that the Kremlin aims at overturning the existing security architecture in Europe. In pursuit of that goal, Vladimir Putin's foreign policy has been opportunistic. Whether it was successful provocation towards Georgia in 2008, or chaos after Ukraine's Euromaidan in 2014, or President Obama's unwillingness to be seriously engaged in the Syrian civil war and dithering on the red lines concerning use of chemical weapons by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, Russia has utilized the chances it encountered – or engineered – and has been ruthless in its use of military force when and where necessary.

Should the Baltic States be worried that Russia could try to reconquer them? There is no reason to believe that it would be in the Kremlin's interest to occupy the Baltic States and in that process "acquire" six million additional subjects who would never accept Russian rule and would fight it with every means they have. Nonetheless, we have seen in the past 30 years that Russia does not need to occupy the whole of the territory of an adjacent country to achieve its foreign policy goal of preventing its Western neighbours from slipping to the West. If we consider that Russia is trying to overturn the security architecture of Europe, then the Baltic States might become not an end, but a way to achieve it.

7 S. Jones, "Estonia ready to deal with Russia's 'little green men'", *Financial Times*, 13 May 2015.

Let's consider a scenario where a Russian snap readiness exercise at NATO's border turns real and its forces advance 10 miles into a NATO member's territory. Russia would deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the theatre, put its strategic rocket forces on alert and declare that this occupied piece of territory is ancient Russian land and any military activity against it would be considered as an attack on Russia and responded to with nuclear weapons. Russia has developed a so-called "escalate to de-escalate" doctrine, whereby it attempts to signal its seriousness and de-escalate a military situation by a limited nuclear attack. In this situation the US and NATO would have to choose between a nuclear war and the dissolution of NATO. Should the US and NATO dither, and not respond with force to free a NATO member's territory, the Alliance would be dead. American military alliances across the globe would equally be dead. That would mean a new world order and a new European security architecture, which is exactly what Russia is aiming at.

Russia has been preparing for a potential war against NATO (meaning the US in Russian military thinking) since at least 2008. During the 2009 military exercise Zapad ("West" in Russian), Russia mimicked a nuclear attack on Poland. During the last decade, Russian military exercises have become larger and more sophisticated. Since the dismal performance in Georgia in 2008, Russia has invested heavily in military reform and readiness. Also the required resources have been brought to bear. Michael Kofman estimates[8] that if you add up different parts of Russian expenditures on defence efforts and take into account purchasing power parity (PPP), Russian defence spending is in the range of USD 150 to 180 billion, way higher than the USD 61.4 billion reported by SIPRI.[9] Using PPP does make sense in deciphering Russia's defence spending, because Russia is doing all defence acquisitions internally.

NATO's efforts have paled in comparison. Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the Baltic States is sized to be a tripwire. Considerable efforts have been put into enhancing NATO's high readiness forces and follow-on forces. Yet an outstanding issue is the time and space advantage of Russia over NATO. The Alliance agreed at its 2018 Brussels Summit to the "Four 30s" formula, whereby the aim is to have 30 combat battalions, 30 major naval vessels and 30 squadrons of fighters, all at 30 days' readiness.[10] The problem with this formula is that there is no reason to think that a war between NATO and Russia would last that long, or would not go nuclear, within this one-month timeline. Because Russia is so much weaker economically than NATO, it needs to achieve its goals quickly.

8 M. Kofman, "Russian defense spending is much larger, and more sustainable than it seems", *Defensenews*, 3 May 2019.

9 "World military expenditure grows to $1.8 trillion in 2018", SIPRI, 29 April 2019.

10 "NATO Agrees To 'Four 30s' Plan To Counter Russia", *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*, 6 June 2018.

What needs to be done

Policy options to tackle this situation are not many. First and foremost, much more attention should be paid to deterrence. That means American forces to be forward deployed in the Baltic States. The US is currently deployed, on a continuing basis, in Poland but not in the Baltic States. Since the Russian military is measuring itself against the US, the absence of American troops from Baltic soil is detrimental to NATO's deterrence posture. The best way to remedy that is to identify the most evident capability gaps of existing eFP arrangements in the Baltic States and for the US to fill those gaps. That means supplementing, not supplanting, existing NATO troop deployments.

The second issue to be dealt with are the maritime and air dimensions of NATO's and American presence in and around the Baltic States. An American military presence does not necessarily need to be from the Army.

Third, because of Russia's considerable Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities in the Kaliningrad region, the reinforcement of the Baltic States is going to be challenging. Furthermore, the military mobility of NATO troops in Europe is far from optimal. This is an area where NATO is cooperating with the European Union.

Fourth, as explained before, NATO member states need to work on the readiness levels of their spear-head forces.

Fifth, as deterrence is partly rhetorical, one hopes that President Trump will refrain from further undermining NATO in the future. In the absence of any conviction that he will adhere to this wish, the US should provide more facts on the ground, compensating for the weakness in public messaging.

Sixth, the Baltic States themselves need to increase their defence spending beyond the current level of 2 percent. Lithuania has committed itself to the increase to 2.5 percent by 2030[11] – a distant target, but positive news nevertheless.

Seventh, all other NATO members whose defence investments are below 2 percent should work to achieve this agreed goal as soon as possible. This is the only facet of NATO that President Trump cares about, and if there is insufficient progress towards that goal the US could well disengage from the Alliance. And that would amount to the end of NATO.

Finally, Sweden and Finland need to be further integrated into NATO. Sweden especially is crucial to the defence of the Baltic States and, since it is not going to apply for NATO membership any time soon, a *de facto* integration is the best second option available.

11 A. Syutas, "Lithuania commits to spending 2.5 % of GDP on defence by 2030", *Reuters,* 10 September 2008.

Conclusion

Over the last decade the Russian Federation has demonstrated that it attempts to overturn the European security architecture. The likelihood of a NATO-Russia military conflict is low, yet it should not be ruled out as a possibility. To reduce the risks, NATO's deterrence posture in the Baltic States should be strengthened by the deployment of American forces on Baltic soil. That deployment should complement, not compete with, existing eFP arrangements.

8

The necessary adaptation of NATO's military instrument of power

Jan Broeks *

Since 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of a series of actions taken by Russia: Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; Russia's military posture and provocative military activities, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violations of NATO Allied airspace, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nuclear dimension.

In parallel, growing instability in our southern region, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are challenging our security. These factors can all have long-term consequences for peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe. Yet it is mainly Russian military actions that have brought deterrence and collective defence back to the forefront of NATO's agenda.

Alliance adaptation in perspective

As a consequence of this new environment, the Alliance has started to adapt to ensure that its deterrence and defence posture remains credible, coherent and resilient. Military adaptation is only one of the three distinct lines of effort driving the long-term adaptation of the Alliance, together with political and institutional adaptation. The objective is the development of an Alliance adaptable by design, where the capacity to anticipate and react to change is integral to how we operate. Since 2010, reforms have contributed to an improved effectiveness and efficiency, moving NATO towards greater readiness and responsiveness.

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The three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security – remain extant, as per NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept. However, there has been an adaptation and re-balancing of the weight of effort and activities related to these core tasks to reflect the current security environment and accommodate the interests and views of all 29 member states.

To place the adaptation of NATO's Military Instrument of Power into perspective, one has to go back in history. Back in 1990, the NATO London Summit provided a sense of the positive trends in the security environment. The Summit Declaration stated that "Europe has entered a new, promising era [...] As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally". It then noted that NATO will "field smaller forces", and "scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises". Also, if and when needed NATO would "more heavily rely on the ability to build up larger forces".[1] Accordingly, the Alliance will have to rely on adequate infrastructure to allow for reinforcement if necessary.

Two decades later, these decisions were followed by the 2010 Lisbon Summit Declaration, whereby Allies state that they "want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia".[2] This language was then replicated in the 2010 New Strategic Concept. At the time, the absence of an existential threat allowed NATO to adapt to a changing world and new challenges. From the 1990s to early 2014, NATO's Military Instrument of Power was predominantly used for operations of choice including missions and operations abroad, such as crisis management. Coalitions were established to conduct operations and sovereign nations could decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not to participate. Such operations were not subject to any particular urgency, therefore nations followed their own decision-making procedures and force generated contributions at their own pace.

Continuous military adaptation

Since 2014, the Alliance has implemented the largest reinforcement of its deterrence and defence posturing since the end of the Cold War. NATO tripled the size of the NATO Response Force to 40,000 troops, and created a "spearhead force" within it, known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), ready to move within days. Military exercises have been stepped up and enhanced air policing has been initiated in the Baltic

1 "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance", NATO Summit, London, 5-6 July 1990, para.14.

2 Lisbon Summit Declaration, NATO Summit, Lisbon, 20 November 2010, para.23.

and Black Sea regions. Cyber defence, and defence against missile attacks have also been strengthened.

The Alliance has also reversed the trend of declining defence budgets, in light of growing needs for investment in capabilities and to further a more balanced burden sharing. A more robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens the Alliance's cohesion, including the transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles and responsibilities. NATO must also continue to adapt its strategy in line with security trends to ensure that its overall deterrence and defence posture is capable of addressing potential adversaries' doctrine and capabilities.

To respond to the changes in the security environment on NATO's borders and further afield, the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) was approved at the 2014 Wales Summit. It provides a comprehensive package of measures addressing both the continuing need for assurance of Allies and the adaptation of the Alliance's military strategic posture.

Measures adopted deal with:

- an Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF);
- the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF);
- the establishment of eight multinational NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) on the territory of Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance;
- as part of the NATO Force Structure, making the Headquarters of a Multinational Corps Northeast in Poland fully operational, and establishing the Headquarters of a Multinational Division Southeast in Romania to take command of the NATO Force Integration Units and to provide flexible command and control options in their regions;
- the enhancement of NATO Standing Naval Forces with additional capabilities;
- delivering a more ambitious exercise programme;
- enhancing advance planning and enabling accelerated decision-making to ensure both military and political responsiveness;
- a strategy on NATO's role in Countering Hybrid Warfare, implemented in coordination with the European Union;
- the establishment of a framework for NATO's adaptation in response to growing challenges and threats from the south ("Framework for the South").

The assurance measures include continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis.

They provide the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable to respond to the evolving security situation. In addition, tailored assurance measures for Turkey reflects the growing security challenges from the south and contribute to the security of the Alliance as a whole.

Building on the Readiness Action Plan, at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance adopted a broad approach to deterrence and defence, drawing upon all of the tools at NATO's disposal. One of the key decisions was the establishment of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland aimed at demonstrating, as part of the overall posture, Allies' solidarity, determination, and ability to act by triggering an immediate Allied response to any aggression.

In parallel, the development of a tailored Forward Presence (tFP) in the southeast region of the Alliance included appropriate measures, tailored to the Black Sea region. This reflected the Romanian initiative to establish a multinational framework brigade to help improve integrated training of Allied units under Headquarters Multinational Division Southeast. A number of air and maritime measures have been undertaken in the Black Sea region to enhance NATO's presence and maritime activity.

Then, at the 2018 Brussels Summit, taking on the RAP and related measures as the strategic background, Allies launched a NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI) to ensure that more high-quality, combat-capable national forces at high readiness can be made available to NATO. From within the overall pool of forces, Allies will offer an additional 30 major naval combat vessels, 30 heavy or medium maneuver battalions, and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days' readiness or less. The NRI will further enhance the Alliance's rapid response capability, either for reinforcement of Allies in support of deterrence or collective defence, including for high-intensity warfighting, or for rapid military crisis intervention, if required. These measures will also promote the importance of effective combined arms and joint operations.

Towards Responsiveness, Readiness and Reinforcement

Since the Warsaw Summit in 2016, a number of steps have been taken to support the deployment and sustainment of Allied forces and their equipment into, from, and within the entire Alliance territory. To that end, the implementation of the Enablement Plan for SACEUR's Area of Responsibility (AOR) received the highest priority. Responsiveness, Readiness and Reinforcement are the strategic imperatives for the work on the implementation of the Alliance's strengthened Deterrence and Defence Posture. Responsiveness encompasses two separate elements. The first element requires a military

posture that includes having the right forces in the right place and at the right time to be able to respond in a timely, appropriate and credible manner to assure, deter and address contingencies that might arise. The second element of responsiveness is expeditious political decision-making. Readiness is about having the right capabilities and forces that are trained, interoperable, deployable and maintained in the right operational structures and groupings and at an appropriate notice to move to meet all Alliance requirements. The ability to provide rapid and timely reinforcement to a threatened member state is essential for the credibility of the Alliance's Deterrence and Defence Posture, underpinning the tripwire function of the Forward Presence and ensuring effective reinforcement in other regions, if required. In that vein, the enablement of SACEUR's AOR required NATO to be able to rapidly move forces into, within and from the AOR in all directions and to sustain them.

In this context, the adaptation and strengthening of the NATO Command Structure (NCS), the military backbone of the Alliance, enables the Supreme Commanders to command and control forces to deal with any military challenge or security threat at any time, from any direction, including large-scale operations for collective defence, as well as to ensure adequate transformation and preparation for the future, in particular through capability development, education, and training.

The new NATO Command Structure was endorsed at the 2018 Brussels Summit; it includes:

- a Cyberspace Operations Centre at SHAPE in Belgium to provide situational awareness and coordination of NATO operational activity within cyberspace;
- a Joint Force Command Norfolk headquarters in the United States to focus on protecting the transatlantic lines of communication;
- a Joint Support and Enabling Command in Germany to ensure freedom of operation and sustainment in the rear area, in support of the rapid movement of troops and equipment into, across, and from Europe.
- The adapted NCS enhances and strengthens the relationship to the NATO Force Structure headquarters and national headquarters, which also improves the Alliance's regional understanding.

Domains of operations: conventional and asymmetric threats

The adaptation of the Alliance over recent years was aimed at making it fit-for-purpose in the new strategic environment. NATO's adaptation since the Wales Summit in 2014 has been, and continues to be, a process of critical strategic thinking, which allows the Alliance to meet current and emerging security challenges ahead. The world – and NATO's adversaries – have moved on and NATO must undertake a process of continuous adaptation to ensure that it can face the broad spectrum of threats and challenges.

Alongside the NCS, the strengthening of the Alliance's maritime capabilities responded to the need for adapting to a rapidly evolving and increasingly unpredictable maritime security environment. NATO has continued to intensify and expand the implementation of the Alliance Maritime Strategy, further enhancing the Alliance's effectiveness in the maritime domain, and reinvigorating NATO's Standing Naval Forces. The Standing Naval Forces are a core maritime capability of the Alliance and are the centrepiece of NATO's maritime posture. They have been enhanced and aligned with NATO's eNRF to provide NATO's highest readiness maritime forces. Similarly, in the air domain, Allies agreed at the 2018 Brussels Summit a Joint Air Power Strategy, a key enabler for NATO's peacetime Air Policing and Ballistic Missile Defence missions.

Furthermore, NATO joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS/Da'esh, and has enhanced its AWACS and air-to-air refueling support. NATO's Military Concept for Counter-Terrorism established that NATO will contribute more effectively to the prevention of terrorism and increase resilience to acts of terrorism. To this end, the Alliance will coordinate and consolidate its counter-terrorism efforts and focus on three main areas: awareness, capabilities and engagement. Most notably, the recognition of cyberspace as a domain of operations represented a milestone in the Alliance's resolve against emerging threats. Through the Cyber Defence Pledge adopted in the margins of the Warsaw Summit, NATO committed to enhance the cyber defence of national networks and infrastructure. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, which is affected by both state and non-state actors, including state-sponsored.

NATO's New Military Strategy

Since the Wales Summit, there has been a change in the Alliance's paradigm, shifting from a reactive to a proactive approach, culminating with the May 2019 Chiefs of Defence approval of the new NATO Military Strategy (NMS), a capstone document which supports the ongoing wider military adaptation and modernization of the Alliance. The 2010 Strategic

Concept, coupled with the outputs from the Wales, Warsaw and Brussels Summits, as well as the actions taken to follow through on Alliance assurance and adaptation measures, have all formed the basis for the new NMS. It constitutes the basis for further adaptation of the Alliance's Military Instrument of Power. The approval of NMS marked a fundamental step forward in adapting the Alliance to the increasingly complex security challenges. Under the broader umbrella of NATO's policy on Deterrence and Defence, Projecting Stability, and the Fight against Terrorism, the NMS supports the Alliance's three core tasks and overarching Alliance messaging. It outlines how the Alliance deters and defends and how it provides military support to the efforts in Projecting Stability and the Fight Against Terrorism in a coherent manner.

Conclusion

The last 25 years of continuous reductions in financial resourcing and readiness levels have left NATO and its partners inadequately prepared for the emerging new security environment. This is not to question the changed focus and reduced resourcing and readiness levels throughout the 1990s up to and including 2010. On the contrary, these were all the results of deliberate decisions based upon valid assessments of the changing security environment. Although one might argue that the Alliance and its member states have missed some signals since 2008. We were looking for the indicators we wanted to see instead of those we needed to see.

Nevertheless, NATO's adaptation since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 is something to be proud of and a testimony to the Alliance's agility and solidarity. Taking deliberate consensus-based decisions and carefully coordinated political will and military capabilities could take the Alliance even further. It is impressive to have witnessed NATO's strategic adaptation over the short space of five years. Moreover, NATO's Military Strategy provides – from a military perspective – contextualization, while also allowing for purpose and a coherent approach for the present and for the immediate future.

9

From hybrid warfare to "cybrid" campaigns: the new normal?

Antonio Missiroli *

The speed and intensity at which the strategic landscape has evolved over the past two decades requires constantly updating our analytical and operational tools, capturing change as it occurs, anticipating it whenever possible, and also framing it in terms that facilitate adaptation and cooperation. The recent debates over "hybrid" are an excellent case in point.

What's in a name?

The term "hybrid", as associated with "warfare", made its first appearance a decade ago among American military analysts. It was Frank Hoffman, in particular, who first coined it. He acknowledged that other definitions (such as "unrestricted", "compound" or "4th generation") had already captured the emerging features of 21st century warfare, as carried out by both state and non-state actors. Hoffman characterized "hybrid" as involving "a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder".[1] He based his empirical analysis on the tactics used by Hezbollah in the conflict with the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) in South Lebanon in 2006, but the experience of the US with insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq provided additional backdrop.

Hoffman articulated two interconnected terms: hybrid "war" proper, encompassing different modes of warfare in various possible combinations, and hybrid "threats", indicating the actor that employs them. For both, the emphasis was exclusively on operational *military* activities "directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to

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1 This and other references here are from F.G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st century: the rise of hybrid warfare*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, 2007.

achieve synergistic effects". For Hoffman, the Hezbollah provided "the clearest example of a modern hybrid challenger", combining highly disciplined, well trained and properly equipped regular units, adaptive guerrilla tactics in both urban and mountainous areas, high tech weapons and UAVs, and swift and effective information operations, allowing it to take the IDF by surprise and forcing it into a military and political stalemate.

Written by and for the US top brass, this definition offered both strictly military orientation and conceptual practicality, and it opened the floodgates to a flurry of historical and empirical studies applying the "hybrid" label to more traditional cases of "asymmetric" warfare.[2] In retrospect, the main contribution of Hoffman's work was its emphasis on contemporary military technologies and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) (what we now call "cyber") as having a multiplier and acceleration effect on those tactics. Interestingly, it also entered NATO's strategic discussions, mainly through the initiative of then Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General James Mattis, who partnered with Hoffman in launching the concept in the first place.[3]

Subsequently, it was Russia's actions in Ukraine in 2014, building on the methods used against Georgia in 2008, which lent the term a new lease of life. However different in nature and scope, both the occupation and annexation of Crimea and the ensuing "rebellion" in the Donbas prompted a reconceptualization of "hybrid warfare" and catapulted it into the public debate. NATO's 2014 Wales Summit Declaration highlighted "the specific challenges posed by hybrid *warfare* threats, where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design". In November 2015, the Allies agreed a dedicated "Strategy on NATO's Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare", while openly discussing its functional and geographical scope.[4] The Alliance's Warsaw Summit Communiqué (July 2016) spoke for the first time of "terrorist, cyber or hybrid *attacks*", potentially originating from all strategic directions, and indicated that NATO could respond to hybrid *warfare* by invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Two years later, the Alliance's Brussels Summit Declaration mentioned "hybrid *challenges*, including disinformation campaigns and malicious cyberattacks", and "hybrid *activities* that aim to create ambiguity and blur the lines between peace, crisis and conflict", confirming NATO's readiness to invoke Article 5 in the event of hybrid *warfare*.

The debate soon involved national security communities, especially in France (where it was linked to the domestic terrorist threat), the UK and Central Europe. For its part,

2 See e.g. W. Murray and P.R. Mansoor (eds.), *Hybrid warfare: fighting complex opponents from the ancient world to the present*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.

3 J.N. Mattis and F.G. Hoffman, "Future warfare: the rise of hybrid wars", *Proceedings*, Vol.131, No.11, 2005, pp.18-19.

4 G. Lasconjarias and J.A. Larsen (eds.), *NATO's response to hybrid threats*, NDC Forum Paper, No.24, Rome, 2015.

the EU first established (April 2016) and then regularly reviewed a "Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats", and agreed to cooperate closely with NATO – through two Joint Declarations (2016 and 2018) and a detailed list of actionable proposals.[5]

Comparisons were also drawn between Russia in Ukraine and ISIL/Daesh with its short-lived "Caliphate". Accordingly, ISIL's distinctive hybrid approach blended kinetic and information operations locally – in the Levant, including seizure of physical territory and practice of government as a "quasi-state" – with the instigation of terrorist activities globally. Last but not least, growing attention was paid to China's doctrine (and practice) of the so-called "three warfares" – psychological, public opinion, and legal – as articulated in a set of recommendations promulgated by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2003. Though elaborated with special reference to Taiwan and the South and East China Seas, a number of experts saw them as inspiring Beijing's increasingly assertive behaviour on the international scene.[6]

The quick success of the concept was due, at least in part, to the intrinsically ambiguous nature of the term "hybrid" but also, in part, to the misuse of the terms "war" and "warfare". Russia's "little green men" in Crimea carried out a smart, swift and stealthy military and ICT operation that can indeed be characterized as "hybrid warfare", although it was "asymmetric" in reverse – so to speak – as Moscow was the stronger side on the ground. For their part, the alleged "rebels" in the Donbas constituted – in Hoffman's language – a truly hybrid "threat" to the Ukrainian military but Russia, as such, did not directly engage in "warfare" there. Ever since, hostile intelligence operations carried out by Moscow in the West – such as the Skripal assassination attempt or the failed hack of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) networks – have often been labeled as "hybrid" and "war"-like.

In addition, Russia's overall aggressive conduct seemed to translate into operational reality what some analysts called the "Gerasimov doctrine", from Russia's then deputy Chief of military staff Valeriy Gerasimov's vision of "non-linear" (rather than "hybrid") warfare, as articulated in a series of articles published in 2013. On the other hand, Russian analysts did use an equivalent of the term "hybrid warfare" (*gibridnaya voina*) with reference to the way in which the West, and especially the US, had operated – through *non-military* means – both before and after the end of the Cold War to weaken Moscow. In particular, Russians saw the (in)famous "Colour Revolutions" in the post-Soviet space as direct results

5 See D. Fiott and R. Parkes, "Protecting Europe: the EU's response to hybrid threats", *Chaillot Paper* No.151, EUISS, Paris, April 2019.

6 S. Lee, "China's 'three warfares': origins, applications, and organizations", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol.37, No.2, 2014, pp.198-221.

of that Western/American approach, later applied also to Yanukovych's Ukraine before the 2014 crisis.[7]

In other words, the semantic overstretch of the "hybrid warfare" concept contributed to a growing politicization of its use while, in fact, "hybrid" tactics were already shifting towards intelligence operations falling below the level of armed conflict and characterized by a higher degree of opacity and deniability. In military terms, it is fair to conclude that what has been labelled as "hybrid warfare" amounts to a new conceptualization of an already existent practice of blurring and blending different methods and tactics – but with additional emphasis on the way in which "cyber"-enabled technology works as a potential game-changer.[8]

Moving target(s)

Despite laudable efforts made, for instance, by the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) or the new European Centre of Excellence in Helsinki, there is no agreed international definition of what a "hybrid" activity precisely is. Yet the fluidity of the concept is no reason to contest it, especially as it has now officially entered our political vocabulary: on the contrary, its inherent catch-all nature can be used as a prism to capture trends and phenomena that keep evolving and adapting. For instance, low-intensity hybrid operations may still constitute the beginning of something bigger that may in turn escalate to the level of "warfare". Yet it is equally clear that they often aim at simply testing and probing the other side's capabilities – by trial and error, by design or randomly, with a strategic or just opportunistic approach.

It is also evident that "cyber" is an essential vector – as a means and, occasionally, also an end – for all these operations. It is now both a military domain in its own right (alongside land, sea and air) and the "space" in which most of our economic, civilian and even personal activities unfold – a domain of domains, so to speak.[9] It is not by accident that one of the first tabletop exercises ever carried out at ministerial level in this area, organized during Estonia's EU presidency in 2017, was codenamed "CYBRID 2017", and that many similar ones have followed since, especially at NATO level. By using cyberspace,

7 M. Galeotti, *Hybrid war or* gibridnaya voina*? Getting Russia's non-linear military challenge right*, Mayak Intelligence, Prague, 2016. For a skeptical view see R.N. McDermott, "Does Russia have a Gerasimov doctrine?"*, Parameters*, Vol.46, No.1, 2016, pp.97-105.

8 See especially O. Friedman, *Russian "hybrid warfare": resurgence and politicisation*, Hurst & Co., London, 2018, which constitutes the most complete study on the concept to date.

9 For an overview see A. Missiroli, "The dark side of the Web: cyber as a threat", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.24, No.2, 2019, pp.135-152.

these operations tend to be – at least in comparative terms – low cost, low risk and high impact, and therefore quite accessible and rewarding. What is more, they do not know physical borders or respect territorial jurisdictions.

Despite the lack of an agreed definition, however, there is some broad common understanding of the nature of the threats and challenges we label as "hybrid". To qualify as such, these need to include coordinated and roughly simultaneous operations: in other words, not every single hostile and unconventional activity under the threshold of armed conflict is, per se, "hybrid". They also tend to be scalable, both horizontally (onto additional domains) and vertically (up or downwards). They tend to be targeted and tailored to specific vulnerabilities: every hybrid campaign is unique, although some common patterns are discernible. Finally, they tend to be hard to detect and hard to attribute, although some footprints are increasingly recognizable.[10]

Predictably, NATO tends to emphasise their potential links with military, paramilitary and intelligence activities, with a focus on their overall coercive effects. For its part, the EU tends to highlight their potential disruptive effects on the functioning of the single market and more recently also on the functionality of domestic political processes – since it has become apparent that sophisticated hybrid campaigns may have affected the integrity and even the outcome of democratic elections.

Such campaigns may employ different methods: focused "hack-and-leak" operations, large scale influence operations through social media and, at least in principle, vote manipulation – although the emphasis now is all on the "weaponisation" of social media.[11] Available evidence shows that these campaigns are most effective when they target "swing" electoral constituencies and when the choice at hand is binary (e.g. referenda) – less so, for instance, when some form of proportional representation is applied. However, after our "Sputnik moment" (when evidence of electoral interference in the US and elsewhere first emerged), our increased awareness of these risks has probably contributed to mitigating them – or diverting them elsewhere.

Perhaps most importantly, all the "hybrid" threats and campaigns outlined above are hard to deter and hard to respond to. To start with, they often belong in the domain of foreign intelligence operations as carried out by most states: such operations are not forbidden by international law, although they can be prosecuted domestically through law enforcement. Of course, things would change if/when espionage turns into sabotage – but

10 Attribution, be it private or public, involves technical, legal and political aspects. In the case of terrorist groups, which tend to "over-claim" rather than deny actions, the specific challenge is to verify their credibility.

11 P.W. Singer and E. Brooking, *Like war: the weaponisation of social media*, Mifflin Harcourt, Boston-New York, 2018. General David Petraeus once famously spoke, referring to insurgencies, of "the weaponisation of everything".

evidence may still remain insufficient (at least to stand up in a court of law) and attribution prove elusive.

More fundamentally, these hostile "hybrid" activities are unconventional also in the sense that they cannot be countered in the same way conventional military (or even nuclear) ones can – that is, by matching and "parrying" an adversary's capabilities and actions. Externally, in fact, we do not necessarily want to "mirror" or replicate the methods of our attackers – be it disinformation, deception, corruption or coercion. No tit-for-tat, although some robust responses remain conceivable and executable. Internally, too, we do not want to restrict our own freedoms – of expression, organization, or ownership of business or media outlets – as our potential vulnerabilities also represent our declared strengths.

Finally, traditional conflict prevention and arms control mechanisms seem difficult to apply to the "cybrid" domain. First, the "weapons" are not (exclusively) state-owned, and states do not have the legal monopoly of the use of code (as opposed to the use of force). Second, by nature such "weapons" cannot be effectively monitored, inspected or disposed of, and they can easily be recreated anyway. Third, the current international climate seems hardly favourable to any fresh multilateral arrangement, especially in a domain where ongoing technological advances occur at lightning speed. Historically speaking, most arms control agreements were signed only after new technologies had matured and the resulting risks had been fully appreciated by the main stakeholders – and we appear to be still very far from that stage.

A long game

Despite all these constraints, however, there is ample room for strengthening our collective resilience (at both state and societal level) vis-à-vis the growing "hybridisation" of threats – wherever they may come from. Joined-up situational awareness is essential, and certainly requires better intelligence sharing than what we have now. Anticipation is also important, and technology may represent an asset and not just a liability in this area. Capacity and willingness to impose costs (both reputational and material) on attackers should also be part of the policy toolbox.[12]

Here NATO and the EU can provide a high degree of complementarity and potentially even synergy. Both can assist and advise their members in their areas of respective competence, e.g. through national points of contact, the activation of dedicated instruments and playbooks, the organization of crisis management exercises and the deployment of

12 The spectrum of applicable policy responses is often referred to as DIMEFIL (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intelligence, Legal) or just DIME.

relevant experts – separately[13] and/or in parallel and coordinated fashion. Both can also resort to negative diplomacy and countermeasures to sanction hostile behaviour.

Still, responses need to be as targeted and tailored as the challenges are. Dealing with Russia and/or its proxies requires a different approach than dealing with Chinese operators or terrorist groups and their sponsors. Operating inside the Euro-Atlantic area will not be the same business as operating outside – in the East, in the South and notably in the South East, where different hybrid threats coexist and conflate. And cooperation is required not only between states and between international organizations but also between them and the private sector, which often owns and operates the "spaces" where those activities take place. If "cybrid" is the new normal, and if the resulting campaigns cannot be completely deterred, then the name of the game is long-term sustainable containment.

13 For instance, NATO is about to deploy to Montenegro (at its request) a first dedicated Counter Hybrid Support Team. CHSTs were established in July 2018 and consist of national experts appointed by nations in fields as diverse as cyber defence, energy security, intelligence and counter-terrorism, civil preparedness, strategic communications, logistical and legal assistance.

10

NATO at 70: what defence policy and planning priorities?

Patrick Turner *

NATO at 70 shows no sign of slowing down. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by a growth in the challenges to which we must respond, and a high tempo of decisions and adaptation. NATO's ability to adapt to the changing security environment has always been a core strength – but this ability has been and will continue to be put to the test.

In the last five years, since Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been going back to basics. Its core purpose of defending Allies has come back to the fore. But not to the exclusion of other tasks and priorities such as: NATO's operations and missions, for example in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq; our broader contributions to the international fight against terrorism; or our work to build partner capacity.

This chapter focuses on NATO's efforts to strengthen its defence posture. The NATO shorthand for our efforts to improve our collective defence is deterrence, defence and dialogue (the "three Ds"). These are underpinned by responsiveness, readiness and reinforcement (the "three Rs"), as well as strengthened national resilience to attack. More investment and commitment by non-US Allies in line with the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the shorthand for which is cash, capabilities and contributions (the "three Cs"), provides the crucial enablers for the three Ds and the three Rs.

Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue

The three Ds lie at the core of the Alliance's strategy. They mean ensuring, and communicating effectively, the ability to defend ourselves against any threat. That on its own has a strong deterrent effect. But it also means demonstrating our willingness to use

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our capabilities, and adapting our deterrence to meet today's challenges, including those that lie below the threshold at which a collective defence response would be triggered under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. And it means working to sustain a dialogue with Russia, notwithstanding the challenges involved.

Strengthening our deterrence and defence posture

We have taken significant steps to strengthen our posture since 2014, both for collective defence purposes and, prospectively, for the purposes of crisis management outside the NATO area. Examples include:

- strengthening NATO's rapid reaction forces, and trebling the size of the NATO Response Force, ensuring that it remains fit to respond to any challenge from any direction;
- implementing the NATO Readiness Initiative agreed at NATO's 2018 Brussels Summit – increasing the readiness of our forces with an additional 30 medium or heavy manoeuvre battalions, 30 major naval combatants and 30 kinetic air squadrons, with enabling forces, at 30 days' readiness or less;
- deployment of multinational forward presence battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, and taking a range of other measures to increase NATO's forward presence in the South-East of the Alliance;
- building a framework for NATO's response to the challenges and threats emanating from the South, which includes establishing a dedicated "hub" within Joint Force Command Naples, improving capabilities for expeditionary operations, better advance planning, and strengthening support to partners in the South;
- agreeing to implement a range of measures in response to Russia's deployment of the SSC8 nuclear capable intermediate range ground launched missile, which threatens Europe;
- improving our abilities to move forces quickly to, and within, Europe, and working closely with the European Union on this as well as on a range of other shared priorities;
- increasing our exercise programme, both NATO and national: in 2018 we undertook the largest NATO collective defence exercise since the end of the Cold War, Trident Juncture;
- further enhancing our preparedness to effectively defend Allies, including by improving our advance plans for defence, which must be flexible in view of the

evolving security environment;

- maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of NATO's nuclear deterrent capability;
- building our resilience, including our defence against cyber-attacks and other forms of "hybrid" attacks. We have made cyber an operational domain, and have agreed that both cyber attacks and hybrid attacks could rise to the level of an armed attack, and trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- adopting a new NATO Military Strategy;
- adopting a NATO space policy and examining further measures as part of its implementation.

This is supplemented by national efforts that reinforce and further strengthen our posture. For example, under the European Deterrence Initiative, the US is taking substantial steps to increase its presence in Europe and improve its ability to reinforce Europe in crisis. All of this, in strengthening our ability to defend ourselves, helps strengthen our deterrence. Especially if our efforts are well communicated, well demonstrated, and credible.

We are not seeking only to deter an armed attack that would trigger a collective defence response under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In a complex hybrid environment, our potential adversaries seek to challenge us, or achieve advantage, *under* that threshold.

They use a variety of means – disinformation, attempted interference in our electoral processes, cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and even the use of chemical weapons on Alliance soil (in the United Kingdom in March 2018) or an attempted coup (in October 2016 in Montenegro, as it was in the final stages of becoming a NATO member). They seek to challenge and contest our interests in a range of geographies, and a range of domains. They probe, they test, they contest, seeking to find and exploit vulnerabilities or to divert and absorb our attention. It will remain a significant challenge to ensure that our competitors do not do us damage, and do not gain advantage.

Allies have become more attuned to those efforts and willing to describe and attribute them publicly. And to take action. A prominent example of collective action by Allies and partners was the expulsion of around 150 Russian diplomats from more than 20 countries after the Russian use of chemical weapons in the UK in 2018.

At the other end of the spectrum, NATO also seeks to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of its nuclear posture. As a fundamental part of our overall posture, NATO remains a nuclear Alliance, with US nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and European Allies providing dual-capable aircraft and infrastructure in support of NATO's nuclear deterrence mission.

Beyond this, the strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, the United Kingdom and France are the supreme guarantee of the security of Allies. The independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. Any adversary which believed that coercion or aggression against NATO with nuclear threats or actions could succeed would need to have drawn the conclusion that the three nuclear Allies individually, and NATO collectively, would fail to defend their fundamental security. That would be a very unwise calculation.

Dialogue with Russia

Allies decided that our efforts on deterrence and defence have to be complemented by meaningful dialogue with Russia, in particular through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). The NRC was established in 2002 to serve as a unique forum for consultations on security issues and to foster practical cooperation in a wide range of areas. However, since April 2014, following Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and its military intervention in Eastern Ukraine, all civilian and practical cooperation with Russia has been suspended. For us, there can be no "return to business as usual" until Russia ceases its aggressive actions and returns to compliance with its obligations under international law.

At the same time, political and military channels of communication remain open and continue to be utilized. The NRC has met ten times since 2016 and the first topic discussed is always the continuing conflict in Ukraine. In addition, at the most recent meeting on 5 July 2019, Allies once again spoke with one voice in urging Russia to come back to compliance with its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty before the 2 August 2019 deadline for US withdrawal – unfortunately to no avail.

During NRC meetings over the last few years, we have also discussed a range of other important topics such as Afghanistan, hybrid, or risk reduction and transparency, including the exchange of advanced briefing on our exercises. In the same spirit, military lines of communication are kept open, which are useful to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation and unintended escalation. To that end, NATO's senior military leadership hold meetings and maintain phone contact with the Russian Chief of the General Staff.

Responsiveness, Readiness and Reinforcement

The three Rs – responsiveness, readiness and reinforcement – which underpin the three Ds are in essence about speed and effectiveness of response, whether in a collective defence or a crisis response situation.

Deciding and acting quickly

In future we may not have the luxury of being able to undertake dedicated and detailed planning and force generation over a period of months, but may need to act within days or weeks. Responsiveness is about being as prepared as possible and able to decide and act quickly.

NATO has, for example, further enhanced and developed its advance plans and regularly practices its crisis decision-making procedures. These decision making procedures are designed to allow for very fast decisions if that were required. And they involve pre-prepared response measures and steps, which can be drawn upon, or modified, as necessary. And having the best possible warning of a potential crisis is also key to our ability to react.

Ensuring our forces are ready

The appropriate readiness of our forces is fundamental. For much of the period since the Cold War, Allies have been able to assume less demanding levels of readiness for much of their force structure than was previously the case. The scenarios for the employment of force were, in many cases, ones which would have allowed for the deliberate and steady generation, deployment and build-up of forces, including in the context of long term operations (for example in Afghanistan).

But Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014 and Syria in 2015 were very short notice, and we cannot assume that a collective defence situation would not also arise at short notice. Also, we need to remove any misperception by a potential adversary that it could act rapidly against us, secure advantage or territory before we could adequately respond, and then, having done so, deter us from action to reverse its gains. While we assess the current risk of an adversary taking such action as low, or even very low, it is our responsibility to actively manage that risk. We must guard against, and minimize the possibility of, an adversary miscalculating that aggression could give it a significant, or even decisive advantage.

Moving quickly

Reinforcement is about our ability to move substantial forces quickly in support of any Ally that comes under threat, including into and around Europe. And to support those forces adequately in terms of infrastructure and supply. As part of our continuing adaptation of the NATO Command Structure, we are setting up two new commands to help drive and underpin this effort – a new Joint Force Command in Norfolk, Virginia, which will have lead responsibility for transatlantic reinforcement, and the Joint Support and Enabling Command in Ulm, Germany, which will have the lead responsibility for ensuring that we can adequately support military training, exercising, movement and employment. The intent is to ensure that we would be able to operate freely across the NATO area, without any potential adversary limiting our ability to do so.

Cash, Capabilities and Contributions

The last triptych of Cs – cash, capabilities and contributions – underpins our ability to deliver on the three Ds and the three Rs. The Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014 has been a powerful instrument in helping ensure more adequate resources for defence and fairer burden sharing across the Alliance, including between the United States and other Allies.

Spending more on defence, and on the capabilities we need

The commitments made by Heads of State and Government at Wales to the guidelines of spending 2 percent of GDP on defence and 20 percent of defence budgets on investment in capabilities have had significant effects. By the end of 2020, non-US Allies will have increased their defence expenditure by a total of well over USD100 billion in real terms over a four-year period. By the end of the Defence Investment Pledge decade, in 2024, that figure will be much larger. About two thirds of Allies already have plans to spend 2 percent or more on defence by 2024, and the great majority of Allies have plans to spend 20 percent or more of their defence budgets on investment.

This progress has involved some tough political choices, and major decisions. There is still a good deal further to go if all Allies are to meet the guidelines: several Allies, including some of those with larger budgets, still fall well short of the 2 percent target, and about a third of Allies do not yet have plans to reach the 2 percent target. This will continue to be a critical priority in the years to come.

The progress we are making means that Allies are better able to resource the new priorities set out above, for example to make real improvements in readiness, mobility and sustainability. And to meet the capability targets which NATO sets Allies through the NATO Defence Planning Process.

Sharing the burden on operations

Burden sharing comes in many forms, not just financial. Allies have been sharing the burden on operations, for example in Afghanistan, in Kosovo and in Iraq, by making troop contributions, or helping fund capacity building efforts. In 2018, non-US Allies and partners contributed 50 percent of the troops in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, and over 80 percent of the troops to the Kosovo Force. The great majority of the combat forces contributed to the standing elements of the NATO Response Force, as well as those being identified in the NATO Readiness Initiative, will be provided by European Allies and Canada. This is all part of the "commitments" elements of the three Cs, which will also remain of critical importance in the years to come.

Future challenges

For the future, we need to continue to ask ourselves the right questions. Are we deterring effectively and adequately, including by ensuring that we are ready to defend any Ally, should that be needed? Fail at that, and little else counts. Are Allies using their one trillion dollars of defence expenditure annually to good effect? Are our posture, our readiness and our structures fit for purpose? Are we adequately trained and exercised? Do we have the necessary infrastructure and plans to reinforce all Allies? Are we adequately able to operate, if required, across multiple domains or multiple regions? And – as we focus on all that – are we communicating our ability and our resolve to defend the Alliance clearly and adequately, but in a way that is not escalatory? If deterrence were to fail, even in a limited sub-Article 5 setting, or, in the worst case, an Article 5 setting, could we rapidly re-establish conditions for the resumption of deterrence?

Overall, as the above makes clear, NATO has a large and demanding transformation agenda. It will involve a multi-year effort, and in some areas a generational effort. It involves, and will involve, significant efforts by NATO, and individual Allies, to deliver. Achieving lasting progress will require a sustained allocation of additional resources and the implementation of important reforms to restore a "culture of readiness" among Allied forces. We will more than ever need to ensure that our operations and force structures are properly resourced.

While the current transformation agenda described above is ambitious, this does not cover the full range of our current efforts. Looking into the future, it is clear that NATO will have to further adapt in order to successfully tackle the full range of today's and tomorrow's challenges. Those include, for example: international terrorism; hybrid threats; challenges in the newer domains of cyber and space; and the challenges and opportunities posed by transformational technologies.

In the years ahead, we will have to continue the hard work to modernise and transform our capabilities, and to build and sustain a fully credible deterrence and defence posture. And we will have to go on making, and improving, the case to Allied publics about the need for sustained or increased investment in defence.

The values which NATO was designed to embody and to protect are more than ever essential. And it will remain a daily task in the years to come to preserve the unity of effort and purpose which is NATO's core strength. Our values will endure, and our unity of effort and purpose will endure. But, to ensure that, each succeeding generation of political and military leaders across the Alliance, and those who support them, will need to commit to the hard work needed to maintain our resolve, our strength and our cohesion. The purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington 70 years ago are as relevant as ever.

11

Alliance capabilities at 70: achieving agility for an uncertain future

Camille Grand and Matthew Gillis *

The credibility of any alliance depends on its ability to deliver deterrence and defence for the safety and security of its members. Without capability, any alliance is deprived of credibility and exists only on paper. Despite a rocky history – up to and including the current debate on burden sharing – capability lies at the heart of NATO's success. There is good cause to draw optimism from the Alliance's accomplishments throughout its 70 years in providing a framework for developing effective and interoperable capabilities.

However, the future promises serious challenges for NATO's capabilities, driven primarily by new and disruptive technology offering both opportunities and threats in defence applications. Moreover, developments in these areas are, in some cases, being led by potential adversaries, while also simultaneously moving at a pace that requires a constant effort to adapt on the part of the Alliance.

On the occasion of NATO's 70th anniversary, the future outlook requires a serious conversation about NATO's adaptability to embrace transformation and develop an agile footing to ensure its relevance for the future.

The value of capability: historic perspectives

Having the right set of capabilities is a foundational element of the Alliance. The North Atlantic Treaty enshrines the impetus to develop and maintain military capability in its article 3: "in order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack".

NATO's efforts in support of these ends are similarly long standing. Through nearly

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the entirety of its history, the Alliance has provided a framework of tools and resources to encourage the development of interoperable and combat-capable forces. The establishment of NATO's integrated military structure in 1951 is, in fact, predated by the stand-up of the Military Agency for Standardization (1950), known today as the NATO Standardization Office, which is a repository of many hundreds of NATO standards in use by Allies and many other nations.

Moreover, capabilities have long served as material manifestations of the Alliance's transatlantic bond. North American and European investments in research and development, multinational acquisition, and collective infrastructure not only deliver operational capabilities while benefitting from economies of scale, but also serve as measurable and tangible commitments to the Alliance's shared defence and security.

The contemporary context: cause for optimism

Despite some energetic debates on Alliance defence spending, burden-sharing, and readiness, the present status and outlook of the Alliance's capabilities offer cause for optimism. While the situation is not perfect, Allies are making serious and measurable investment in their capabilities, and NATO is continuing to provide the frameworks and encouragement to facilitate collective progress.

On the national efforts, the progress of Allies in reaching the NATO guideline of 2 percent of defence expenditure as a share of their Gross Domestic Product has been well documented. From 2016 to 2020, European Allies and Canada will have spent an additional USD130 billion, with more and more Allies meeting or have developed plans to meet the 2 percent target by 2024. Less documented is the swift and significant uptick in national equipment expenditure as a share of defence expenditure, for which NATO has established a guideline of 20 percent. Figure 1 shows that since 2014 nearly all Allies have reported increased expenditure, many have doubled or even tripled their expenditure, and more than half have already met the 20 percent guideline. In concrete terms, this means Allies are dedicating more of their resources towards researching, developing, and acquiring new capabilities.



Figure 1: Equipment expenditure as a share of defence expenditure (%) based on 2015 prices and exchange rates

Source: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_06/20190625_PR2019-069-EN.pdf

NATO, for its part, continues to help Allies to find value for the money they invest in capabilities. The primary example is the facilitation of multinational cooperation. This in itself is not a new development. NATO established the Conference of National Armaments Directors in 1966, with the intent of providing a common forum for Allies to identify and pursue opportunities for cooperation in capability development. Multinational cooperation has been known by many names in NATO circles over the years, including as the 'Smart Defence' initiative, but the benefit has fundamentally remained the same: working together drives down per-unit costs through economies of scale, supports better coherence and prioritisation in how Allies allocate their resources, and allows Allies to achieve more together than they would otherwise on their own.

Multinational cooperation under NATO is not simply a paperwork exercise. Through it, Allies are delivering tangible capabilities, and the outlook is positive. Among the higher visibility projects agreed at the level of their Defence Ministers, Allies – in various groupings and configurations – are currently participating in ten separate efforts, ranging from the bulk purchase of munitions to the establishment of a training centre for air crews operating in support of special forces or work on maritime unmanned systems. Allies continue to

both launch new projects and join existing ones at a steady pace, with new commitments made at nearly every NATO Defence Ministers' meeting. In short, cooperative capability development through NATO is a reality and helps to address NATO's capability shortfall.

There is also cause for optimism for capabilities developed between NATO and its international partners, primarily the European Union. Here, the current template for successful cooperation is still the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet. Initiated by a NATO Capability shortfall assessment, this project started with the European Defence Agency work on requirements, while the acquisition is managed by the *Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement* as contract executing agent for the NATO Support and Procurement Agency, who will in turn manage the life cycle of the fleet. The resulting capability operated by the European Air Transport Command will significantly contribute towards the air-to-air refueling requirements of both NATO and European nations.

Provided they avoid unnecessary duplication and are well coordinated with NATO priorities, European initiatives related to capabilities can contribute to fairer burden-sharing by Europe and can lead to capabilities that should ultimately be made available to support NATO's own operations and activities. In other words, European capabilities are NATO capabilities.

The Future Outlook: meeting the challenges of the 21st Century

The Alliance's 70 years have endured seismic shifts not only in the geopolitical context, but also in the technologies that underpin and constitute its capabilities. From this perspective, NATO is no stranger to change; the last 70 years saw remarkable transformations ranging from the birth of the transistor, to the creation of the internet, to the invention of the smartphone. However, the accelerating pace of this change is challenging for NATO's future capabilities, and calls for a serious discussion about the Alliance's agility and adaptability to retain its technological edge.

Implications for the Alliance

The Alliance's use and leadership in sophisticated high-end technology has underpinned its successes in both peace and conflict. The current outlook places the Alliance's success at risk for two reasons: broadened accessibility by peer and non-state competitors, and the pace of change. Put simply, rapid changes in the spaces of both threats and opportunities will drive disruptions in how NATO develops and uses capabilities. 'Business as usual' may no longer be sufficient to ensure the Alliance's competitive advantages.

Firstly, broadening accessibility to technology has shattered the near-monopoly on technological advantages enjoyed by Allies up to now. Furthermore, NATO's potential adversaries are not only investing in disruptive technologies; they are – in some cases – directly leading developments and working to close the gap with NATO nations in others.

For example, China has emerged as a major competitor for the future capability space. Chinese telecom companies are already pursuing the roll-out of 5G infrastructure in many nations; with massive investment into a research and development. Moreover, China has demonstrated real-world applications of quantum technology while also maneuvering to gain an edge in quantum research and development, with EUR9 billion recently committed to develop a national quantum laboratory. NATO Allies will struggle to bring individually a similar magnitude of resources to bear towards research and development in these areas.

Secondly, the pace of change has accelerated at a tempo that risks outpacing our ability to exploit and, as necessary, counter the technological advancements on the horizon. Many of these technologies are driving towards faster and more distributed decision-making, which in turn bumps up against the somtimes bureaucratic and conservative nature of NATO's machinery and decision making. Posturing the Alliance to fully embrace these technologies will require an adapted mindset and culture of delegating authority and accepting ambiguity.

One case for improvement is in the area of NATO processes, particularly those that manage procurements, standardization, and capability life cycles. We often strive for perfection in our future requirements, and engineer our processes around numerous decision gates and complicated management structures. The result is capability that can be over budget, late, and obsolete when delivered. NATO has taken some healthy steps in this direction with the adoption of a new model for governing common funded capabilities with fewer decisions and dramatically streamlined oversight. But continued efforts are needed.

Industry itself also has a substantial role to play in this area. Our traditional defence industrial base should not be complacent with a business model that can be slow, cumbersome, and risk averse. In what Klaus Schwab has defined as the "Fourth Industrial Revolution", the changes on the horizon "herald the transformation of entire systems of production, management, and governance"[1] while entirely upending existing industrial value chains. The success of Allies' industries will depend on more acceptance of risk, greater investment in research and development, and an adapted mindset towards partnering with players outside the traditional defence sphere.

1 K. Schwab, "The fourth Industrial Revolution: what it means and how to respond", *Foreign Affairs*, 12 December 2015.

Blueprints for the future?

The future outlook for disruptive technology is not entirely negative. Two new initiatives show exceptional promise to invert traditional capability development models, while seizing upon the opportunities offered by new technology. They demonstrate vividly how NATO adapts.

The first is the Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative. Here, 14 Allies have committed to a cooperative framework for developing and integrating unmanned systems into NATO's defence architecture.[2] The project is aimed at bringing autonomy and unmanned capability to bear in support of tedious and dangerous jobs at sea, including anti-submarine and counter-mine warfare. But beyond leveraging new technology, the project is also leveraging a 'start up' mindset for agility and lean approaches. The project has benefited through experience drawn from industry, academia, and government, including Coca Cola and the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit. This model has already paid dividends; less than a year after the first commitment was taken, the largest-ever exercise of NATO unmanned underwater, surface and air vehicles took place off Portugal.[3]

The second initiative is Alliance Future Surveillance and Control. In a novel example of obsolescence management, NATO leaders have committed to cooperate towards defining a replacement for NATO's AWACS fleet in anticipation of its retirement around 2035. The project launched in 2016 with a fundamental re-evaluation of NATO's future needs, eschewing any assumptions that AWACS would simply undergo a "like-for-like" replacement. The project has since arrived at capability requirements that drive for an integration of surveillance and C2 across multiple domains. Allied industries have now been challenged to offer ideas on how NATO's requirements could be fulfilled by 2035. Up to six concepts are being sought in order to encourage a wide variety of innovative solutions, including those that leverage emerging and disruptive technologies.

Both of these projects are in their early steps. Nevertheless, their models are contesting the traditional approaches to defence acquisition by embracing disruptive technology, tapping into industry expertise, and leaving space for future capability growth. These projects offer promise for the future adaptability and agility of NATO capability development, and as such deserve close attention and support.

2 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

3 Recognized Environmental Picture, Maritime Unmanned Systems 2019 – known as REPMUS19.

Conclusion: maintain NATO's lead in an uncertain future

The Alliance has over the last few years weathered a vigorous public debate on burden-sharing. Allied spending on capabilities is increasing dramatically. A growing number of Allies are teaming up under the banner of multinational cooperation to drive down costs and achieve more than the sum of their parts. Finally, European nations are also taking greater strides towards resourcing development of their own capabilities.

Looking forward, the landscape offers serious challenges. While change in technology is nothing new in NATO's 70 year history, the challenge stems from both the speed of this change coupled with the loss of NATO's quasi dominance on many high-end technologies. The emerging areas touched upon here – to include quantum technology, "big data" analytics and artificial intelligence, and 5G cellular technology – all offer profound opportunities and potential threats for NATO's future capabilities.

The challenge is not insurmountable, and the latest NATO initiatives related to innovation and future capabilities demonstrate the organization's continued ability to change 70 years into its history. The success of these projects – and of NATO's capability portfolio more broadly – will depend upon the willingness of the Alliance and its industrial base to take risks, be agile, and innovate. Within the Alliance's overall adaptation agenda, rethinking our approaches and mindsets to capability development will be essential to maintain NATO's lead in an uncertain future.

12

Calibrating the scope of NATO's mandate

Thierry Tardy *

Anniversaries are opportunities to look back at what has been achieved and to look forward to what ought to be changed and, possibly, improved. Having reached a mature age, an anniversary can also be an occasion to ponder deeper questions of self-identity, purpose and ambition.

In 2019 NATO turned 70, and if, overall, it can be proud of what it has achieved for the security of its citizens since 1949, there are also challenges that constrain its full success as a security actor. More specifically, since 2014, the combination of the Alliance's two main missions of "deterrence and defence" and "projecting stability", furthermore in a context of transatlantic turbulence and deep tension among member states, has raised a number of questions about NATO's capacity to remain united and fit for purpose.

While the security environment is increasingly complex, with constantly evolving threats, and adversaries challenging established state actors and the way they fight, how should NATO further adapt to remain relevant? While conflicts are increasingly "hybrid", should NATO embrace the largest portfolio possible to match the various layers of hybridity, or should it stay focused on what it does best – delivering hard power? Probably both: staying focused might be an option in an ideal world, but in fact, broadening the scope of NATO's mandate will be difficult to resist.

A successful political-military alliance…

From its inception in 1949, NATO has always developed as a political-military organization, meaning that while it was by nature a military alliance delivering military outcomes, it was also a political club, made up of countries with shared interests and values that justified their presence in the organization. In this sense, NATO could not be compared to the Warsaw Pact which belonged to a different species.

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Throughout the Cold War, this political-military dimension shaped NATO and its member states' policies; it acted as an instrument for their rapprochement and, to an extent, forged inherently converging strategic cultures. This not only produced interoperability and joint military doctrine, but also a security community of countries and people sharing more than just a common threat.[1] It is this sense of community that enabled NATO to survive the end of the Cold War and the geostrategic turbulence that followed. NATO was then able to expand and in so doing to become one pillar in the new liberal order, finding a new mission for itself in the crisis management agenda, which almost replaced the (at the time) less central core task of collective defence. While displaying the ability to adapt, rather successfully, NATO also entered a world of profound uncertainty.

…challenged by a constantly evolving security environment

One key challenge for any security actor is to respond adequately to evolving threats, i.e. to design and implement coherent policy responses. In this context, the nature of the current threats to international security, and to NATO in particular, plays against the Alliance's core business and comparative advantages. At heart, NATO is a military instrument. It thinks and acts in military terms and deeds, in contrast to, say, the European Union, which is fundamentally a civilian actor.

In the world that NATO is facing, threats such as Russia or ISIS, show how central a military posture or response needs to be; how deterrence, or coercion, are indispensable to the preservation of stability and NATO values.

This said, many of the current threats are of a different nature and do not necessarily elicit a military response. They can take the form of random urban attacks using ramming vehicles (in the case of terrorism); the disruption of communication channels and IT networks (in the case of cyber); overt and covert activities using artificial intelligence, automation and big data processing (in the case of political warfare); or the mix of some traditional *modus operandi* and covert, non-state-led, violent actions (in the case of hybrid threats); not to mention organized crime or the potential destabilizing effect of illegal migration. The fact that the perpetrators of these criminal and malicious acts are not necessarily military, nor do they use military means to attack (or even fire a shot), must inform about the nature of the response, in a discussion that prescribes a shift from defence to security; or maybe one is simply talking about the evolution of warfare.[2]

1 P.V. Jakobsen and J. Ringsmose, "Victim of its own success: how NATO's difficulties are caused by the absence of a unifying existential threat", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol.16, No.1, 2018, pp.51-52.

2 See E. Fassi, S. Lucarelli, A. Marrone, *What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and Beyond,* Istituto Affari Internazionali, Uni-

Furthermore, these threats are positioned along a spectrum that takes no notice of national borders and where, in some cases, there is no external connection or attribution is impossible. Home-grown terrorism can be as devastating as externally-driven attacks. This is what the internal-external security nexus is about, i.e. the intertwining of internal and external security spaces that can no longer be conceived of as distinct.

These two sets of characteristics pertaining to the nature of threats and the nature of the security environment are challenging NATO's posture as they require a set of policy responses that is arguably far broader than what can be produced by a military institution focused on external defence.

For NATO, this state of affairs poses the deceptive dilemma of either broadening its security agenda or staying focused on the military domain. In both cases to remain relevant.

Enlarging NATO's agenda…

Acquiring a mandate or the capacity to tackle a broad range of threats would imply that NATO move in two directions: towards more security-type activities, as opposed to defence-focused ones; and towards more internal issues.

The shift to security is not new and is inherent to NATO's role; it has by and large been experimented in crisis management operations as well as in counter-terrorism, where NATO has deployed military assets to perform activities that were often closer to policing tasks than to genuine military undertakings. NATO's role in Afghanistan's Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), or in humanitarian relief operations, provides more specific examples of NATO operating at the frontier of military core tasks to respond to broader security needs. More generally, the debate about a possible role for NATO in connection with civilian crisis management activities also falls within the logic of broadening its security agenda.

Applied to the current security landscape, this logic would give NATO a more assertive role in defensive/offensive cyber activities (with cyberspace being an operational domain possibly covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty); in the fight against organized crime networks, *inter alia* through maritime security; as well as in the broader security sector reform (SSR) agenda of partner countries, to give just a few examples. This is partly what NATO's newly-framed Projecting Stability is about. In all these tasks coercion and military effect are not absent, but they are not as fundamental as in traditional defence.

Second, looking inwards would mean that NATO play an increased role in the defence

versity of Bologna, Allied Command Transformation, 2015.

against internal threats by contributing to: critical infrastructure protection and resilience building; police-type activities such as anti-terrorist operations in European cities; operations to tackle the security consequences of (massive) migrant flows; or supporting police forces facing under-the-radar hybrid-type non-conventional attacks.

Although this range of tasks would make sense when assessed against the broad security needs of NATO member states and societies, and may be justified for good political reasons, they carry a number of risks for NATO as a military alliance. Issues pertaining to capacity and resources, expertise, legitimacy, and political backing by member states would be raised. The broad civilian security field is already crowded and NATO would face competition in areas where it would come in a weaker position. From SSR in Sub-Saharan Africa to policing and border tasks within European states, actors like the EU, national administrations, police forces and NGOs would not necessarily welcome a role for NATO.

Any broadening of NATO's mandate would also be resisted as it would risk diluting NATO's war-fighting capability. Contemporary war-fighting is arguably politically, financially and operationally demanding; any parallel effort can therefore be seen as a deleterious diversion.[3]

…versus keeping NATO focused and partnering with others

The second option for NATO is therefore to focus on its military identity and push for a sound division of tasks among a large range of security actors, in keeping with the comparative advantage of each of the parties. This is the starting point for the comprehensive/integrated/whole-of-government approach: because no single actor can do it all, all must accept working with others.

NATO's comparative advantage stems from its nature as a political-military Alliance composed of some of the most powerful and militarily-experienced states. Those assets can be put into two categories. Politically, we refer to the capacity: to deter the most powerful military adversaries; to be a forum for strategy-making;[4] to act as the framework for defining and implementing the defence policies of most of its member states; to be a source of legitimacy for operations; and to provide political clout.

In more operational terms, it indicates a capacity: to carry out military operations covering the entire operational spectrum, including the most complex tasks; to carry out large-scale exercises; to provide interoperability among member states; to supply planning

3 B. Stapleton, "Out of area ops are out: reassessing the NATO mission", *War on the Rocks*, 7 July 2016.

4 See D. A. Ruiz Palmer, "A strategic odyssey: constancy of purpose and strategy-making in NATO", *NDC Research Paper* No.3, Rome, April 2019.

assets and a command and control structure for complex operations; to give expertise on a wide range of military-related issues, including defence capacity-building, defence sector reform, training, counter-IED, etc.

The return of "deterrence and defence" following the 2014 Ukraine crisis has brought these two sets of assets back to the fore.

In this military-focused role, the right balance is to be struck between capacities and doctrines for counter-insurgency operations and other types of asymmetrical warfare on the one hand, and those for more traditional war-fighting on the other, for which the know-how may need to be re-learned.[5] Current policy literature refers to the need for NATO to keep the military edge in an ever more interconnected environment; to remain militarily credible, acquire high-end capabilities, enter the digital age and constantly anticipate.[6] For those activities NATO exhibits un-matched potential and legitimacy, and can therefore claim to be in the lead.

Staying focused suggests that some of the "new threats" are not for NATO to tackle but will be better handled by others, and that the Alliance can, as a result, only be *one part* of the answer, very seldom *the* answer. Accordingly, NATO will only play a secondary role in the cyber domain (where member states will have the lead with strong involvement by the private sector); in projecting stability (where the UN, the European Union, regional organizations, states, or local actors will play the bigger part); or in the efforts made in relation to military mobility (where states and the EU are in the lead).

By its very nature, the Projecting Stability domain involves a large range of tasks and actors, often only marginally of a military kind. NATO's engagement in Afghanistan gave birth to the concept of the Comprehensive Approach and showed, if anything, how ISAF was only one of the actors in the play and could only produce an effect if other levels were simultaneously operating.

In Libya, while Operation "Unified Protector" arguably delivered on its narrow military mandate to "protect civilians"[7], the operation suffered from: a flawed strategic vision to which it should have been subordinated; parallel actions taken by states with differing interpretations of UNSC resolution 1973; and the difficulty of ensuring a presence on Libyan territory so as to prevent the country's dislocation once the NATO operation was over. On these three levels the long term success of NATO operations is inevitably a function of the deeds of others.

5 See T. Greenwood and P. Savage, "In search of a 21st-Century Joint Warfighting Concept", *War on the rocks*, September 2019.

6 See "Framework for Future Alliance Operations", SHAPE and ACT, 2018; "Strategic Foresight Analysis", ACT, 2017.

7 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, 17 March 2011, para.4.

It follows that NATO's policy and success will often be dependent on other actors who may be willing to play the game with NATO because of higher stakes, but who may also diverge with NATO on objectives and methods. In many cases, ranging from Iraq and Libya, to Tunisia and Jordan, NATO will not be the most powerful actor, nor the most strategic. This suggests a degree of humility in what can be achieved: in many situations problems will be managed rather than solved, and this is not necessarily easy to accept for an institution like NATO.[8]

The inevitable two-track approach

From the above, one could logically come to the conclusion that NATO should focus on its military identity, and cooperate with others on most other tasks. In practical terms however, a neat division of labour will be problematic, and the push for a certain broadening is likely to be irresistible.

First, no matter how important military tasks are, they may well cover too narrow a spectrum of activities to justify the existence of the Alliance in the long run. Relevance is about providing responses to current problems; this calls for constant adaptation and an inherent broadening of an institution's mandate. By staying focused NATO would run the risk of leaving aside too many of the current threats, and possibly letting others acquire a role in their management. For these reasons activities such as maritime security, cyber security or security sector reform will remain important to NATO.

Second, regardless of whether NATO is the appropriate tool, is there any alternative? One of NATO's advantages is to provide a strategic-level response that is often difficult to find when the Alliance is absent. This hints at the role of the EU and its ambition to play a strategic level role that still needs to be achieved.

Third, even from an operational point of view, a narrow military approach is difficult to reconcile with the evolution of warfare. To start with, the most hardcore military activities will require some connection with the softer dimensions that any military actor must, to an extent, develop.

Most importantly, broadening the agenda becomes more relevant even when we consider collective defence in reference to the Eastern flank and the containment of Russia.

There, hardcore defence goes hand in hand with the necessity to develop resilient societies and tackle threats that are potentially both external and internal (due to their hybrid nature), rendering imperative not only cooperation with civil societies, municipalities, the

8 See R. Haass, "Assessing the value of the NATO Alliance", Testimony before the US Congress, 5 September 2018.

private sector, non-NATO EU member states (Sweden and Finland in particular) and the European Commission, but also a certain know-how in these domains. This is true for Article 5 situations, and even more so in any scenario for NATO action below the Article 5 threshold.

If, as often suggested,[9] a Russian incursion into NATO territory were to take the form of "little green men" taking key positions in (and destabilizing) cities in a Baltic state, together with multi-tracked cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns (which would most likely start much earlier than any physical incursion), apart from the debate about invoking Article 5, would NATO's response not inevitably be multi-faceted, combining high-end rapid reaction military interventions and lower end military-civilian actions? Or in other words, would NATO's response not be at the crossroads between internal and external security and defence? Is this not simply what modern warfare is all about?[10]

Interestingly enough, it is in these scenarios that NATO's core task of collective defence and the more non-traditional internal and police-type tasks come together. So, even a focus on collective defence brings NATO closer to a non-traditional, non-military-centric agenda. This is the nature of contemporary threat management: by definition multi-layered, non-linear, and hybrid.

In this context, what matters is probably less making a choice between the narrow and the broad paths than calibrating the extent of the broadening.[11] Here is the relevance challenge: NATO must keep its military edge and be able to prevail in future military operations, while sufficiently enlarging the scope of its mandate so that it can respond to the most acute contemporary threats.

This implies at least four sets of conclusions: first, the NATO of the Cold War era is no longer a useful point of comparison; the threat environment is simply too different today. Second, maintaining a comparative advantage in the military domain is a priority, failing that, NATO's added value will be at stake. Third, the nature of the threats means that NATO must to a degree embrace a wider security agenda: hybridity calls for it. Finally, partnering with others is vital since there are issues that are simply not NATO's responsibility but that are, nonetheless, essential to NATO's mission.

9 See M. O'Hanlon, "Can America still protect its Allies? How to make deterrence work", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.98, No.5, 2019, p.198; "'They will die in Tallinn': Estonia girds for war with Russia", *Politico*, 10 July 2018.

10 As M. Galeotti puts it, "what is being called hybrid war should really simply be called 'war'", *Russian Political war. Moving beyond the hybrid*, Routledge, 2019, p.8.

11 See J. Shea, "NATO at 70: an opportunity to recalibrate", *NATO Review*, April 2019.

Conclusion

Stephen J. Mariano *

The twelve chapters in this Volume – together with the contributions by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Chairman of the Military Committee, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stuart Peach, and NATO Defense College Research Director, Dr. Thierry Tardy – cover a substantial amount of NATO 70th Anniversary material.

Though the Volume is wide in scope, this chapter attempts to offer summary comments and include a few issues not addressed, concluding with areas for further reflection as NATO moves into the next 70 years.

Success, adaptation, innovation

The Volume widely acknowledges the issue of the Alliance's 70 years of success, yet the discussion quickly moves from self-congratulation to analysis of *why* the Alliance still exists. As authors noted, NATO's success depended on a 40-year agreement on the threat. Nearly every author noted that NATO has had in-house squabbles for most of its life, but those debates were frequently on ways and means. Throughout the Cold War, NATO nations agreed on the singularity of the Soviet threat and that the main purpose of the Alliance was protecting the North Atlantic area. But Nations also held onto common, liberal democratic values and protection of a certain way of life as equally important objectives. The number of threats to Alliance cohesion appears to be on the rise and debate on competing visions of the future has increased. NATO's future success will likely depend on reconciling visions of the future as much as adapting doctrine, concepts, capabilities, and resources.

NATO's ability to adapt – which is equally noted by most authors – offers a more mixed scorecard. On one hand, NATO enlargement might be the grandest organizational adaptation in a millennium and NATO's re-posturing to conduct out-of-area operations in Afghanistan was a strategically creative policy decision that redefined NATO's original conception of collective defense. On the other hand, NATO's twenty years of activity in Afghanistan has not provided markedly noticeable improvements in Afghanistan's security, stability, or standards of living. Even though Al Qaida-connected threats to Euro-Atlantic

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security emanating from Afghanistan have subsided, those threats have transmogrified in Iran, Iraq, and Syria – ironically closer to Europe – which calls into question the success of the operational adaptation. Similarly, Russian activity in Georgia, Estonia, and Ukraine has called into question the success of NATO's "open door" enlargement policy, which offers Alliance membership to qualified democratic states, as a political adaption.

One of the most interesting areas of debate within these pages and at the College is the role that advanced technology plays in NATO's future. Authors cited cyber, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems as examples of innovative technologies that could change the character of war and disrupt the Alliance. While advanced technologies have always played an important role in warfare, and NATO should maintain its technical advantage, perhaps the analysis could have given more attention to political, demographic, societal, ethical, or regional drivers of innovation.

Threats to Alliance cohesion

Most outside observers see a political trend inside Alliance countries that involves increasing nationalism, populism, and "centralism". These trends are affecting the European Union (EU), and due to the large number of EU states that have dual membership, the Alliance. NATO member states seem to be experiencing a philosophical drift, moving away from NATO as the principle instrument of security policy and toward bi-lateral arrangements. Demographic trends as a challenge to Alliance cohesion is equally important. As most Western European states are experiencing negative population growth rates and turbulent immigration policies, it is difficult to avoid considering the effects of demographics on NATO's security for the next 70 years.

On a related topic, analysis on societal trends would shine light on future challenges to NATO. Scholarship on the millennial generation shows they have different conceptions about diversity and longevity in the work place. They also trust the internet more and institutions less than earlier generations, which give power to antagonists who manipulate information. Decreasing support for institutions and susceptibility to misinformation could threaten the Alliance more than drone technology or machine learning.

Ethical dilemmas that accompany new technologies also require additional thought. Increasing automation is likely to extend the physical distance between humans and violence; changing the human position on the battlefield or role in warfare will likely change views about what it means to be afraid, overcome fear, or act courageously. Noticeably, very few of the authors addressed an essential element of the innovation literature, which is that technology is rarely transformative by itself, but instead disrupts a *status quo* when it is

tightly connected with new organizational structures and innovative concepts. Such radical change could significantly affect the way the Alliance achieves security.

Additionally, despite previous Alliance efforts to avoid North-South, East-West regionalization within NATO (e.g. by removing those terms from the names of its headquarters), regionalism has experienced surprising staying power within the Alliance. Russian aggression in the East has transfixed the Baltic States, Poland, and other central European states, while (illegal) immigration across the Mediterranean Sea has captured the attention of southern European countries like Italy, Spain, and Greece.

These political, demographic, social and regional issues have always been part of, or at least on the margins of, NATO's political-military discussions, but in NATO's 70th year, they seemed to have taken on increasing importance and play into Russia's strategic objective of unraveling the European and Trans-Atlantic projects.

Dozens of other challenges threaten Alliance cohesion and because each issue has its own unique context and qualities, no "one-size-fits-all" policy solution exists. A quick scan of recent NATO Summit communiqués and leaders' meeting read-outs provides more challenges than NATO likely has capacity or competence to resolve.

Cross-Mediterranean immigration is a hot topic in Europe and NATO nations are debating the Alliance's role in projecting stability in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. Further to the south, NATO just signed a technical agreement with the African Union's Peace and Security Council, from which nations are now awaiting proposals for cooperation. NATO's support for the UN-AU mission in Somalia, to the G5 Sahel, and to its own Strategic Direction for the South "Hub", are topics of discussion. Furthermore, "old" operations in Afghanistan and southeastern Europe like Kosovo are competing with "new" operations in Iraq and in the northeastern part of Europe.

Turkey's purchase of Russian air defense equipment and operations in Kurdish areas of Syria and Iraq are also complicating NATO relations – internally and externally. Canada and Norway have differing views on NATO's potential role in the Artic. Baltic nations and Germany have different views on Russia's "weaponization" of petroleum pipelines, and US perspectives on China's "belt-and-road initiative" are different than Italy's.

The list of topics that potentially tear the Alliance apart keeps going and the Volume would need another twelve chapters to cover them all: nuclear weapons, arms control, dual-use capable aircraft, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), personal/data protection, use of cyber (offensive), climate change, energy policy, Britain's exit from the European Union, the need for an "EU army", military mobility, rebuilding European infrastructure, and NATO potentially being "brain dead".

Over-thinking these challenges could result in a pessimistic attitude about the future of the Alliance, yet large constituencies are still optimistic about NATO's future, including the NATO Defense College, still advocate for the Alliance's place in international security, and still volunteer to work on behalf of the Alliance. What to do? One answer is keep thinking, keep listening, keep talking, keep analyzing, and keep studying.

Values added

One of the best experiences at the NATO Defense College is having hundreds of high-quality, expert lecturers every year engage with Course members, faculty, researchers, and staff. Even when news headlines provide pessimistic or even apocalyptic views of the Alliance's future, daily life at the College can turn people into optimists about NATO's future. One of the most interesting formats, however, is interaction between experts and Course members during the question and answer sessions. Course members are free to ask penetrating questions and watching invited guests formulate responses, even if sometimes uncomfortably, is a remarkable learning experience. The learning that takes place in this open environment using traditional education methods is as durable as the Alliance itself (the College will celebrate its own 70th Anniversary in 2021).

Similarly, another highlight of the NDC experience is watching Course members debate the most pressing security challenges of our time among themselves. Academic innovators might say the College uses an "adult learning model" or perhaps even a "flipped classroom" where students are teaching faculty members and each other, but these methods are just natural by-products of having experienced, motivated, intelligent, diverse, and respectful people gather to passionately discuss security challenges in a "western" academic institution. Freedom of expression, open discussions, and respect for alternative perspectives are just a few of the values that the College embodies on behalf of the Alliance.

During NATO's 70th Anniversary year and as the NATO Defense College publishes this Volume, its authors remind readers that common, liberal, democratic values are engrained into the North Atlantic Charter and essential to the Alliance's continued success. Promoting those values, along with providing education, research and outreach activity, is also a major reason the NATO Defense College exists. *Unitatem Alentes*!

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