



The new NATO Force Model: ready for launch?

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At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO Allies agreed on a new force model intended to strengthen and modernize the NATO Force Structure and serve as the primary resource for the new generation of Alliance military plans. Previously, NATO's force structure was focused on crisis management, not deterrence of and defence against two key threats – Russia and terror groups. The NATO Force Model was designed to change this as a manifestation of the Alliance's Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, otherwise known as DDA.

The NATO Force Model, which includes the new Allied Reaction Force (ARF), replaces the NATO Response Force (NRF) and its spearhead, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). More broadly, though, the

Summary

NATO Allies are in the process of a dramatic change to the Alliance's force structure, which will see the NATO Response Force (NRF) replaced with a three-tiered structure of Allied forces, to include an Allied Reaction Force (ARF), all of which is designed to better defend and deter.

This new NATO Force Model faces a variety of challenges, from whether Allies will have sufficient forces at appropriate readiness levels to fulfil their own objectives to whether SACEUR will still have the authority to "alert, stage and prepare" Allied forces as a crisis emerges, through whether and how the Alliance's command structure now needs a re-examination as well.

To avoid the potential pitfalls and ensure the Alliance fulfils its own vision, NATO and its member nations ought to consider an array of mitigating steps, such as using snap exercises and inspection visits to ensure forces are indeed manned, trained and equipped, and emphasizing mass and capacity in Allied acquisition plans and capability targets.

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NATO Force Model was designed to be a more systematic organization of the entire force pool, which is comprised of mostly land formations but includes air, maritime, cyber and space forces as well, to deliver an Allied response at a greater scale and at higher readiness.

However, as implementation of the NATO Force Model unfolds, there are key questions surrounding whether and how the Allies will fulfil their own vision. This paper examines the rationale behind the launch of the new force model and outlines key elements of it, including force organization, force management, command and control, and the alert system used to activate it. It also offers an assessment of implementation, what might be expected in the months ahead, and what steps the Alliance might consider to avoid potential pitfalls on the path toward achieving its objectives.

A new Force Model for a new threat environment

One of NATO's most significant achievements since Russia's first invasion of Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 has been approval of a Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and agreement on a series of related operations plans to counter specific threats, foremost among them Russia. The new family of operations plans – agreed in full at the Vilnius Summit in 2023 – provides a single, threat-based demand signal for the Allies in the form of the Force Structure Requirement (FSR), as opposed to multiple force elements lists from several separate plans previously. The FSR outlines the number and types of equipment and units that NATO requires, across all regions and domains, to ensure the Alliance can defend itself as described in the operations plans.

The NATO Force Model represents the supply that is available to fill the FSR demand signal. Although the NATO Force Model represents the entire force pool available to NATO, it does not represent the *entire* force inventory of all Allies, who retain some forces and capabilities for national purposes. In practice, Allies are taking their time to embrace a full “all-in” approach. Although the International Staff at NATO would have preferred an “all-in” approach immediately, Allies have proven reluctant to place *all* of their forces in the “pool” because they fear it means a loss of full control over their forces and/or that those forces are not available for national missions.

To better meet the requirements of the DDA concept and its operations plans, NATO needs more forces at a higher level of readiness. To achieve this, NATO's military authorities first have to gain greater visibility of the military forces within the Alliance's member states and to ensure their readiness levels are sufficient. Even before the 2020 approval of the DDA concept, NATO had begun working to increase readiness while also granting Alliance military authorities more insights into and access to nations' forces. For instance, the 2018 NATO Readiness Initiative, launched to enhance the Alliance's rapid response capability, was a key step in the effort to significantly raise readiness levels since 2014. It committed Allies to providing 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 surface combatants ready to use within 30 days or less. Unfortunately, and despite how it was presented at the time, this “Four 30s” initiative appears in retrospect to have amounted to less of a quantitative requirement and more of a general direction of travel.

In any case, the key point is that the Allies have recognized the necessity of redefining their command and force structure requirements given the threat posed by Russia, and events since February 2022 have only spurred faster adaptation.


Force organization

In the context of Russia's massive invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the return of large-scale combat in Europe, NATO needed to build upon the Readiness Initiative and achieve even higher readiness standards for an even larger array of forces. Under the terms of the NATO Force Model, the Alliance will have a three-tiered system of readiness for forces that it will draw upon to fulfil the requirements of the recently approved operations plans across three sub-regions of Europe – the Arctic and North Atlantic, southern Europe, and southeastern Europe.

Tier 1 forces, numbering roughly 100,000 troops, are to be ready within 0 to 10 days following the eruption of a crisis or predictive warning of the same. These forces are mostly comprised of so-called “in-place” forces, which include both national troops based at their home station as well as troops of other NATO Allies who are on deployments or missions in the Ally subject to the crisis. For example, in the case of Estonia, the Tier 1 forces include Estonian forces plus those of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence mission – increasingly known by the post-Vilnius moniker, Forward Land Forces – based at Tapa Air Base, with about 1,400 troops from the United Kingdom, France and Denmark. The linking of forces to specific roles and geography, through specific plans, allows heavier land forces to be included by leveraging geographic proximity and regional familiarity.

Tier 2 forces number roughly 200,000 troops and are to be ready within 10 to 30 days. These forces are generally more multi-domain in terms of capabilities, relative to the lighter, rapid-response forces of Tier 1. They are also in larger formations, such as divisions and corps, than Tier 1 forces. Finally, there are the Tier 3 forces. These number roughly 500,000 troops and must be ready for action in 30 to 180 days.

In addition to the three tiers, the Alliance is also building an Allied Reaction Force (ARF). This quick reaction force differs from a previous kind of quick response force known as the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which was perceived within the Alliance as too heavy and too slow, and which was consistently facing



Source: NATO

shortfalls.¹ In fact, because the Allies never contributed enough forces to it, the VJTF never fulfilled its so-called “fill rate.”

The ARF also differs from the VJTF insofar as it is truly multi-domain, including cyber and space – the VJTF was merely joint, including land, air and maritime elements, along with special operations forces. This represents a somewhat new challenge for the Allies, and for at least the foreseeable future, the ARF’s cyber and space elements will be drawn directly from those Allies with relevant capabilities, depending on operational requirements. The ARF maritime force, comprising a framework of several ships plus other tailored forces as necessary, will be drawn from the Alliance’s extant Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs). Given the historically low fill rates of the SNMGs and the fact that forces devoted to the SNMGs may have other missions to prepare for and conduct, it may have been more effective to have a dedicated maritime force solely focused on the ARF mission set, but the Allies lack the capacity to achieve this.

The ARF is not solely focused on the deterrence and defence task but instead will be capable of performing functions in support of *all* core tasks. This may seem counterintuitive, since the primary threat facing the Alliance is Russia, made most manifest in areas along the Eastern frontier, from Norway and Finland in the north to Türkiye in the south. However, some Allies insisted that the ARF be capable of conducting crisis management as

well as classical deterrence and defence operations.² For this reason, the ARF is not explicitly focused on any one of the core tasks. Nonetheless, to ensure the ARF remains ready for, if not largely focused on deterrence and defence missions, it will likely have a training concept and exercise plan heavy on Article 5 scenarios.

Force management

To identify the specific units from within the overall force model that will fulfil the requirements of the regional plans as well as the ARF during any given period, the Alliance conducts force sourcing conferences. For the purposes of the operations plans, force sourcing conferences are conducted roughly three times per year. Meanwhile, for the purposes of the ARF, force sourcing conferences are conducted roughly once per year.

Given the readiness demands of the ARF, force sourcing is conducted two years in advance of the year the forces are needed. This allows at least a year for the contributing Allies to prepare their units, which are then certified by NATO. Following certification, ARF forces will be on stand-by from July of one year to June of the next, versus January to December as was the case with the VJTF and NRF. This summer-to-summer alignment better corre-

¹ Interview with a staff officer at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, 18 April 2023.

² Interview with a civilian official at NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium, 6 September 2023; interview with a staff officer at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, 18 April 2023.

sponds to the exercise programmes of the Allies. Once on stand-by status, ARF-identified forces may be subject to snap exercises as a way of validating their readiness, assuming there is funding available.³

Beyond the ARF, and with regard to the broader array of forces within the NATO Force Model, the Alliance will not have a formal certification process across all tiers. Indeed, verifying whether the Allies have the forces they say they have at appropriate readiness levels across all three tiers, while perhaps logical, would require significantly more personnel within the two strategic commands at Mons and Norfolk. Instead, the focus is on verifying the forces merely within Tiers 1 and 2. Nonetheless, the NATO defence planning capability review process will complement this effort by looking across the entirety of an Ally's force inventory, while focusing on the specific outputs agreed in contribution to the operations plan requirements.

The two-part verification process for Tiers 1 and 2 will first entail an Alliance prioritization board comparing the operational/regional plans with the national reporting of forces against those plans. The analysis resulting from this comparison will then be informed by unannounced visits to military staffs in relevant Allied defence establishments.

It is unclear, though, whether this verification approach will have sufficient rigour. There are well-documented readiness challenges among some of NATO's leading European members.⁴ In part, this reflects the inherently difficult task of defining, measuring and assessing readiness in military units, a challenge that even the Alliance's foremost member has struggled with.⁵ Nonetheless, a more robust system of snap exercises and unannounced inspection visits to motor pools, barracks, depots and other facilities would make great sense. However, Allies are reluctant to permit this – most likely because of the expense involved and because it could lead to some embarrassment.

Unfortunately, this verification approach is not much of an improvement over what existed under the NRF or under examinations conducted as part of the NATO Defence Planning Process. The risk is that some Allies may claim capabilities, capacity and/or readiness levels that exist only on paper. Given past practice, it is possible some “cheating” will occur, and it will be up to NATO staffs in Brussels, Mons and Norfolk to perform more difficult due diligence.

Command and control

Beginning in 2022 and continuing through summer 2023, NATO conducted an analysis of the arrangements necessary to command and control the forces aligned to the operational plans. Putting a well-reasoned, fully resourced command and control arrangement in place in advance of when it is needed is critical for deterrence and defence – this enables the headquarters staff to train together, building trust and capability before a crisis erupts. Most importantly, it allows mission rehearsal based on approved plans.

At the joint warfighter level, NATO will maintain its three joint force headquarters – in Brunssum, Netherlands; Naples, Italy; and Norfolk, Virginia – but the areas of responsibility among them will evolve somewhat over the short run. The accession of Finland and Sweden complicated the command and control analysis. On the one hand, placing in the hands of JFC Brunssum responsibility for operational plans covering Finland and Sweden makes sense because Brunssum also has responsibility for Poland and the Baltic states – this would facilitate a holistic approach to defence of the Baltic region. Plus, JFC Norfolk lacks the appropriate manning levels at present.

But on the other hand, Brunssum's span of control is already at its maximum, and splitting Finland and Sweden from their Nordic neighbour Norway, which is under JFC Norfolk, is not logical. All three of the Nordics plus the Baltic states could have been placed under JFC Norfolk, but it makes more sense to keep the Baltics under Brunssum, given its land domain emphasis and the nature of the threat to those three countries.

A third alternative would have been to create a fourth Joint Force Headquarters, focused on the Nordics, the Baltic Sea and the High North, leaving JFC Norfolk to focus on the challenge of securing the vast North Atlantic (especially the Greenland-Iceland-UK [GIUK] gap). Such a JFC could perhaps be based in the United Kingdom so as to leverage its historically strong role in the Alliance, its naval traditions and its key role as a regional leader as well, including through such frameworks as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Extant Alliance commands located in the UK, such as the NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) or the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), could have formed the kernel of this new JFC. However, Allies have so far proven reluctant to pursue a fourth JFC, most likely for cost reasons.⁶ So, for the time being, JFC Brunssum will have responsibility for plans defending Finland and Sweden but only until JFC Norfolk is fully resourced.

At the next echelon of command, NATO's analysis revealed that 11 corps headquarters are necessary to command the many divisions and brigades required for the

³ Email exchange with a civilian official at NATO HQ, 11 December 2023.

⁴ Gabriel Rinaldi, “Germany Can't fulfill NATO Obligations, Says Army Chief in Leaked Memo,” *Politico*, 11 April 2023, <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-nato-leaked-memo-defense-budget-boris-pistorius/>; Elise Vincent, “French Military Confronts Challenge of Personnel Quitting,” *Le Monde*, 10 May 2023, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2023/05/10/french-military-confronts-challenge-of-personnel-quitting_6026178_7.html; Andrew Chuter, “British Army Admits More Delays in Fielding Enough Combat Forces,” *Defense News*, 12 October 2020, <https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/10/12/british-army-admits-more-delays-in-fielding-enough-combat-forces/>.

⁵ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, et al., *Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force* (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2017), pp. 51-60; Todd Harrison, “Rethinking Readiness,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* (Fall 2014), vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 38-68, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26270619>.

⁶ Interview with a civilian official at NATO HQ, 28 March 2023; interview with a civilian official at JFC Brunssum, Netherlands, 21 March 2023.

operational plans. Fortunately, the Alliance has several of these already, although whether they all have the required enablers remains unclear.⁷ They include:

- Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Innsbruck, United Kingdom;
- NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy (NRDC-IT) in Solbiate Olona near Milan;
- NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Spain (NRDC-Spain) in Valencia;
- NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Türkiye (NRDC-T) based near Istanbul;
- 1st German-Netherlands Corps based in Münster, Germany;
- Rapid Reaction Corps France (RRC-FR) in Lille;
- NATO Deployable Corps Greece (NRDC-GR) based in Thessaloniki;
- Eurocorps based in Strasbourg, France;
- Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) in Szczecin, Poland; and
- Multinational Corps Southeast (MNC-SE) in Sibiu, Romania.

It is unclear where the remaining corps will come from. In theory, the US V Corps, formerly based in Heidelberg, Germany, but now split-based between Ft. Knox, Kentucky and Poznan, Poland, could become the last one to fill out the structure.

Modernizing SACEUR's alert system

In the event of a crisis, Allied Command Operations will be required to put into motion the operations plans and activate the Allied force structure. However, ACO can only do this after the North Atlantic Council has given the go-ahead. The time required for this process to unfold could provide an adversary with key advantages, inadvertently facilitating a *fait accompli* and catching the Alliance flatfooted.

In the wake of Russia's first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the Alliance granted ACO the authority to "alert, stage and prepare" Allied forces as a crisis emerged but before the NAC had taken any decisions.⁸ Following Russia's second invasion in February 2022 and the ensuing brutal war against Ukraine, the Allies realized that even

this was not sufficient, and so the NAC granted SACEUR greater leeway in preparing the VJTF before a full-blown conflict emerges.

Today, it is unclear whether those authorities will or should apply to the ARF. One might argue that the Alliance has loosened the political reins too much with regard to the VJTF, and that SACEUR should be required to request approval from the NAC before preparing, alerting or staging the ARF. Such tensions – between a SACEUR interested in preparing forces as soon as possible in the face of a crisis and a NAC interested in safeguarding sovereign decision-making – have long existed in the Alliance.⁹

Although political control must ultimately remain with the NAC, turning the clock back on SACEUR's peacetime activation authorities in a post-2022 security environment seems particularly risky. This is especially so when it comes to reinforcement and supply networks. Given exposed covert operations directed against the Polish transportation network and bombings at Bulgarian ammunition storage facilities, Russia has already shown a willingness to test the boundaries.¹⁰ It stands to reason, then, that SACEUR needs greater flexibility, not further constraints, if the Allies are serious about adopting a "fight tonight" attitude and capability.¹¹

Prospects for implementation

The process of Allies reporting whether and where their forces fit into this new force structure construct continues to unfold. So far, and when viewed broadly, Allied identification of forces necessary to fulfil the requirements of the operations plans as well as the ARF has generally been successful. The Allies have met most, but not all, of the analysed requirements. Although the ARF still lacks sufficient forces in a few niche areas, it has nearly achieved its fill rate; it is expected to be combat credible by the time of its activation in July 2024.¹²

However, there are persistent challenges. Some of these were foreshadowed above, including the suitability of the command and control arrangements and whether Allies will actually have forces as capable and ready as they claim. Most significant of those challenges noted above, though, is the gap between what the Allies have on hand and what the operations plans require. To explain, even though the NATO Force Model may not represent *all* forces across

⁷ Interview with a civilian official at NATO HQ, 8 September 2023.

⁸ "Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers", North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 24 June 2015, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120967.htm.

⁹ "A Report by the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council on Allied Command Europe Counter-Surprise Military Alert System," MC 67 (revised), originally dated 29 November 1956, declassified 10 September 1992, <https://archives.nato.int/allied-command-europe-counter-surprise-military-alert-system-5>.

¹⁰ "Poland Detains Suspected Russian Spies 'Preparing Acts of Sabotage'", *Euronews*, 17 March 2023, <https://www.euronews.com/2023/03/17/poland-detains-suspected-russian-spies-preparing-acts-of-sabotage>; "Overnight Explosion Rocks Ammunition Depot In Bulgaria," *RFE/RL*, 31 July 2022, <https://www.rferl.org/a/bulgaria-gebrev-ammunition-depot-explosion/31967824.html>; Krassen Nikolov, "Explosions at Bulgarian Arms Factory Set to Export To Ukraine", *Euractiv*, 26 June 2023, <https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/explosions-at-bulgarian-arms-factory-set-to-export-to-ukraine/>.

¹¹ Brendan Cole, "NATO Forges Secret Plans Against Russia—'We Are Ready To Fight Tonight!'", *Newsweek*, 18 May 2023, <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-nato-alliance-war-1801199>.

¹² Email exchange with a civilian official at NATO HQ, 11 December 2023; email exchange with an allied officer at SHAPE, 16 May 2024.

all Allies, generally it can be thought of as the supply of forces available *today*. The challenge facing NATO is that a gap exists between that available supply and what the operations plans demand, as spelled out in the FSR. Another analytical tool – the Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) – is designed to fill that gap as the “supply of tomorrow”. The MCR is part of the quadrennial NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), and it represents what the Allies are working toward over the next 19 years, including what is already in the inventory today.¹³ The question confronting Allies is how quickly the MCR – and by extension the Ally-specific capability targets that are based upon it – can close the gap, given political will, defence spending and industrial capacity, between what is on hand today and what is needed to fulfil the operations plans.

But beyond this gap and the other challenges suggested above, additional hurdles are emerging as well. For example, European Allies in particular have shortfalls in Integrated Air and Missile Defence and other key enablers. This was perhaps predictable given the effort to arm Ukraine and the high demand for air defence systems there at nearly every range, as well as a lack of emphasis on this capability area following many years operating against adversaries, like the Taliban, that lacked air power. Acquiring the necessary systems will not occur overnight and in some cases could take years.¹⁴

Moreover, there are significant requirements in the new operations plans for medium and heavy units, especially at the Tier 2 level. Allies do not have sufficient quantities of these kinds of forces on hand, much less at the readiness levels required. European defence investment decisions over the last decade have generally favoured capability enhancements over added capacity.¹⁵ In an era of ubiquitous battlefield ISR, relying on a smaller pool of highly advanced platforms presents too great a risk – namely, that massed Russian indirect fires and uncrewed weapons systems will wipe out that smaller number of advanced NATO platforms early in a conflict, leaving little available for a counterattack. For this reason, the Allies need mass, if not in the motor pools today, then in the hardened prepositioned sites for tomorrow.

Additionally, even the success of the ARF in achieving a relatively high fill rate that was noted above deserves an asterisk. The success in fulfilling most of its requirements so far is largely due to the fact that the ARF is a lighter force than the VJTF, and nearly all Allies have light forces. Their lack of heavy forces in the inventory reflects the kinds of adversaries the Allies have tended to face during the post-Cold War period of 1991 to 2014 but it also reflects severe underinvestment by many of the Alliance’s biggest players. The irony is that *many* Allies produce heavy armoured combat vehicles. Eight European NATO Allies – Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Türkiye and the UK – produce main battle tanks, while 15 European NATO Allies produce other kinds of armoured

combat vehicles. Viewed another way, perhaps it is this multiplicity of European manufacturers that is actually the problem, reflecting a persistent irrationality in the European defence market that results in inefficient use of what limited defence spending is available.

Recommendations and conclusions

How can the Alliance best avoid the pitfalls outlined above and maximize the odds that the new force model will indeed deliver what NATO needs? Among other steps, NATO and its member nations should consider the following:

Build a maritime component for the ARF that is tasked with no other mission set and that is not based on the SNMGs. This would help to ensure the ARF is truly joint and has the capacity necessary immediately.

Ease the burdens of the ARF command staff and units by focusing them entirely on defence and deterrence missions, primarily in northeastern Europe and in the vicinity of Romania. The days when NATO could get away with spreading its peanut butter as broadly as possible ended in February 2022.

Ensure the ARF is indeed tested at least once per year with a no-notice readiness exercise. This could result in somewhat embarrassing outcomes, but it is the most effective way to ensure learning, adaptation and, ultimately, readiness.

Refocus elements of ACT to certify *all* forces across all tiers, not merely Tiers 1 and 2. For too long, Allies have got away with not putting their money where their rhetoric is on readiness, force structure and capacity. Those days *should be over*.

Reinforce the certification process of *all* tiers with a robust system of snap exercises and unannounced inspection visits to motor pools, barracks, depots and other facilities. As noted above, in post-2022 security environment, the Allies cannot afford to be paper tigers.

Especially given the recent accession of Sweden, reconsider and revamp Alliance command structures to unburden JFC Norfolk with responsibility for Alliance plans covering Scandinavia. Ideally, the Alliance should create a fourth Joint Forces Command manned largely by UK personnel, based in Great Britain, and focused on Scandinavia, Finland and the Arctic.

Ensure SACEUR maintains the authority to “alert, stage and prepare” the ARF, as was the case with the VJTF. Doing otherwise flies in the face of logic, given the unpredictable Russian threat and the evident brutality of its military forces.

¹³ For more on the NDPP, see John R. Deni, *Security Threats, American Pressure, and the Role of Key Personnel: How NATO's Defence Planning Process is Alleviating the Burden-Sharing Dilemma* (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press), 2020, <https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/919/>.

¹⁴ “Ukraine’s allies are scrambling to bolster its air defences”, *The Economist*, 24 October 2023, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/24/ukraines-allies-are-scrambling-to-bolster-its-air-defences>.

¹⁵ John R. Deni, “European Strategies in Post-Pandemic Peer Competition: Implications for America,” *Defence Studies* (2022) 22:4, pp. 644-65, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2110473.

Emphasize the role of mass in Allied force structure requirements and capability target development, particularly that which is stored in hardened prepositioned equipment sites.

Enlist the EU and the NATO Defence Planning Process in efforts to rationalize the European defence industry through incentives as well as penalties. Reducing the number of distinct main battle tank or armoured combat vehicle platforms, for example, will not only save money, it will also make sustainment far easier in the event of a conflict.

In sum, although NATO has made tremendous strides since Russia launched its brutal war against Ukraine

in terms of revamping how it provides security for its members, there are still many bumps in the road ahead. Navigating them will require a long-term commitment to reversing a quarter century of underinvestment as well as more novel, bureaucracy-busting steps to unleash and consolidate the defence industry in order to build capacity and stockpiles in the short run. The upcoming Washington Summit in mid-2024 would be an ideal occasion to focus Allied leaders on the magnitude of the requirements they have signed up for and convince them to take more dramatic action without delay, instead of handing such challenges to their successors.

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