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Because of its magnitude, economic dimension, and lethality, the COVID-19 crisis has\u00a0 raised a wide range of questions that pertain to how seismic the crisis is, how much it will\u00a0 shape international politics and in what ways it is going to change the way we live. These\u00a0 are strategic-level questions (with very practical consequences) that only arose to the same\u00a0 degree in the context of the Second World War. \u00a0<\/p>\n
The analysis of the impact of the current crisis on international security is not an easy\u00a0 exercise given that a) the crisis is not over and b) it will impact so many interconnected\u00a0 domains over such a long period that the number of unknowns is immense. The way\u00a0 and speed in which COVID-19 has already changed our lives \u2013 who would have thought\u00a0 in January 2020 that just three months later all of Europe’s economies would be totally\u00a0 paralyzed with most of their populations at home under lock-down? \u2013 are also an invitation to some prudence, or modesty, when it comes to predicting the fallout. On three occasions\u00a0 over the last 20 years, major events on the international scene \u2013 9\/11, the Arab Spring,\u00a0 and the current health crisis \u2013 have come as strategic surprises to our societies (if not to\u00a0 policy-makers and security experts). Not that global terrorism, political and social unrest in\u00a0 the MENA region or pandemics were absent from strategic foresight exercises, but the way\u00a0 they happened and, even more uncertainly, the type of cascading effects they provoked,\u00a0 were simply beyond any predictive capacity. \u00a0<\/p>\n
The topic of the day, and of this Research Paper<\/em>, is more the cascading effects of the\u00a0 current crisis than its non-prediction. Looking back at 9\/11 and the Arab Spring, and at\u00a0 what those events meant for NATO, one can only acknowledge that such implications\u00a0 could hardly have been fully comprehended in the midst of the two events. \u00a0<\/p>\n Who would have predicted, on 12 September 2001, that what had happened the day\u00a0 before would inter alia <\/em>lead NATO to run its largest operation ever, at more than 7,000\u00a0 km away from Europe, and in a country \u2013 Afghanistan \u2013 that arguably did not appear in\u00a0 the national security and defence strategies of the vast majority of Allies? Ten years later,\u00a0 in the context of the Arab Spring, and a few months after NATO Allies adopted their\u00a0 New Strategic Concept, how likely was the type of operation that NATO ran in Libya,\u00a0 in the name of the Responsibility to Protect, and who fully grasped what this operation\u00a0 would mean for the overall stability of the entire MENA region (and, slightly ironically, for\u00a0 NATO’s Projecting Stability agenda as framed at the 2016 Warsaw Summit)? \u00a0<\/p>\n Those uncertainties, and methodological difficulties, complicate any broad strategic\u00a0 stock-taking exercise in the current context; incidentally, this will have to be factored in by\u00a0 the newly-established NATO Reflection Group, mandated at the December 2019 London\u00a0 Leaders Meeting to “offer recommendations to reinforce Alliance unity, increase political\u00a0 consultation and coordination between Allies, and strengthen NATO’s political role”. \u00a0<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, and with the above caveats in mind, issues such as the nature of\u00a0 the strategic environment, the evolution of war, our understanding of the notion of threat\u00a0 and security (and whose security we are talking about), as well as how all of these may\u00a0 impact NATO as a politico-military alliance, are to be debated. The seven chapters of this\u00a0 NDC Research Paper <\/em>aim to shed light on some of these issues; they were produced by the\u00a0 researchers and visiting fellows of the NDC Research Division in the weeks that followed\u00a0 the outbreak of the crisis. \u00a0<\/p>\n In the first Chapter, Andrea Gilli looks at some of the implications of the COVID-19\u00a0 crisis on the international system, and identifies five main consequences, articulated around\u00a0 the idea that micro-parasites may favour an age of “bigness”. First, important choices\u00a0 lie ahead of us. Decisions taken in the domains of health, economics or the place of\u00a0 multilateral frameworks will likely significantly affect the years to come, although the full\u00a0 effects are difficult to grasp at this stage. Second, a big divide in our societies will probably\u00a0 emerge, including between those who have access to healthcare, digital technologies and\u00a0 financial resources and those who do not, with all the consequences on society and national\u00a0 cohesion that this divide may create. Third, the COVID-19 crisis has further emphasized\u00a0 the importance of technology, and the necessity to adapt those technologies to much bigger\u00a0 needs, to the benefit of big tech companies. Fourth, the health crisis will bring about a big\u00a0 recession as well as it will challenge some of the premises of globalization; the State will\u00a0 grow in importance as a consequence. Finally, the crisis could lead to a big retrenchment,\u00a0 as Western countries may have to concentrate more on domestic issues. \u00a0<\/p>\n In the second Chapter, Thierry Tardy unpacks the possible consequences of the crisis\u00a0 on the very notion of security, and on NATO. With the current crisis, pandemics have\u00a0 moved from the category of possible contingencies to that of reality. Yet COVID-19 is a\u00a0 threat with no enemy, i.e. “there is no Clausewitzian ‘collision of two living forces’ or the\u00a0 confrontation of two opposing strategies”. Furthermore, the COVID-19 crisis epitomizes\u00a0 both the transnational dimension of the threat and the individual as a target, leading to\u00a0 the “individual-centric” notion of human security, making resilience a key element of\u00a0 any security policy. This will impact security entities’ narratives, threat prioritization, and\u00a0 even thinking and policy-making about war-fighting in different ways. Insofar as NATO is\u00a0 concerned, the current COVID-19 risks further exacerbating the challenges that NATO\u00a0 is facing. The Alliance will remain indispensable as the overall international security\u00a0 environment deteriorates; however, issues such as internal cohesion, burden-sharing or\u00a0 assessment of and adaptation to the “new” threats will be further tested, in an environment\u00a0 where new priorities \u2013 in relation to health or simply economic recovery \u2013 will appear on\u00a0 national radar screens. \u00a0<\/p>\n Third, Marc Ozawa explores Russia’s policy in the first months of the crisis, and in\u00a0 particular the disinformation campaign that Russia has instigated, largely targeting NATO\u00a0 and its member states. Those campaigns fit a recurring pattern. Not only do they “support\u00a0 the usual goals of discrediting NATO and undermining its cohesion”, they also aim to\u00a0 “advance geopolitical circumstances towards the optimal strategic outcome” of Russia’s\u00a0 decision-makers. In response, NATO has implemented a series of actions, through the\u00a0 systematic tracking of false and misleading messages, to developing counter narratives\u00a0 backed up by facts and data. For Ozawa, the Russian efforts at information manipulation\u00a0 may, however, be counterproductive. They have the potential to “backfire not only in\u00a0 terms of their desired propaganda effects, but also on the overall state of bilateral relations\u00a0 between Russia and key members of the Alliance”. As with Russia’s annexation of Crimea,\u00a0 which had a unifying effect within NATO, “Russia’s actions in the age of the Coronavirus\u00a0 could have an even deeper unifying impact on NATO and ultimately on its cohesion”. \u00a0<\/p>\n In the fourth Chapter, Chlo\u00e9 Berger and Cynthia Salloum analyze the possible\u00a0 consequences of the crisis for the MENA region, what it means for NATO and the\u00a0 Alliance’s Projecting Stability agenda. The “South” appears highly vulnerable to the\u00a0 COVID-19 pandemic due to generally fragile health systems, but also as a result of political\u00a0 instability and conflicts in the region. Berger and Salloum acknowledge that NATO is not\u00a0 a first responder in the management of the COVID-19 crisis, and that given the nature of\u00a0 the vulnerabilities in the South, NATO’s role can only be limited. However, they also point\u00a0 to the intertwining of security developments in the South with our own situation, making\u00a0 the involvement of the Alliance in building the resilience of societies on our periphery\u00a0 indispensable. This is what Projecting Stability is supposed to be about. In practice though,\u00a0 the potential destabilization of the entire region as a result of the current crisis, and the\u00a0 transformation of the health crisis into a security crisis, may lead NATO to be involved in\u00a0 very different ways, and not only through capacity-building. \u00a0<\/p>\n Fifth, Dumitru Minzarari offers an evaluation of the possible impact of the COVID-19\u00a0 crisis on the nature of war. He first argues that the pandemic is likely to serve as a catalyst\u00a0 for escalating violence in conflicts by encouraging the choosing of risky military strategies.\u00a0 More fundamentally, Minzarari contends that the current crisis will trigger a shift in\u00a0 interstate aggression practices, moving away from “war in the physical realm” towards\u00a0 “war in the social realm”, of which hybrid hostilities are an example. While conventional\u00a0 wars aim to conquer and control territory, for Minzarari, “war in the social realm” aims at\u00a0 “acquiring control over the other two elements of a state’s sovereignty, which are ruling\u00a0 elites and population”. And because conventional wars have become too costly and\u00a0 ineffective, “targeting population and ruling elites” through other means is becoming the\u00a0 dominant model in modern interstate conflict. For Minzarari, this shift from one type\u00a0 of confrontation to the other is facilitated by the health crisis as it creates a conducive\u00a0 environment for the manipulation of citizens and the influencing of elites, in particular by\u00a0 Russia. If confirmed, the shift will arguably demand a fundamental review of NATO’s and\u00a0 member states’ defence policies, planning processes and strategies. \u00a0<\/p>\n In the sixth Chapter, Ion Iftimie looks at the weaponization of biological agents and\u00a0 discusses NATO’s role as a guarantor of biodefence and deterrence. While COVID-19\u00a0 is not categorized as a biological weapon, the current crisis offers a real-life scenario of\u00a0 what bioterrorism could lead to. In the fight against bioterrorism, the Allies will continue\u00a0 to play the most central role. The Alliance, however, should be “prepared (if called upon)\u00a0 to assist members and partner nations during growing threats in the biosphere or in the\u00a0 germs domain”. For Iftimie, enhancing NATO’s situational awareness, capabilities and\u00a0 engagements, is critical in at least four lines of effort: “first, to prevent the increase in\u00a0 intent and capabilities of terrorist entities; second to pursue indicators and warnings\u00a0 of bioterrorism activities; third to protect civilians and critical infrastructure of NATO\u00a0 members; and fourth to prepare for future bioterrorism attacks”. As Iftimie puts it, the\u00a0 post-COVID-19 crisis era “offers a good moment for lessons to be identified and learned,\u00a0 and for these issues to be actively considered and acted upon, for the next biological attack\u00a0 may be even more deadly and destabilizing”. \u00a0<\/p>\n Finally, in the last Chapter, Howard Coombs offers a historical perspective of the\u00a0 current crisis, in relation to the 1918-19 Spanish Flu. A retrospective of 1918-1919 provides\u00a0 a glimpse of the impact of that outbreak on the various combatant forces of that time.\u00a0 From that, one can discern some of the choices that modern militaries must grapple with\u00a0 during a global pandemic. Coombs makes three sets of observations that are pertinent\u00a0 to the current situation, relative to force protection, operational tempo, and support to\u00a0 civilian authorities. At these three levels, a century ago as today, armed forces have proved\u00a0 simultaneously vulnerable and able to adapt, most notably to support their own civilian\u00a0 partners. Coombs concludes with some thoughts about the handling of future pandemics,\u00a0 and how NATO can adapt. For him, NATO militaries “not only need to consider the\u00a0 impact of illness on both military and civilian personnel”, but must also “contingency plan\u00a0 for how they will simultaneously conduct operations while protecting and preserving their\u00a0 forces for future activities”. \u00a0<\/p>\n These seven texts do not offer an exhaustive overview of all the challenges lying ahead.\u00a0 They nonetheless put into perspective some key developments that may occur as a result of\u00a0 the current COVID-19 crisis. In doing this at least three levels of analysis appear, dealing\u00a0 respectively with the nature of globalization, the nature of threats and wars, and the nature\u00a0 of security governance, by states, non-state actors, or institutions, including NATO. \u00a0<\/p>\n As far as globalization is concerned, the crisis may accelerate already recognized trends\u00a0 such as a questioning of globalization and its effects on the sovereignty of states and the\u00a0 well-being of their people. The nature of global supply chains, over-dependence on China\u00a0 in some areas of goods production, the virtues of free travel and borderless regions, or the\u00a0 overexploitation of natural resources (and incidentally, the increasing proximity of human\u00a0 populations to wild species, which explains the spread of some diseases) are but a few\u00a0 examples of issues that will be looked at differently in the post-crisis era. Whether this\u00a0 leads to a better world is uncertain, as most of the sources of instability will remain; and\u00a0 there is no guarantee that the current crisis will make the environment a priority of public\u00a0 policies, especially at a time of unprecedented economic crisis. \u00a0<\/p>\n Second, the COVID-19 crisis will shape our own conception of threats and subsequently\u00a0 the nature of security policies and warfighting. Two parallel trends are possible here: on\u00a0 the one hand, the nature of the current threat may lead to an increased focus on human\u00a0 security considerations over strictly-defined defence matters. Debates on issues such as\u00a0 health security, resilience or civil protection will gain momentum and likely lead to policy\u00a0 choices \u2013 far beyond the defence and security realm \u2013 that would have been difficult to\u00a0 envisage prior to the crisis. On the other hand, the general destabilization of countries or\u00a0 regions, or the increased tensions between great powers that may result from the health\u00a0 crisis \u2013 scenario of a health crisis morphing into a security crisis \u2013 may lead to conflicts that\u00a0 will call for some sort of renewed defence (and crisis management) efforts. \u00a0<\/p>\n Finally, how states, non-state actors and international organizations assume their\u00a0 responsibilities as security actors and interact with one another remains difficult to assess at\u00a0 this stage. What has already been observed is how the state <\/em>with its highest prerogatives has\u00a0 been at the centre of the policy response to COVID-19, in line with a narrow understanding\u00a0 of the “national interest”. In this picture though, none of the great powers has appeared\u00a0 in a real position of leadership, and the US risks coming out of the crisis in a relatively\u00a0 weaker position than before. As for China, early hesitations in the management of the\u00a0 crisis and the fact that the virus may have originated from there, will tarnish China’s profile\u00a0 as a great, responsible, power; and how adjustments to the meaning of globalization will\u00a0 impact its position is unclear; in the medium term though, China may well benefit from\u00a0 the relative decline of the US, and therefore confirm its rise on the international scene.\u00a0 In the meantime, non-state actors have also played an important role in some domains,\u00a0 most notably the GAFAMs though the provision of technological tools that have enabled\u00a0 entire sectors to continue to operate despite the lockdown. In this context, multilateralinstitutions have not appeared as a privileged tool of governance of the crisis, and they\u00a0 may suffer from the strengthening of nationalist policies. In the longer run, the virtues of\u00a0 multilateral institutions are likely to appear in a better light, in the broad global governance\u00a0 domain (including health), but also in the security domain, where the transnational nature\u00a0 of threats is difficult to reconcile with a predominantly national response. \u00a0<\/p>\n Overall, authors of this publication converge on one point: none of the current threats\u00a0 to our security is likely to be attenuated as a consequence of the crisis; pre-COVID-19\u00a0 threats will continue to exist once the health crisis is over, quite a few may well be worse,\u00a0 and new ones will appear. The pressure this will create on the international system will be\u00a0 huge. This will likely make security institutions such as NATO even more indispensable, yet\u00a0 one effect of the crisis may also be the necessity to once again revisit the added-value of\u00a0 the military alliance, at a time when a lot of the threats out there call for very broad types\u00a0 of responses.\u00a0 More Research Division Publications…<\/a><\/span><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" NDC Research Paper 9: “COVID-19: NATO in the Age of Pandemics”, edited by Thierry Tardy Introduction Thierry Tardy<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","advgb_blocks_editor_width":"","advgb_blocks_columns_visual_guide":"","editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","_EventAllDay":false,"_EventTimezone":"","_EventStartDate":"","_EventEndDate":"","_EventStartDateUTC":"","_EventEndDateUTC":"","_EventShowMap":false,"_EventShowMapLink":false,"_EventURL":"","_EventCost":"","_EventCostDescription":"","_EventCurrencySymbol":"","_EventCurrencyCode":"","_EventCurrencyPosition":"","_EventDateTimeSeparator":"","_EventTimeRangeSeparator":"","_EventOrganizerID":[],"_EventVenueID":[],"_OrganizerEmail":"","_OrganizerPhone":"","_OrganizerWebsite":"","_VenueAddress":"","_VenueCity":"","_VenueCountry":"","_VenueProvince":"","_VenueState":"","_VenueZip":"","_VenuePhone":"","_VenueURL":"","_VenueStateProvince":"","_VenueLat":"","_VenueLng":"","_VenueShowMap":false,"_VenueShowMapLink":false,"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-13047","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"featured_image_src":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"modified_by":null,"author_meta":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"featured_img":null,"featured_image_urls":{"full":"","thumbnail":"","medium":"","medium_large":"","large":"","1536x1536":"","2048x2048":"","trp-custom-language-flag":"","morenews-featured":"","morenews-large":"","morenews-medium":""},"category_info":"News<\/a>","tag_info":"News","comment_count":0,"coauthors":[],"tax_additional":{"categories":{"linked":["News<\/a>"],"unlinked":["News<\/span>"]}},"relative_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 6 ans il y a","modified":"Mis \u00e0 jour 6 mois il y a"},"absolute_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mai 25, 2020","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le janvier 15, 2026"},"absolute_dates_time":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mai 25, 2020 10:05","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le janvier 15, 2026 09:29"},"featured_img_caption":"","series_order":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13047","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13047"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13047\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13047"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13047"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13047"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=13047"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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