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Introduction<\/strong>\n<\/p>\n Thierry Tardy<\/em><\/strong>\n<\/p>\n \nAt the Madrid Summit held on 28-30 June 2022, NATO Allies adopted a new Strategic Concept (see Annex I). This is the fourth of its kind in the post-Cold War era, following previous Concepts adopted in 1991, 1999 and 2010. <\/p>\n NATO\u2019s Strategic Concept aims to define the Alliance\u2019s vision for the coming decade. It lays out the security challenges facing the Alliance and outlines the political and military tasks that NATO must carry out to address them. As such, the Concept is not an Action Plan, nor does it aim to offer policy options for Allies. Its objective is strategic; its main purpose is to define what NATO stands for and to communicate this to a broad audience both within and beyond the Alliance.<\/p>\n The process through which the Strategic Concept is drafted, adopted, and finally released enables Allies and observers to reflect on the rationale of such a document. This includes the objectives that a strategic-level document serves, the pitfalls these documents must avoid, and, once released, the vision that it offers, as well as the opportunities it has possibly missed.1<\/a><\/p>\n The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept was of course drafted during a particular historical moment. While a semi-formal process began at the end of 2019, when the London Leaders\u2019 Meeting mandated the NATO Secretary General to establish a reflection group,2<\/a> the final document itself was directly and fundamentally shaped by Russia\u2019s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.<\/p>\n A decade ago, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept stated, \u201cthe Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low\u201d.3<\/a> In 2022, this is obviously no longer the case. While the Alliance itself has not faced military attack, war has returned to Europe. Russia has not only blatantly violated principles and values that NATO Allies stand for, it has also raised the plausibility of a conflict directly involving NATO. Not since the Cold War has the threat of war against the Alliance been so real. Indeed, the 2022 Strategic Concept states that \u201cThe Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace\u201d (para.6) and that \u201can attack against Allies\u2019 sovereignty and territorial integrity\u201d cannot be discounted (para.6). Russia is depicted as the \u201cmost significant and direct threat to Allies\u2019 security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area\u201d (para.8). Inevitably, the war in Ukraine bluntly interrogates NATO\u2019s purpose, including how it can deter Russia from attacking Allies and how it should defend itself if need be.<\/p>\n These dangers have prompted Allies to initiate a reset of their posture that re-prioritises collective defence and a \u201cdeterrence and defence\u201d agenda. The era of NATO crisis management operations, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, is over. And while the new Concept maintains the three core tasks (deterrence and defence, crisis management, and cooperative security) as defined in the 2010 document, these are subordinated as \u201ccomplementary to ensure the collective defence and security of all Allies\u201d (para.4).<\/p>\n That being said, the international security environment still presents broader challenges than Russia alone. In the 2022 Concept, drafters have therefore balanced their emphasis on Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine by identifying other challenges NATO faces and assessing their impact on the Alliance. For instance, consider the issue of terrorism, characterised in the new Concept as \u201cthe most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity\u201d (para.10), or the issue of \u201cpervasive insecurity\u201d, which NATO sees emanating from its Southern neighbourhood. Indeed, the Concept insists on a 360-degree approach, in which collective defence is not unidirectional. Most importantly, for the first time ever, the new Concept mentions China, stating that its policies challenge Allied \u201csecurity and values\u201d. China does not make it to the category of \u201cthreat\u201d, yet the way the document presents China conveys much about how Beijing is perceived (at least by some Allies).<\/p>\n How, then, does the new Concept define the strategic environment and how must the Alliance adapt? What are the core tasks that NATO must fulfil, and how do recent global developments impact the Alliance\u2019s raison d\u2019\u00eatre<\/em>, cohesion, and identity? Is the new Concept evolutionary or revolutionary? Does it offer a vision or a snapshot? To what extent will it shape NATO\u2019s mandate in terms of balancing the Eastern flank versus the South, in dealing with China, and in handling issues such as hybrid warfare, the climate crisis, emerging technologies, and resilience? Lastly, what are its possible weak points and likely implementation challenges?<\/p>\n These are the issues that the six authors of this Research Paper<\/em> examine. These authors \u2013 namely, Patrick Keller, Stanley Sloan, Bruno Tertrais, Mark Webber, Marcin Zaborowski, and Thierry Tardy \u2013 are academics and researchers hailing from five different countries. They present their own views on the Strategic Concept, deciphering what it says about the Alliance, what it does not say, and how it prepares the Alliance to adapt to the coming decade.<\/p>\n Overall, four issues stand out in the following chapters. First, the new Strategic Concept is concise, clear, and focused; it is the result of a broad consultation process and offers a mix of continuity and disruption \u2013 for instance, keeping the three core tasks while taking into account an evolving security environment. As such, it successfully conveys the sense of cohesion and unity that the Alliance constantly craves.<\/p>\n Second, in contrast to the 2010 document, the new Concept is clear-eyed regarding the nature of the international security environment, buffeted by the return of strategic competition and the renewed Russian threat to Europe. The document marks the return of collective defence, though Allies have refrained from overemphasizing confrontation with Russia. In this context, the text tends to overlook threats emanating from NATO\u2019s Southern flank.<\/p>\n Third, China is included in a NATO Strategic Concept for the first time \u2013 not quite as an explicit threat but nonetheless portrayed as such. What this implies for the Alliance, however, remains unsaid. There is an understanding that China poses a number of problems to the Alliance and its member states, yet how and where NATO can or will respond is still to be defined. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Concept mentions China indicates a shift in Alliance policy.<\/p>\n Finally, while the Concept depicts a rather large security agenda for the coming decade, with threats and challenges ranging from hard security to softer human security-related issues, it is largely silent on NATO\u2019s internal cohesion and on the ways this cohesion is potentially undermined from within, be it by its own governments or peoples. The Concept largely refers to \u201cNATO values\u201d and how they matter to transatlantic security. In the face of current threats, then, it stands out as an interest-focused document rather than one which offers a strategic vision, articulated around shared values and what NATO will stand for in the coming decade.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \n More Research Division Publications…<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n NDC Public Affairs Office<\/em><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" NDC Research Paper 25: NATO\u2019s New Strategic Concept, edited by Thierry Tardy Introduction Thierry Tardy At the Madrid<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","advgb_blocks_editor_width":"","advgb_blocks_columns_visual_guide":"","editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","_EventAllDay":false,"_EventTimezone":"","_EventStartDate":"","_EventEndDate":"","_EventStartDateUTC":"","_EventEndDateUTC":"","_EventShowMap":false,"_EventShowMapLink":false,"_EventURL":"","_EventCost":"","_EventCostDescription":"","_EventCurrencySymbol":"","_EventCurrencyCode":"","_EventCurrencyPosition":"","_EventDateTimeSeparator":"","_EventTimeRangeSeparator":"","_EventOrganizerID":[],"_EventVenueID":[],"_OrganizerEmail":"","_OrganizerPhone":"","_OrganizerWebsite":"","_VenueAddress":"","_VenueCity":"","_VenueCountry":"","_VenueProvince":"","_VenueState":"","_VenueZip":"","_VenuePhone":"","_VenueURL":"","_VenueStateProvince":"","_VenueLat":"","_VenueLng":"","_VenueShowMap":false,"_VenueShowMapLink":false,"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-13482","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news"],"featured_image_src":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"modified_by":null,"author_meta":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"featured_img":null,"featured_image_urls":{"full":"","thumbnail":"","medium":"","medium_large":"","large":"","1536x1536":"","2048x2048":"","trp-custom-language-flag":"","morenews-featured":"","morenews-large":"","morenews-medium":""},"category_info":"News<\/a>","tag_info":"News","comment_count":0,"coauthors":[],"tax_additional":{"categories":{"linked":["News<\/a>"],"unlinked":["News<\/span>"]}},"relative_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 4 ans il y a","modified":"Mis \u00e0 jour 6 mois il y a"},"absolute_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le septembre 14, 2022","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le janvier 15, 2026"},"absolute_dates_time":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le septembre 14, 2022 16:45","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le janvier 15, 2026 09:36"},"featured_img_caption":"","series_order":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13482","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=13482"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/13482\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=13482"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=13482"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=13482"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=13482"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
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