{"id":4851,"date":"2023-03-14T16:27:40","date_gmt":"2023-03-14T15:27:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newsite.ndc.nato.int\/?p=4851"},"modified":"2025-02-14T17:03:36","modified_gmt":"2025-02-14T16:03:36","slug":"heroes-of-the-information-front","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/heroes-of-the-information-front\/","title":{"rendered":"“Heroes of the Information Front”?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Russian Studies Series 01\/2023<\/em><\/strong>
REVIEW<\/p>\n\n\n\n

by Natasha Groom<\/strong>1<\/a>\u201cHeroes of the Information Front\u201d?<\/strong>Reviewing Russia\u2019s Military Bloggers<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n


Russia\u2019s military bloggers have emerged from the shadows. Valued in both Russia and the West for the immediacy of their reporting and information about the battlefield realities in Ukraine, these unequivocal supporters of the invasion are also some of the Kremlin\u2019s most trenchant critics. Disillusioned with the way the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d (\u201cSVO\u201d) is being waged, they have bemoaned the poor logistics and conditions, pummelled the military leadership and punctured holes in official narratives. Yet several of these \u201cnon-system\u201d critics have been appointed to a task force created by presidential order on 20 December. This essay will examine two of the most prominent bloggers and their pro-war or \u201cZ\u201d channels, Rybar (https:\/\/t.me\/rybar) and WarGonzo (https:\/\/t.me\/s\/wargonzo), with 1.1 and 1.3 million subscribers respectively. It will explore their multiple and seemingly subversive and contradictory functions, look at their complex relationship with the Kremlin and consider why the regime tolerates \u2013 even values \u2013 their criticism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Who are the military bloggers?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In January 2023, Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed decrees imposing personal sanctions on 3172<\/a> Russian and pro-Russian public and media personalities. The sanctions aim to block distribution in Ukraine of the media content of these individuals. Among the lesser-known figures targeted were the 31-year-old \u201cmilitary analyst, known for his publications in the Rybar telegram channel\u201d, Mikhail Zvinchuk,3<\/a> and 37-year-old \u201cRussian journalist, blogger, war correspondent\u201d, Semyon Pegov, who blogs under the alias WarGonzo. Pegov was included as a \u201c(m)ember of pro-Kremlin propaganda\u201d who \u201cspreads disinformation about Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine\u201d.4<\/a> Zvinchuk is deemed to \u201cpublicly call for an aggressive war, justify and recognise as lawful the armed aggression\u201d, \u201cglorify\u201d its participants and thus undermine, inter alia, \u201cpeace\u201d and \u201csovereignty\u201d in Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The embargo recognises the increasing significance of Russia\u2019s so-called \u201cpro-war\u201d or military bloggers. This disparate group ranges from the avowed nationalist and veteran of the Donbas war Igor Girkin (also known as \u201cStrelkov\u201d) to accredited military correspondents, or voenkory<\/em>, and individuals affiliated with the private military company Wagner Group. These men with military connections are behind dozens of \u201cZ\u201d channels that have emerged from obscurity since 24 February 2022 and gained large online followings on the messaging app Telegram: Boris Rozhin\u2019s Colonelcassad has 840,000 (https:\/\/t.me\/boris_rozhin<\/a>), voenkor<\/em> Aleksandr Kots has 666,000 followers (https:\/\/t.me\/s\/sashakots<\/a>) and Strelkov\u2019s channel (https:\/\/t.me\/strelkovii<\/a>) has 800,000. They are united by their hawkish support for Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and their exceptional access to the theatre of war. Such privileged interaction with the front is largely off-limits to journalists operating in the traditional media in Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, the Z channels occupy a unique place in the highly restricted Russian media landscape in which independent war reporting is now virtually extinguished. The means by which information is disseminated is tightly controlled: Telegram (and its network of channels) was, alongside YouTube, one of the few platforms not state-owned or controlled that was not blocked as soon as the invasion began.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, there is draconian new censorship legislation: laws adopted on 4 March 2022, eight days after the commencement of the invasion, made it illegal to spread what the state deems \u201cdeliberate\/knowingly false information\u201d about the Russian military and its activities. They also criminalise protesting the war, \u201cdiscrediting the armed forces\u201d, or supporting Western sanctions imposed in response to the offensive. The maximum penalty is 15 years in prison.5<\/a> But while the bloggers are subject to varying levels of military censorship or control from Moscow, the immediacy of their largely unfiltered updates and eyewitness accounts has transformed them into popular sources of information about the fighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These champions of the \u201cRussian world\u201d are also proving to be some of the Kremlin\u2019s most fearless critics. Almost from the outset of Russia\u2019s chaotic invasion, they began to criticise the poor logistics, equipment shortages and mounting losses at the front, and even the war strategy itself. By September, as Russia\u2019s forces retreated from Kharkiv, the chorus of disapproval became impossible to ignore. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov warned that \u201ccritical viewpoints\u201d were acceptable while they remained within current law \u2013 that was \u201cpluralism\u201d \u2013 but that the critics were treading a \u201cvery, very fine line\u201d.6<\/a> Then on 14 October, Pegov warned that he had heard from \u201creliable sources\u201d in security service structures that there was a \u201chunt\u201d for the bloggers for \u201cdiscrediting\u201d7<\/a> the army and it was reported that Valery Gerasimov, Russia\u2019s Chief of the General Staff, had \u201cpersonally\u201d requested the investigation of nine military correspondents or \u201cprojects\u201d for their criticism of the Ministry of Defence (\u201cMoD\u201d) and its decisions during the SVO.8<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zvinchuk and Pegov<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The men behind Rybar and WarGonzo come from very different backgrounds. By his own account,9<\/a> Zvinchuk attended the Suvorov Military School from the of age 14 and later graduated from the Military University of the MoD as a translator specialising in Arabic and English. He served in Russia\u2019s Special Forces in Iraq and Syria as a translator and in reconnaissance, later joining the Department of Information and Communications in the MoD. While engaged in information and analytical work in the field, he sent missives to war correspondents from an anonymous account to correct mistakes in their reporting.10<\/a> With Denis Shchukin, he established Rybar in 2018, partly due to frustration at reading reports by people who knew \u201cabsolutely nothing\u201d about these conflicts.11<\/a> Rybar initially focused on the Middle East and in February 2022, by which time Zvinchuk had left the MoD, had a following of 30,000. Rybar continued to post anonymously, even as it amassed followers, until the founders were unmasked by The Bell<\/em> in November 2022.12<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Rybar\u2019s approach is studiedly analytical and professional. At one remove from the front, Zvinchuk stresses the OSINT and media skills of his forty-strong team, his wide-ranging network of sources on the ground, including \u201cinformants inside enemy headquarters\u201d,13<\/a> and his understanding of \u201cgeopolitical\u201d dimensions. He goes to great lengths to cultivate a sense of objectivity, claiming independence from Wagner founder Evgeny Prigozhin, for whose media outlet RIA FAN he previously wrote a column, and insisting that he does not blog according to a narrative fed to him by the Kremlin.14<\/a>

Unlike Zvinchuk, Pegov was a well-established journalist in February 2022. Beginning his career in 2006 initially in state-run outlets, he subsequently worked for the LifeNews media stable of Aram Gabrelianov, an associate of Vladimir Putin\u2019s longstanding friend Yury Kovalchuk. He has considerable exposure as a voenkor<\/em>. In 2019, Pegov created his WarGonzo YouTube channel (deleted in March 2022 for violating platform rules) which covered conflict zones and promoted the ideology of the \u201cRussian world\u201d and released a series of films including one about the deceased leader of DPR, Alexander Zakharchenko.15<\/a>
WarGonzo stands out less for its objective assessments of events on the frontline and more for the immediacy of its reporting. A one-man band, Pegov is embedded with forces at the front, and while traditionally loyal to the regime, has become close to ordinary soldiers. He gives voice to the rank-and-file, shares content of immediate concern to them such as courses in \u201cmilitary medicine\u201d or morale-boosting videos of their exploits,16<\/a> and his poems. WarGonzo takes a \u201ctabloid\u201d approach and is littered with expletives. Pegov has connections in the security services, seemingly unrivalled access to high-level connections, and an uncanny ability to lead the agenda, frequently eclipsing his mainstream media counterparts. The only correspondent in Izyum when it was surrounded by Ukrainian forces on 9 September,17<\/a> it was also Pegov who was selected for an \u201cexclusive\u201d interview with Prigozhin on 10 February.18<\/a>
Both are regularly cited in the West. Rybar is described as \u201cthe most important source of information for analysts and the media\u201d among the pro-war channels.19<\/a> Its insights into performance on the ground, including daily chronicles of events and campaign maps, are referenced by the BBC, New York Times<\/em> and Institute for the Study of War. Zvinchuk boasts that Rybar is \u201cthe most cited military segment Telegram channel in the West\u201d.20<\/a>
Functions of the pro-war bloggers<\/em>
In Russia itself, however, they are fulfilling multiple and seemingly contradictory functions. They both play a direct role in the war and pump out pro-Russia narratives. Pegov regularly live-streams disinformation and is responsible for orchestrating numerous false-flag plots, notably in the two months prior to Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion,21<\/a> and frequently \u201cexposes fakes\u201d. In line with his pro-war views, he refers to Ukrainians as \u201cneo-Nazis\u201d and talks of their \u201canimal nature\u201d.22<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zvinchuk boasts of supplying target co-ordinates to the MoD and Wagner.23<\/a> He publishes artwork exalting the army, analysis in multiple languages of conflicts in geographies from Mali to Haiti and pushes pro-Kremlin narratives. He is a hard-line ideologue and proponent of maximalist goals, firmly favouring Russia\u2019s assault on Ukrainian infrastructure.24<\/a> While he \u201csincerely believed\u201d that the SVO would be \u201ca blitzkrieg\u201d,25<\/a> he remains convinced that Russia will prevail but that you \u201cneed to eat an elephant in parts\u201d. He believes that many Ukrainians despite their \u201cdisillusionment\u201d following setbacks, understand the \u201cjustification\u201d and \u201cnecessity\u201d of the SVO.26<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

More broadly, they function as a useful counterpoint for the Kremlin. The regime does not appear to regard their hawkish views as politically risky, but instead as a backdrop against which Putin can appear judicious. Furthermore, in the absence of a genuinely organic movement in support of Russia\u2019s invasion, these two comparatively youthful bloggers help create an illusion of mass support while their exaltation of the army complements creeping militarisation. Putin could tap into this pro-war constituency to justify further escalation or a shift to \u201ctotal\u201d war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even so, Rybar and WarGonzo offer scathing criticism of the SVO. Zvinchuk (blogging anonymously) addressed a post to the MoD three days before Peskov\u2019s shot across the bows in September remarking that he knew the MoD was \u201creading us\u201d and that however inconvenient such \u201cnon-system critics\u201d were because they did not toe the party line, \u201cnow is not the time when we can be silent and say nothing<\/strong>\u201d. He begged them to take the \u201cinformation environment\u201d into their own hands, and not to act on \u201cthe principle of \u2018forbid and say nothing\u2019 \u2026 It\u2019s very detrimental to the cause\u201d. 27<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After the warning shots from Peskov and Gerasimov, it appeared that the bloggers reached an accommodation with the Kremlin. In early October, just days before reports surfaced that they were being investigated, Rybar began publishing promotional posts about MoD training for mobilised soldiers.28<\/a> Gerasimov\u2019s \u2018friendly fire\u2019 subsequently fizzled out,29<\/a> and Pegov (wounded by a petal mine in October) was awarded the Order of Courage in November for his \u201ccourage, bravery and selflessness in performing professional duty\u201d.30<\/a> Putin personally decorated him at the Kremlin on 20 December.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both men were appointed to a 31-member task force created by presidential order on 20 December, headed by Andrei Turchak, deputy chairman of Russia\u2019s upper house which includes bloggers, representatives of public associations, state corporations and members of both houses of parliament. The aim is to coordinate work on mobilization and the social and legal protection of mobilised Russian soldiers and their families. Responsibilities include analysis of \u201cpatriotic education\u201d aimed at young Russians and public outreach. The MoD is to provide support to the group which reports monthly to Putin to offer recommendations to lawmakers, executive authorities and relevant organizations.31<\/a> Zvinchuk takes pride in this and blogs in support of the government,32<\/a> sharing details of improvements in social support for military personnel and their families.33<\/a>Since January 2023, Zvinchuk has been embraced by the media mainstream and appears in a weekly show, \u201cRybar\u2019s Analysis\u201d,34<\/a> on the platforms of one of Russia\u2019s most well-known television presenters, Vladimir Solovyov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yet their criticism has not entirely faded. In November, Zvinchuk disparagingly noted that Peskov does not always speak for Putin, and again criticised the Kharkiv debacle.35<\/a> And following the mass killing of Russian troops in Makiivka in early 2023, Pegov posted a video disputing the official death toll and demanding punishment for those responsible for the death of so many soldiers in one place.36<\/a> He described the MoD\u2019s statement about the incident as \u201cnot very convincing\u201d and \u201ca blatant attempt to spread the blame\u201d.37<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Heroes of the information front?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The bloggers\u2019 relationship with the Kremlin is, therefore, complex. Rather than repressing the dissent, as was Gerasimov\u2019s instinct, the Kremlin has responded partly by co-opting these erstwhile \u201cnon-system\u201d critics. But Putin also sees value in the criticism and is instrumentalising it. First, the criticism is a tool to force the system to self-correct. At a meeting of the MoD Board on 21 December, the day after the creation of the presidential task force, Putin noted \u201cthere are always problems in such major, complex work \u2013 it can be emotional, but we need to hear those who do not hush up the existing problems but strive to contribute to their solution\u2019.38<\/a>
This fits with Zvinchuk\u2019s understanding that the bloggers are \u201cheroes of the Russian information front\u201d, highlighting inadequacies and \u201cthe truth\u201d so that \u2013 in theory at least \u2013 systemic challenges, and not just in the military, can be dealt with, as well as engaging and challenging the \u201cmass attacks\u201d by Ukraine and \u201cthe collective West\u201d39<\/a> on Russia\u2019s information structure. Their unique understanding of the \u201cinformation environment\u201d means that they became \u201cthe information shield of our country when the official media departments turned out to be incapable. They showed the real problems on the ground and the real situation even though criminal cases were initiated against them afterwards and individual commanders threatened them\u201d.40<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Second, the bloggers help insulate Putin from blame. He and the army are above the fray. Zvinchuk stresses that the bloggers \u201cwere not afraid to tell the truth \u2013 not to smear and discredit the army but to solve problems\u201d. Their devotion to the cause is unequivocal. Instead, he criticises the \u201chuman factor\u201d and \u201cperpetually non-functioning system\u201d,41<\/a>picks out individual commanders for praise or condemnation,42<\/a> and talks dismissively of the \u201cprimitive\u201d methods used for army recruitment.43<\/a> While Putin dodges responsibility, underlings are kept on their toes. Furthermore, by allowing Pegov to give voice to Prigozhin, Putin gives space to a Kremlin outsider \u00adto provide solutions to problems where the establishment has failed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, by acknowledging the setbacks, the Z channels act as an emotional safety valve helping to release pressure from the ultranationalist section of the population within controllable parameters. And by co-opting the bloggers and appearing to listen to their criticism, the regime gives the impression to an increasingly anxious Russian public that it is serious about improving the conditions of military service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusions<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It will surely be unnecessary to note that most readers in the West will not agree with their foundational views. But such sources, handled with appropriate care, are valuable. They provide essential context, insights, and detail as we try to interpret internal dynamics, Moscow\u2019s actions, and the lessons the Russian leadership might be learning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The pro-war bloggers are fulfilling multiple and nuanced functions in Russia. And while their influence should not be overstated, they are becoming an increasingly prominent factor in Russian domestic affairs and the information space. They do not always toe the line, with some even criticising Putin himself,44<\/a> but \u2013 in theory \u2013 they can be reined in at any stage; for now, the regime does not regard them as too politically risky.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is unlikely that the Russian military is capable of undertaking a thorough and genuinely frank analysis of what has gone wrong during the full-scale invasion. But it seems that criticism \u2013 which began as spontaneous responses to setbacks in Ukraine \u2013 from the impeccably patriotic Zvinchuk and Pegov is nevertheless being absorbed and instrumentalised by the Kremlin as it attempts to adapt for the long haul and reshape its use of the armed forces over the coming decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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1<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  Natasha Groom is a Senior Advisor at Inter Mediate, an NGO working to end armed conflicts around the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cUkaz prezidenta Ukraini \u21164\/2023\u201d, Website of the Presidential Administration<\/em>, 7 January 2023, https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/documents\/42023-45517<\/a>; \u201cUkaz prezidenta Ukraini \u211623\/2023, Website of the Presidential Administration<\/em>, 15 January 2023, https:\/\/www.president.gov.ua\/documents\/232023-45589<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

3<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cSanctions Imposed on Individuals: Zvinchuk Mikhail Sergeevich\u201d, 15 January 2023, War and Sanctions, https:\/\/sanctions.nazk.gov.ua\/en\/sanction-person\/25299\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

4<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cSanctions Imposed on Individuals: Pegov Semyon Vladimirovich\u201d, 15 January 2023, War and Sanctions,  https:\/\/sanctions.nazk.gov.ua\/en\/sanction-person\/9031\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

5<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  A year later, on 2 March 2023, the Russian parliament voted in favour of a bill that would make it a criminal offence to \u201cdiscredit\u201d anyone fighting for Russia in Ukraine, extending coverage to disparate \u201cvolunteer\u201d participants or mercenaries serving in Russia\u2019s growing number of private military companies. \u201cVvoditsya otvetstvennost\u2019 za diskreditatsiyu dobrovol\u2019tsev \u2013 uchastnikov SVO\u201d, Website of the State Duma, 2 March 2023, http:\/\/duma.gov.ru\/news\/56483\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

6<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  RIA Novosti, 13 September 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/rian_ru\/177624<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

7<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  WarGonzo, 14 October 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/8702<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

8<\/sup> (back) <\/a>   Mash, 14 October 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/breakingmash\/39083<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

9<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon, problemy \u2018patriotov\u2019, razocharovanie v spetsoperatsii\/Osnovatel\u2019 Telegram-kanala \u2018Rybar\u2019\u201d, RTVI Novosti, 25 November 2022, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=sB0aoHwTx68<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

10<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

11<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d; \u201cUnmasking Russia\u2019s influential pro-war \u2018Rybar\u2019 Telegram channel\u201d, The Bell<\/em>, 22 November 2022, https:\/\/thebell.io\/en\/unmasking-russia-s-influential-pro-war-rybar-telegram-channel\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

12<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cUnmasking\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

13<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

14<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

15<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cProsmotr documental\u2019nogo filma pro Aleksandra Zakharkhenko\u201d, Timepad, 31 August 2022, https:\/\/knizhnaya-lavka-listva.timepad.ru\/event\/2151591\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

16<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cKak \u2018shakhter\u2019 otomstil za komandira\u201d, WarGonzo, 19 February 2023, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/10959<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

17<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cOborona Izyuma: Vklyuchenie WG iz goroda\u201d, WarGonzo, 9 September 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/8195<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

18<\/sup> (back) <\/a> https:\/\/t.me\/s\/wargonzo\/10816<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

19<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cUnmasking\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

20<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu chto v blizhaishee vremya Bakhmut padet\u201d, LenTV 24, 20 January 2023, https:\/\/lentv24.ru\/rybar-ya-ne-dumayu-cto-v-blizaisee-vremya-baxmut-padet.htm<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

21<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cSROCHNO: Vklyuchenie s mesta terakta v Donetske\u201d, WarGonzo, 18 February 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/5834<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

22<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cKak \u2018shakhter\u2019\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

23<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

24<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

25<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

26<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

27<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cDa oni izdevayutsiya\u201d, Rybar, 10 September 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/38565<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

28<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cPodgotovka mobilizovannykh na voennyx poligonakh Rossii: Leningradskaya Oblast\u2019\u201d, Rybar, 11 October 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/40046<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

29<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  Mash, 14 October 2022, https:\/\/t.me\/breakingmash\/39083<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

30<\/sup> (back) <\/a>  \u201cUkaz o nagrazhdenii Semena Pegova ordenom Muzhestvo\u201d, Website of the Presidential Administration, 24 November 2022, http:\/\/www.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/69930<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

31<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRasporyazhenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 20.12.2022 \u2116420-rp\u201d, Website of the Federation Council, 20 December 2022, http:\/\/publication.pravo.gov.ru\/Document\/View\/0001202212200054<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

32<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

33<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cZayavleniya prem\u2019er-ministra RF Mikhaila Mishustina o podderzhke uchastnikov SVO i voennoi promyshlennosti\u201d, Rybar, 8 February 2023, https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/43402<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

34<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRazbory Rybarya\u201d goes out on multiple platforms including Telegram and Rutube, https:\/\/tlgrm.ru\/channels\/@SolovievLive\/158326<\/a>, https:\/\/t.me\/rybar\/44376<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

35<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

36<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cMakeevskaya tragediya: Spetsial\u2019noe vklyuchenie WG po obstanovke\u201d, 3 January 2023, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/10160<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

37<\/sup> (back) <\/a> WarGonzo, 4 January 2023, https:\/\/t.me\/wargonzo\/10166<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

38<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRussian army must tackle problems it has suffered in Ukraine: Putin\u201d, Reuters<\/em>, 21 December 2022, https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/europe\/putin-promises-meet-all-russian-armys-needs-ukraine-2022-12-21\/<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

39<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cDeanon\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

40<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

41<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

42<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

43<\/sup> (back) <\/a> \u201cRybar\u2019: Ya ne dumayu\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

44<\/sup> (back) <\/a> S. I. Ivanovich, 21 February 2023, https:\/\/t.me\/strelkovii\/4026<\/a>, Andrei Medvedev, 6 January 2023 https:\/\/t.me\/MedvedevVesti\/12684<\/a><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Russian Studies Series 01\/2023REVIEW by Natasha Groom1\u201cHeroes of the Information Front\u201d?Reviewing Russia\u2019s Military Bloggers Russia\u2019s military bloggers have<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"no","_lmt_disable":"","advgb_blocks_editor_width":"","advgb_blocks_columns_visual_guide":"","editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","_EventAllDay":false,"_EventTimezone":"","_EventStartDate":"","_EventEndDate":"","_EventStartDateUTC":"","_EventEndDateUTC":"","_EventShowMap":false,"_EventShowMapLink":false,"_EventURL":"","_EventCost":"","_EventCostDescription":"","_EventCurrencySymbol":"","_EventCurrencyCode":"","_EventCurrencyPosition":"","_EventDateTimeSeparator":"","_EventTimeRangeSeparator":"","_EventOrganizerID":[],"_EventVenueID":[],"_OrganizerEmail":"","_OrganizerPhone":"","_OrganizerWebsite":"","_VenueAddress":"","_VenueCity":"","_VenueCountry":"","_VenueProvince":"","_VenueState":"","_VenueZip":"","_VenuePhone":"","_VenueURL":"","_VenueStateProvince":"","_VenueLat":"","_VenueLng":"","_VenueShowMap":false,"_VenueShowMapLink":false,"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[117],"tags":[],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-4851","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-the-russian-studies-series"],"featured_image_src":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"modified_by":"NDC","author_meta":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"featured_img":null,"featured_image_urls":{"full":"","thumbnail":"","medium":"","medium_large":"","large":"","1536x1536":"","2048x2048":"","trp-custom-language-flag":"","morenews-featured":"","morenews-large":"","morenews-medium":""},"category_info":"The Russian Studies Series<\/a>","tag_info":"The Russian Studies Series","comment_count":0,"coauthors":[],"tax_additional":{"categories":{"linked":["The Russian Studies Series<\/a>"],"unlinked":["The Russian Studies Series<\/span>"]}},"relative_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 3 ans il y a","modified":"Mis \u00e0 jour 1 an il y a"},"absolute_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mars 14, 2023","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 14, 2025"},"absolute_dates_time":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mars 14, 2023 16:27","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 14, 2025 17:03"},"featured_img_caption":"","series_order":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4851","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4851"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4851\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6964,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4851\/revisions\/6964"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4851"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4851"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4851"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=4851"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}