<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Russian Studies Series 05\/2022<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Defining the \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d<\/strong>1<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n ARTICLE REVIEW<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n by Roger N McDermott & Charles K. Bartles<\/strong>2<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Review of:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Viktor Litvinenko \u201cSushchnost\u02b9 kategoriy \u00abvoyna\u00bb i \u00abspetsial\u02b9naya voyennaya operatsiya\u00bb<\/em> Vladimir Kvachkov, Otkrytoye pis\u2019mo polkovnika V.V. Kvachkova ofitseram General\u02b9nogo shtaba i Komandovaniya spetsial\u02b9nykh operatsiy<\/em> [An open letter from V. V. Kvachkov to the General Staff Officers and Command of the Special Operation], 28 March 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moscow insists on using the term spetsial\u2019naya voyennaya operatsiya <\/em>(\u201cspecial military operation\u201d) or spetsoperatsiya<\/em> (\u201cspecial operation\u201d) to describe its campaign in Ukraine. The terms appear to be used interchangeably in both a colloquial context, and in the context of Russian military theory.3<\/a> Those familiar with Russian military theory are also interested in what exactly the term special military operation<\/em> meant for the Russians, as there was no formal standing definition, or even commonly accepted meaning, for the term. This is somewhat baffling: Russian defense scholars and officers invest much time and effort in defining explicitly what exactly military terms mean for the Russian military and security communities. Thus, it was somewhat surprising that Russians began using this relatively obscure term to describe the invasion.4<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Given the circumstances, little thought in the West has been given to what exactly the term means, with most Western mass media and governments understanding the term to be simply a euphemism for military invasion and war. Perhaps this view was best encapsulated by the humor of the website Urban Dictionary<\/em>, which defines the term as \u201cAn Invasion. Especially one conducted by an authoritarian regime\u201d; and \u201cThis isn\u2019t an Invasion of the sovereign nation of Ukraine. It is a Special Military Operation\u201d, somewhat in jest.5<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Most Russians were, and arguably still are, as confused about the term as their Western counterparts. But understanding what it may mean, and thus placing the operation into the hierarchy of Russian military strategy sheds light on Moscow\u2019s intentions and goals, not to mention Moscow\u2019s choice of forces used and possibilities for escalation. This essay reviews how Russian military theorists define and understand a special military operation<\/em> in the context of Russian military theory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Retired Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov was one of the first to provide a working definition of the term.6<\/a> On March 28, 2022, he published an open letter to the Russian General Staff and command of the special operation. The letter focuses on justifying Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and seems directed less at a military audience than to influence the Russian civilian population. Nevertheless, some insight may be gleamed from his description of the term:<\/p>\n\n\n\n What is the difference between a special military operation, its goals and objectives, and other operations of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation? The main difference is that the course and outcome of a special operation are directly related to military-political goals and objectives, in contrast to the combined-arms offensive and defensive operations of operational and operational-strategic formations (during the Great Patriotic War \uff0darmies and fronts), as well as other independent and joint operations of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. This statement is also true for the strategic actions of the Armed Forces \u2026 Thus, military-political goals and tasks in special operations are lowered to the level of tactical actions of formations, units and even battalions (battalion tactical groups). The officially declared goal of the ongoing special military operation is the and denazification of Ukraine.7<\/a>Kvachkov\u2019s account is interesting because it notes that a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d differs from other combined arms operations of the Armed Forces in the way military force is used to achieve military-political goals. He proposes that the goals of a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d are achieved through a more direct approach, with the strategic aim being accomplished by a single decisive operation conducted by a combined arms formation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This understanding of the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d is nested in Russian military theory and the Russian concept of military conflict: \u201cwar\u201d is the most intense form of military conflict with other types of military conflict, such as a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d, being on the spectrum of military conflict, but less intense.8<\/a> With this in mind, achieving victory in what the Russians call \u201cwar\u201d can require military, economic, and\/or social mobilization, deep battle, physical encirclements, and multiple operations, and have military-strategic goals such as the total destruction of the enemy forces, occupation of the enemy\u2019s homeland, eventually leading to the military-political goal of political capitulation. Achieving victory in lesser types of military conflicts, such as a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d may be achieved more simply through the application of a varying mixture of military and non-military (indirect) methods to coerce the enemy\u2019s political-military leadership to accept unfavorable terms.9<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In terms of the spectrum of military conflict, therefore, the most important difference between \u201cwar\u201d and a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d is that the former requires multiple operations for strategic success, while strategic success for the latter can (in certain circumstances) be achieved by a single decisive operation. It should be noted that Russian military theory recognizes several different types of operations, but in relation to the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d, Kvachkov is referring specifically to operations conducted by combined arms formations, not strategic operations.10<\/a> Moreover, in certain circumstances a single operation can not only be decisive in terms of a political-military goal, but also of a relatively short duration such as an active phase of 10-15 days.11<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n In sum, Kvachkov\u2019s understanding is that the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d differs from other combined arms operations due to the more direct way that the political-military goal is achieved, without the use of strategic operations at the highest level of state commitment. Kvachkov understands the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d applied to Russia\u2019s 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a combined arms operation intended to rapidly achieve the military-political goal of \u201cdemilitarization and denazification.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Though the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d is extensively covered in Russian mass media, there was no other discussion of theoretical aspects and where it might fit in Russian military strategy until retired Colonel Viktor Litvinenko published an article on the term in the July issue of Armeyskiy Sbornik<\/em> (Army Digest). This is an important contribution, given the author and the publication: Litvinenko is a prominent and well-respected member of the Russian professional military-scientific community,12<\/a> and Armeyskiy Sbornik<\/em> is the monthly journal of the Russian Armed Forces, covering a wide range of military issues primarily at the tactical and operational levels. Given his background, current position, and the well-known severe penalties for criticizing Russia\u2019s military or spreading \u2018fake news\u2019, it can be safely assumed that Litvinenko\u2019s definition and understanding of the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d is similar, if not identical, to other Russian military theorists and the Russian government\u2019s view on the matter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Litvinenko explains the term in a slightly different light from Kvachkov, but they both have largely similar understanding. Given the definitions previously discussed, Litvinenko posits that the special military operation\u201d in Ukraine was intended to have distinct features, which make it a new category on the \u201cmilitary conflict\u201d spectrum.13<\/a> Litvinenko even states that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) definition of the term is \u201ca special operation of troops (forces) that involves the special actions of troops (forces) coordinated in objectives, tasks, place and time, carried out according to a single plan to achieve specified goals.\u201d14<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n He further elaborates that this definition is closer to the Russian MoD\u2019s concept of \u201cmilitary operation\u201d than to the concept of \u201cwar\u201d.15<\/a> The main difference between the two is that the goal of the special operation is to defeat only the enemy\u2019s military. Therefore, the actions of the operation (strikes, battles, and the like) were carried out specifically to achieve this end within a specified period of time. This form of military action is more focused, and limited in nature, than the Russian concept of \u201cwar\u201d. Litvinenko believes that the criteria for a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d might also apply to past military operations carried out by the United States, NATO, Russia, and others countries. For example, such operations would include Russia\u2019s 2015 military operation in Syria and US operations in Yemen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Litvinenko\u2019s article, however, has less to do with the specific definition of the term \u201cspecial military operation\u201d, than the way he instead framed it in the along the spectrum of military conflict, admitting that the character of the conflict has changed. This suggests that Russian military theorists may think that despite the initial declaration of \u201cspecial military operation\u201d, the military conflict has since evolved into something different, and more intense: perhaps a \u201clocal war\u201d, or even, as some Russian pundits have argued, a \u201cregional war\u201d.16<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Litvinenko points out a number of reasons for this change relating to the various types of military aid being provided to Ukraine. His comments further Moscow\u2019s narrative that Russia is not just fighting Ukraine but also the \u201ccollective West\u201d by proxy: \u201cthe Ukrainian soldier is used as cannon fodder, while western diplomats convince the world that the West upholds peace and democracy, while at the same time supplying combat equipment and weapons to the Ukrainians, advancing their own interests by selling weapons.\u201d17<\/a> This view was then also made by the senior national leadership, including Putin, at the Moscow International Security Conference in August 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n From a Western lay perspective, the Russian\u2019s use of the term \u201cspecial military operation\u201d is simply a euphemism for \u201cwar\u201d But this is not the understanding of Kvachkov, Litvinenko, and likely most Russian military theorists \u2013 indeed there is an important distinction in the Russian view, with implications for our understanding of Russia\u2019s activities, particularly in terms of the scale of Moscow\u2019s military (and wider state) deployment. For both Kyachkov and Litvinenko, a \u201cspecial military operation\u201d falls on the spectrum of military conflict below<\/em> the level of \u201cwar\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Here, the use of the term \u201coperation\u201d is key. In general, they believe that \u201cwar\u201d required multiple<\/em> combined arms operations for strategic success. To them, the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d was special because of the intention to be a single combined arms operation with the aim of achieving strategic success. This does not downplay or mitigate any Russian responsibility for the invasion. Rather, it describes how Russian military theorists view these events on the spectrum of military conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There are two implications. First, given this understanding of the nature of a military operation, Putin\u2019s declaration about its purpose, and the general debacle for Russia that was the early days of the invasion, it appears that Moscow genuinely envisaged a single, large operation to achieve the goals of \u201cdemilitarization and denazification\u201d in a relatively short period of time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Second, Russia\u2019s inability to quickly achieve the military-political goals of the operation (demilitarization and denazification) meant that the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d failed. Consequently, though it has not been declared openly, the view of Russian military theorists appears to be that the \u201cspecial military operation\u201d has now escalated to become what many Western observers declared in February, a \u201cwar\u201d. The regime\u2019s insistence on the use of the former term is likely for political reasons: an admission that the country was now at war would mean the special military operation was a failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, invoking the term, \u201cwar\u201d, not only raises the level of intensity of military involvement, but also the capabilities and the goals. While events in Ukraine may look like \u201clarge-scale combat operations\u201d or \u201cwar\u201d to a Western audience, the distinctions raised by different terminology in the context of Russian military theory can assist with understanding how Russians interpret red lines, escalation, victory, and defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1<\/sup> (back) <\/a> This article is an extracted version of content from the authors\u2019 unpublished study: \u201cAn Assessment of the Initial Period of War: Russia-Ukraine 2022\u201d written under the auspices of the United States European Command\u2019s Russia Strategic Initiative. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the US Government, NATO Defense College or NATO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Roger N McDermott is a Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King\u2019s College, London, Research Associate, Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of St. Andrews, Scotland, Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, Non-Resident Research Fellow, International Center for Defense and Security, Tallinn, Estonia and guest lecturer on Russian military strategy, F\u00fchrungsakademie der Bundeswehr <\/em>in Hamburg, Germany. McDermott is also assistant editor, Journal of Slavic Military Studies<\/em>. He is the author of the book: Russia Enters the High-Tech Battlespace<\/em>, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 2022. 3<\/sup> (back) <\/a> For the purposes of this report the special military operation<\/em> is used, but the latter term is also used when directly quoted from Russian sources.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4<\/sup> (back) <\/a> C. K. Bartles, Review of \u201cDefining Russian Military Science\u201d<\/em>, Russian Studies Series 3\/21<\/em>, NATO Defense College, Rome, 20 July 2021, www.ndc.nato.int\/research\/research.php?icode=705<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 5<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Definition and example as provided by Urban Dictionary, 26 February 2022. https:\/\/www.urbandictionary.com\/define.php?term=special+military+operation<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Vladimir Kvachkov is a retired GRU Colonel and GRU Spetsnaz brigade commander who is a Frunze (combined arms) academy graduate and veteran of several conflicts to include Afghanistan (1983), Azerbaijan (1990), Tajikistan (1992). Despite Kvachkov\u2019s impressive service record, his notoriety comes not from his military service, but from his post retirement activities. These activities have included some dabbling in politics: he is an ardent Russian nationalist and strong proponent of Russian Orthodox Christianity. But his most notable actions have been his criminal activities. In 2005, Kvachkov was allegedly involved with an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Anatoly Chubais, a prominent Russian politician who led Russia\u2019s privatization program in the 1990s. Kvachkov was tried and convicted for involvement in the plot, but the conviction was eventually overturned on appeal in 2010. Subsequently, Kvachkov has been arrested, tried, and convicted for several different crimes related to armed sedition and terrorism. On February 19, 2019, Kvachkov was released from prison by court decision, and has since avowed to resume his political activities and run for political office. 7<\/sup> (back) <\/a> V. Kvachkov, Otkrytoye pis\u2019mo polkovnika V.V. Kvachkova ofitseram General\u02b9nogo shtaba i Komandovaniya spetsial\u02b9nykh operatsiy<\/em> [An Open Letter from V. V. Kvachkov to the General Staff Officers and Command of the Special Operation], 28 March 2022. http:\/\/ www.ooc.su\/news\/ otkrytoe_pismo_polkovnika_v_v_kvachkova_oficeram_generalnogo_shtaba_i_komandovanija_specialnykh_operacij\/2022-03-31-111<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 8<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Voyna <\/em>[War], Encyclopedia of the Russian Ministry of Defense (online), https:\/\/encyclopedia.mil.ru\/encyclopedia\/dictionary\/details.htm?id=12849@morfDictionary<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 9<\/sup> (back) <\/a> C. K. Bartles, Review of \u201cPreparation and Conduct of Military Actions in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts\u201d, Russian Studies Series<\/em> 03\/21, NATO Defense College, Rome, November 2018. https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/download\/downloads.php?icode=564<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 10<\/sup> (back) <\/a> The Russian definition of \u201coperation\u201d is essentially a set of coordinated and interrelated missions conducted to achieve strategic, operational or operational-tactical tasks in a theater of military operations (teatr voyennykh deystviy<\/em>), strategic (operational) direction or in a certain area (zone) in a specified period. Operations can be categorized as global strategic operations, strategic operations in a theater of operations, strategic operations in one or more strategic directions, operations and formations of the armed forces (fleets, flotillas, army corps, air and air defense armies) in one or more operational directions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 11<\/sup> (back) <\/a> S. Batyushkin, Podgotovka i vedenie boevykh deistvii v lokalnikh voinakh i vooruzhennykh konfliktakh<\/em> [Preparation and Conduct of Military Actions in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts], KnoRus, 2017, p. 20.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 12<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Viktor Ivanovich Litvinenko is a retired artillery colonel, candidate of military sciences, and associate professor (docent) of the Missile and Artillery faculty in the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Ground Forces of the Combined Arms Academy of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. He is a veteran of Afghanistan, and commanded the 1074th artillery regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division. Litvinenko has an impressive publication record consisting of 8 monographs, over 300 articles, and 12 textbooks and manuals. Litvinenko\u2019s textbooks and manuals are staples for many cadets studying at various Russian military academies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 13<\/sup> (back) <\/a> V. Litvinenko \u201cSushchnost\u02b9 kategoriy \u00abvoyna\u00bb i \u00abspetsial\u02b9naya voyennaya operatsiya\u00bb<\/em> 14<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Formy primeneniya Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii <\/em>[The main forms of employment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation], Encyclopedia of the Russian Ministry of Defense (online), https:\/\/encyclopedia.mil.ru\/encyclopedia\/dictionary\/details_rvsn.htm?id=14014@morfDictionary<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 15<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Russian military theory defines a \u201clocal\u201d war as a military war between two states in which limited military-political goals are pursued; and a \u201cregional\u201d war as a military conflict of several nations or coalition of nations pursuing military-political goals with regular and\/or irregular forces in a specific region. Voyna<\/em>, Encyclopedia of the Russian Ministry of Defense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 16<\/sup> (back) <\/a> A. Stepanov, \u201cPosledneye interv’yu Ol’gi Kachury: Fashistov budem bit’, nikogo ne sprashivaya <\/em>[Olga Kachura’s last interview: We will beat the Nazis without asking anyone]\u201d, Rossiyskaya Gazeta<\/em>, 3 August 2022. https:\/\/rg.ru\/2022\/08\/03\/poslednee-interviu-olgi-kachury-fashistov-budem-bit-nikogo-ne-sprashivaia.html<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n 17<\/sup> (back) <\/a> Litvinenko, pp.17.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Russian Studies Series 05\/2022 Defining the \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d1 ARTICLE REVIEW by Roger N McDermott & Charles K.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","advgb_blocks_editor_width":"","advgb_blocks_columns_visual_guide":"","editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","_EventAllDay":false,"_EventTimezone":"","_EventStartDate":"","_EventEndDate":"","_EventStartDateUTC":"","_EventEndDateUTC":"","_EventShowMap":false,"_EventShowMapLink":false,"_EventURL":"","_EventCost":"","_EventCostDescription":"","_EventCurrencySymbol":"","_EventCurrencyCode":"","_EventCurrencyPosition":"","_EventDateTimeSeparator":"","_EventTimeRangeSeparator":"","_EventOrganizerID":[],"_EventVenueID":[],"_OrganizerEmail":"","_OrganizerPhone":"","_OrganizerWebsite":"","_VenueAddress":"","_VenueCity":"","_VenueCountry":"","_VenueProvince":"","_VenueState":"","_VenueZip":"","_VenuePhone":"","_VenueURL":"","_VenueStateProvince":"","_VenueLat":"","_VenueLng":"","_VenueShowMap":false,"_VenueShowMapLink":false,"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[117],"tags":[],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-4862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-the-russian-studies-series"],"featured_image_src":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"modified_by":"NDC","author_meta":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"featured_img":null,"featured_image_urls":{"full":"","thumbnail":"","medium":"","medium_large":"","large":"","1536x1536":"","2048x2048":"","trp-custom-language-flag":"","morenews-featured":"","morenews-large":"","morenews-medium":""},"category_info":"The Russian Studies Series<\/a>","tag_info":"The Russian Studies Series","comment_count":0,"coauthors":[],"tax_additional":{"categories":{"linked":["The Russian Studies Series<\/a>"],"unlinked":["The Russian Studies Series<\/span>"]}},"relative_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 4 ans il y a","modified":"Mis \u00e0 jour 1 an il y a"},"absolute_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le septembre 6, 2022","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 14, 2025"},"absolute_dates_time":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le septembre 6, 2022 16:43","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 14, 2025 12:37"},"featured_img_caption":"","series_order":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4862","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4862"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4862\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9392,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4862\/revisions\/9392"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4862"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4862"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4862"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=4862"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
[The essence of the categories \u201cwar\u201d and \u201cspecial military operation\u201d]\u201d, Armeisky Sbornik<\/em>, July 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\nIntroduction<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Kvachkov\u2019s Definition of \u201cSpecial Military Operation\u201d<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Litvinenko\u2019s Definition of \u2018Special Military Operation\u2019<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
Conclusion<\/h1>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n
Lieutenant Colonel Charles K Bartles is an Army Reservist assigned to the USNORTHCOM\/NORAD J2. Chuck is imagery (35A1D) and space operations (FA40) officer that has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and has served as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. He is also an analyst and Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cFormer Russian Intelligence Officer Released From Prison,\u201d Radio Free Europe\/Radio Liberty<\/em>, 19 February 2019,
https:\/\/www.rferl.org\/a\/former-russian-intelligence-officer-released-from-prison\/29778498.html<\/a>
O. Falichev, \u201c\u0414\u0443\u0445\u043e\u0432\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u043d\u0438\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0441\u0438\u0442\u0435\u0442\u044b \u043f\u043e\u043b\u043a\u043e\u0432\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0430 \u041a\u0432\u0430\u0447\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430 [The Spiritual Universities of Colonel Kvachkov],\u201d Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer<\/em>, 9 April 2019, https:\/\/vpk-news.ru\/articles\/49517<\/a>
R. Finch \u201cThe Transformation of Colonel Kvachkov\u201d OE Watch, June 2019, https:\/\/community.apan.org\/wg\/tradoc-g2\/fmso\/m\/oe-watch-past-issues\/281809\/download<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n
[The essence of the categories \u2018war\u2019 and \u2018special military operation\u2019]\u201d, Armeisky Sbornik<\/em>, July 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n