{"id":6890,"date":"2018-11-19T10:42:00","date_gmt":"2018-11-19T09:42:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newsite.ndc.nato.int\/?p=6890"},"modified":"2025-02-14T12:31:00","modified_gmt":"2025-02-14T11:31:00","slug":"russias-arctic-papersthe-evolution-of-strategic-thinking-on-the-high-north","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/russias-arctic-papersthe-evolution-of-strategic-thinking-on-the-high-north\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia\u2019s Arctic Papers:The evolution of Strategic Thinking on the High North"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Russian Studies Series 4\/18<\/em><\/strong>
DOCUMENT <\/strong>REVIEW<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

by Nazrin Mehdiyeva<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s Arctic Papers: The evolution of Strategic Thinking on the High North<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Review of the Documents: \u201cPrinciples of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond\u201d, September 2008; \u201cThe Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Provision of National Security to 2020\u201d, February 2013; \u201cState Programme of the Russian Federation \u2013 Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone to 2020\u201d, 21 April 2014; \u201cState Programme of the Russian Federation \u2013 Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone to 2025, 31 August 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Arctic has been characterised by President Putin as a region of \u201cconcentration of practically all aspects of national security \u2013 military, political, economic, technological, environment and that of resources\u201d.1<\/a> In Putin\u2019s assessment, the goal of Russian state policy in the Arctic is to enhance, continuously and systematically, the positions that Russia has gained there over \u201cthe dozens of years\u201d by \u201cstrictly adhering to\u2026 our strategic planning\u201d. Already in September 2008, the Russian government adopted a comprehensive strategic document on the \u201cPrinciples of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 and beyond\u201d (henceforth \u201cPrinciples of State Policy\u201d).2<\/a> An Arctic Strategy, formally known as \u201cThe Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Provision of National Security to 2020\u201d,3<\/a> was signed into law in February 2013. And a state programme, adopted in April 2014 under the title of \u201cSocioeconomic Development of the Russian Arctic Zone up to 2020\u201d (2014 State Programme),4<\/a> has become the main mechanism for the implementation of Russia\u2019s Arctic Strategy. In August 2017, the State Programme was updated and extended to 2025 (2017 State Programme). 5<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

To understand Russian thinking and action in the region, it is essential to see these documents as forming a broader whole.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This review essay examines the key tenets across these four Arctic documents, reflecting on policy aspects that have stayed constant, despite profound changes in the geopolitical context, and those that have been altered, either in tone or substance. The review makes references to the geopolitical considerations of Russian policymakers and considers how the context has shaped decision-making on the Russian Arctic during the last decade, also referencing other relevant documents that have been adopted in Russia since 2008 to provide essential context.A common feature of Russia\u2019s strategic documents on the Arctic is that they highlight two policy strands that Russian planners see as fundamental to enhancing the country\u2019s sovereignty over the \u201cArctic macro-region\u201d. The first is the assertion of Russian jurisdiction over the Northern Sea Route (NSR) which is expected to be mostly ice-free and navigable in the summer months by 2025-30. The second is extending Russian jurisdiction over the exploration and exploitation of natural resources of Russia\u2019s continental shelf beyond the commonly accepted 200 nautical mile limit. Both objectives are linked to resources. Unimpeded access to, exploitation and transportation of the mineral riches is seen as serving Russia\u2019s national interests and is deemed to become increasingly strategic in the post-2020 framework as global competition for resources and markets intensifies. 6<\/a> Achieving the two objectives is expected to strengthen Russia\u2019s national security, give it control over a larger share of global resources and improve its competitiveness by enabling it to reach exports markets via a shorter transportation route.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This review demonstrates the evolution in Russia\u2019s attitude towards the Arctic. It reveals that while the earlier documents assign paramount value to the region\u2019s resources, they consider their development primarily within the framework of international cooperation. By contrast, the later documents juxtapose the question of developing the reserves, particularly of the continental shelf, with that of enhanced security of the Arctic and suggest that security is a precondition for successful resource development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The dual objectives of claiming jurisdiction over the NSR and the extended continental shelf appear to be more difficult to achieve in the climate of heightened tensions between Russia and the West. Yet the Russian leadership has continued to assert its determination to claim both and sought to justify its positions within the framework of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The review concludes, therefore, that while the military reinforcement of the Russian Arctic should be expected to continue, Russia would prefer to contain the spill-over of its negative relations with the West in other theatres and conduct a differentiated regional policy that enables peaceful co-existence in the Arctic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s strategic resource base<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Developing oil and gas resources has long been declared to be a paramount objective in the Arctic. The \u201cPrinciples of State Policy\u201d envisage the \u201cuse of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation as a strategic resource base\u201d.7<\/a> While the socio-economic development of the region and the rights of the indigenous population are paid lip service in the document, it is the development of the region\u2019s reserves \u2013 in words that position the Arctic as a resource appendage of European Russia \u2013 that stands out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The document elaborates that the expansion of the Arctic resource base is needed to \u201cmeet \u2026 Russia\u2019s requirements in hydrocarbons, marine biological resources and other types of strategic raw materials\u201d.8<\/a> The fact that the development of hydrocarbons is cited as number one national interest in the Arctic corroborates the views that were prevalent in energy and policy-making circles in Moscow at the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For instance, in his book published in 2011, Lukoil CEO Vagit Alekperov stated that the hydrocarbons resources of the Volga-Urals province and West Siberia had reached critical lows, with limited opportunities for increasing onshore reserves through exploration. Alekperov cited worrying statistics, such as low average oil recovery factors, especially in comparison to global majors, high percentage of discovered oil and gas fields already under development and inadequate geological exploration and prospecting, among the key industry problems which could lead to irreversible declines in production.9<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarly, the General Scheme for the Development of the Oil Industry to 2020 claimed that the oil resource base of Russia was in a \u201ccritical state\u201d, with over 25 percent of oil reserves yet to be discovered and the reserves of the undistributed fund lingering at an \u201cinconsiderable level\u201d. The conclusion, enshrined in the many iterations of Russia\u2019s Energy Strategy, was that if Russia was to maintain its position as a leading energy producer and exporter, the resources of the Arctic, and specifically the Arctic offshore, needed to be explored and exploited. This conclusion was also reflected in the \u201cPrinciples of State Policy\u201d, which sets a tangible growth in reserves, including on the continental shelf, and the start of drilling operations as a \u201ckey task\u201d (glavnaya tsel<\/em>) in the region.10<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The priority given to Arctic resources in Russia\u2019s strategic documentation is not surprising given the size of reserves at stake. Putin has quoted Russian expert views that the overall energy reserves of Russia\u2019s Arctic zone exceed 1.6 trillion tonnes of oil equivalent while the continental shelf holds \u201calmost a quarter of all the hydrocarbon resources on the entire world sea shelf\u201d.11<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ambitions vs. reality<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In stark contrast to the \u201cPrinciples of State Policy\u201d, the \u201c2014 State Programme\u201d does not cover oil and gas in much detail. Indeed, its main aim appears to be to slot in with the existing programmes on both the federal and regional levels, covering a broad array of issues from tourism to the introduction of advanced technologies. The subsection titled \u201cState programme on the replacement and exploitation of natural resources\u201d states that third generation geological maps will be created, with the emphasis on mapping the areas of the continental shelf for which the maps do not yet exist.12<\/a> The subsection on energy and energy efficiency that follows gives a cursory overview of the need to develop new hydrocarbons fields and pipelines, with a mention of only three fields \u2013 Prirazlomnoye, Naulskoye and Trebs and Titov.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the programme was adopted, two of the three fields \u2013 Prirazlomnoye and Trebs and Titov \u2013 had already been launched, making the programme look unambitious, out of date and unconnected to other strategic documents, such as Russia\u2019s Energy Strategy, National Security Strategy and Maritime Doctrine. The 2014 State Programme was widely criticised by many in Russian policy-making circles, including Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, for its \u201canalytical character\u201d and lack of funding.13 <\/a>In response to this criticism and to address the heightened fears expressed in the National Security Strategy to 2020 (2015) regarding Russia\u2019s ability to defend its Arctic interests given the global and regional instability caused by the formation of a new international political order,14 <\/a>the government adopted in 2017 a revised, updated and extended state programme to 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In its scope and ambition, this \u201c2017 State Programme\u201d is more in line with the \u201cPrinciples of State Policy\u201d and the Arctic Strategy. It sets out three sub-programmes that need to be realised by the end of the planning period:15<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n