{"id":7443,"date":"2022-05-28T12:53:00","date_gmt":"2022-05-28T11:53:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/newsite.ndc.nato.int\/?p=7443"},"modified":"2025-02-21T19:35:29","modified_gmt":"2025-02-21T18:35:29","slug":"the-problems-of-the-applied-theory-of-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/the-problems-of-the-applied-theory-of-war\/","title":{"rendered":"The Problems of the Applied Theory of War"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<h2 class=\" wp-block-heading eplus-wrapper\"><strong><em>Russian Studies Series 04\/2022<\/em><\/strong><br>BOOK REVIEW<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\" wp-block-heading eplus-wrapper\"><strong>by Dr Nazrin Mehdiyeva<\/strong><a href=\"#_edn0\" id=\"_ednref0\"><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Review of:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>\u201cThe Problems of the Applied Theory of War\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>Voprosy Prikladnoi Teorii Voiny<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>A. A. Kokoshin<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Moscow, Izdatel\u2019skii Dom Vysshei Shkoly Ekonomiki, 2018<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><br>Andrei Kokoshin\u2019s important book,&nbsp;<em>The Problems of the Applied Theory of War<\/em>, illuminates many questions on how the Russian leadership regards the subject of war. The book is ambitious in scope, exploring what war actually means in the modern world, how political and military objectives interact in times of war, what comprises victory and defeat, and how crises could escalate from an \u201cordinary war\u201d to a strategic nuclear exchange. Although the author theorises about all contemporary wars, drawing on a wide range of international examples and presenting a methodology for the study of wars as a political and social phenomenon, the book\u2019s main contribution is how it illuminates the key elements of war in&nbsp;<em>Russian<\/em>&nbsp;military thought. Indeed, published in 2018, the book\u2019s conclusions are highly relevant, helping to understand what the war in Ukraine really means to Moscow, and to what extent the Kremlin might be willing to escalate the conflict and what outcomes it might consider acceptable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin is one of Russia\u2019s leading thinkers about strategy, military science and war, and his work (including this book) is reviewed and referred to widely in the Russian discussion of these themes. A former senior policymaker (he served as First Deputy Defence Minister, Secretary of the Defence Council and Secretary of the Russian National Security Council), he is now a distinguished scholar of national security policy, having authored over 160 academic papers and books on strategic stability, the modern system of international relations, and Russia\u2019s military and political strategy. With an engineering degree from the Bauman Technical Institute and as an academician at the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences and Russian Academy of Sciences, Kokoshin weaves into his analysis assessments of the technical strengths and weaknesses of nuclear weapons and high-precision munitions, and their role within the context of strategic nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence. His expertise on the pre-nuclear phase (<em>doyadernyi etap<\/em>) of military conflicts and non-nuclear strategic deterrence leads him to illuminate how new technologies, including hypersonic weapons, lasers and directed energy weapons, might contribute to Russia\u2019s strategic deterrence by enhancing its nuclear potential and survivability.<a href=\"#_edn1\" id=\"_ednref1\">2<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">A feature of Kokoshin\u2019s work is his multidisciplinary approach to the subject of war, incorporating history, philosophy, political and military sciences, drawing on a wide variety of sources, from classical texts by Greek, Roman and Chinese military theorists to more modern works by US, Israeli and Imperial Russian and Soviet strategists. The cornerstone of his writing, however, is the work of Carl von Clausewitz, to which he refers frequently throughout the book. In line with Clausewitz, for instance, Kokoshin argues that politics determines fundamental military questions such as the start of war, the intensity and scope of fighting (at least in the early stages of war), the level of resources that are to be spent on a military campaign and the relative weight assigned to the principles of destruction and extermination\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn2\" id=\"_ednref2\">3<\/a>&nbsp;While many Russian military thinkers lean heavily on Clausewitz\u2019s key tenets, Kokoshin goes further, lamenting the insufficient attention to Clausewitz\u2019s early historical-military works (outlined in detail in the book), and referring to his most famous work \u201cOn War\u201d as the greatest piece of the type the humankind \u201chas not known before or since\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn3\" id=\"_ednref3\">4<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><em>The Problems of the Applied Theory of War<\/em>&nbsp;is an important addition to the growing body of literature detailing how Russian military strategists think about modern warfare and conflict escalation. It outlines five components of war:<\/p>\n\n\n<ul class=\" wp-block-list eplus-wrapper eplus-styles-uid-f0a7f3\">\n<li class=\" eplus-wrapper\">War as the extension of policy;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\" eplus-wrapper\">War as a state of society;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\" eplus-wrapper\">War as a confrontation of two or more state structures and war machines;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\" eplus-wrapper\">War as a sphere of the unknown; and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li class=\" eplus-wrapper\">War as an administrative task for the leadership.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">These components are discussed in individual chapters but they are also woven into the fabric of the main argument.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Throughout the book, Kokoshin highlights the growing use of force in international affairs despite the continued role of the nuclear deterrent which, at least in theory, could limit the use of military force.<a href=\"#_edn4\" id=\"_ednref4\">5<\/a>&nbsp;For Kokoshin, \u201cthe attitude towards war as a last resort is not dominant in the contemporary system of world politics. We see that from the example of the actions of the USA and its allies with regards to Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn5\" id=\"_ednref5\">6<\/a>&nbsp;He concedes that in each case the alliances led by the United States were dealing with a significantly weaker adversary and points to the absence of a powerful and influential opponent, such as the former Soviet Union, which was capable of providing a counterbalance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin also highlights the role that armed forces have traditionally played in wars and insists that, despite the emergence and evolution of other forms of warfare, the centrality of the military preparedness of the state\u2019s armed forces for its ability to wage a successful war has not changed (this is in stark contrast to the assessment of many in the Euro-Atlantic community who had concluded that Moscow emphasised non-military methods in modern warfare<a href=\"#_edn6\" id=\"_ednref6\">7<\/a>). Specifically, in the chapter entitled \u201cWar as the extension of policy\u201d, Kokoshin reiterates Clausewitz when he argues that an armed confrontation (<em>boi<\/em>) is at the heart of any war. He also stipulates that military confrontation comprises \u201cthe true military activity; everything else is but its enablers.\u201d He concludes that the result of any armed confrontation should be the destruction of the armed forces of the opponent.<a href=\"#_edn7\" id=\"_ednref7\">8<\/a>&nbsp;In this vein, Kokoshin reflects on the use of military means by turning to the works of Genrich Leer, a 19th century pioneer of Russian military policy and strategic thought. Leer believed a war to be \u201ca rather natural occurrence in the life of the nations\u201d, which despite its \u201cevil side\u201d, represented \u201cultimately, and if used with common sense, one of the fastest and most powerful civilisators of humanity\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn8\" id=\"_ednref8\">9<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">While Kokoshin does discuss hybrid war (Chapter 4), he casts doubt both on its \u201cnewness\u201d (<em>novizna<\/em>) and the \u201crevolutionary meaning\u201d frequently assigned to it. Kokoshin uses historical examples to demonstrate the use of non-traditional methods in past wars, including reconnaissance-diversionary operations, special forces operations, psychological warfare and disinformation campaigns. He does concede, though, that cyber operations represent a significant new addition to the arsenal of hybrid warfare, which has evolved to become more multidimensional and complex. &nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">The opening lines of Chapter 5, entitled \u201cWar as the extension of policy\u201d, quote Clausewitz, setting the tone for the subsequent discussion. In this chapter, Kokoshin highlights the dominance of politics over military decision-making, the paramount task of continuously reassessing the political objectives during military campaigns and the difficulties in the political management of the war machine. These themes continue through into Chapter 8, in which Kokoshin reflects on the concepts of the \u201cfog of war\u201d and \u201cfriction\u201d, introduced by Clausewitz but, he says, too rarely factored in by modern Russian military strategists.<a href=\"#_edn9\" id=\"_ednref9\">10<\/a>&nbsp;The former refers to the uncertainty in situational awareness experienced by participants in military operations, while the latter describes the \u201cforce that makes the apparently easy so difficult\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn10\" id=\"_ednref10\">11<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin refers again to Clausewitz when he states that three quarters of military action in war is shrouded by the unknown and represents the interplay of chance and action, caused by a host of factors related to enemy and friendly forces, as well as to the environment. The consequence for political decision-making is that, despite the apparent simplicity of the war machine, managing it becomes extremely difficult because none of its parts are made from a single segment and are instead constructed from individuals who experience \u201cfriction from all directions\u201d. Danger, stress, psychological and physical exhaustion are among the elements of friction, which can turn military actions into a poorly controlled or even uncontrollable process. Different types of friction interact with each other, leading to mistakes and producing compounded effect which outweighs the sum of its individual components.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">This discussion paves the way to Chapter 9, which addresses the problem of control. Kokoshin observes that skilful management of war comprises the ability to prevent a sudden escalation of military action which could lead to irreversible consequences. He considers a policy dilemma often discussed by US military specialists: that of retaining control in a scenario where the opponent raises stakes, making backtracking difficult for the fear of \u201closing face\u201d, and escalation dangerous due to the situation spiralling out of control, possibly leading to a nuclear catastrophe. Preserving reliable communication channels is critical to escalation management but doing so effectively remains highly challenging in warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Russian strategists face similar predicaments, but Kokoshin highlights the question of internal command and control as being more topical for the Russian forces. Attempts by Russian political leaders to contain a military conflict within a rigid framework of control to ensure that military actions do not exceed the specified political and military confines could stifle initiative among the officers at the tactical and operational levels, he suggests. According to Russian military observers, the fear of the superiors and the resultant loss of initiative are particularly pertinent in \u201creal life Russian conditions given all our traditions in the military sphere and in management overall\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn11\" id=\"_ednref11\">12<\/a>&nbsp;Failure by officers on the ground to anticipate and respond to friction could have dire consequences in war, reducing, in the words of a prominent Russian and Soviet military strategist, Alexander Svechin, \u201call achievements, leaving the person far behind the set objectives\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn12\" id=\"_ednref12\">13<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin\u2019s scepticism that wars could have ethic or legal foundations is noteworthy. He draws on a wealth of works \u2013 from Hugo Grotius to Karl Marx and Mikhail Tukhachevsky \u2013 to conclude that, in addition to economic motives for waging wars, leadership personality traits, irrational factors and even \u201cabsurd accidents\u201d (<em>nelepye sluchainosti<\/em>) could play a part in or interfere with decision-making. Yet ethic and legal motives are frequently used as pretexts to initiate a war. Kokoshin warns against the danger of escalation, particularly where a threat of nuclear weapons deployment exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">The final pages of&nbsp;<em>The Problems of the Applied Theory of War<\/em>&nbsp;focus on the escalation of crises, originally drawn from Herman Kahn\u2019s \u201cescalation ladder\u201d. Defined in the 1960s, the ladder initially consisted of 44 rungs but Kokoshin reduces it to ten.<a href=\"#_edn13\" id=\"_ednref13\">14<\/a>&nbsp;Kokoshin\u2019s ladder denotes the situation of a \u201cnuclear conflict\u201d, which starts at Rung 7, as one in which one or more nuclear powers use their nuclear capacity as a political-military instrument to pressure verbally the international community. No nuclear weapons are used during this phase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">The testing of Russia\u2019s new Sarmat inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) amid the announcement of a new phase in the war on Ukraine is remarkable in this regard. Commenting on the ICBM\u2019s successful testing on 20 April, Putin stated that Sarmat represented a \u201cunique weapon\u201d capable of overcoming \u201call modern means of anti-missile defence\u201d. He emphasised that the missile \u201chas no analogues in the world and will not have any for a long time to come\u201d, which would guarantee Russia\u2019s security from external threats and \u201cprovide food for thought to those who, in the heat of frenzied aggressive rhetoric, try to threaten our country\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn14\" id=\"_ednref14\">15<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">The next rung in the ladder envisions a demonstrative limited use of nuclear weapons in a deserted area, without targeting people or military objects. This, however, is succeeded in Rung 9 by destructive acts focused, at least initially, on non-strategic nuclear weapons targeting military facilities. The primary goal of modern political management of warfare is to deter a mutually destructive war that would result from a strategic nuclear strike, which concludes the ladder at Rung 10. Kokoshin believes that Russia\u2019s new strategic weapons, such as unmanned oceanic multi-purpose system Poseidon (in the book, referred to by its old codename Status-6), will expand the Kremlin\u2019s strategic deterrence options thanks to their flexible and multivariate use in the pre-nuclear and nuclear phases of war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Russian policymakers and military officials have systematically converged on the view that armed conflicts are becoming more frequent in international affairs. In this sense, Kokoshin\u2019s conclusions fit the mainstream of Russian strategic-military thinking, as he describes the intensification of geopolitical and geoeconomic competition in the 21st century, marred by armed conflicts. Similar to many Russian strategists and policymakers, he highlights the changing geography of future wars, in which Arctic is seen as an emerging new region. Technological developments, such as cyberweapons and AI, make war more multifaceted; nonetheless, hybrid methods should not detract from the view that \u201ca war is not a war without the use of organised violence\u201d.<a href=\"#_edn15\" id=\"_ednref15\">16<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin observes that although space warfare is not yet a reality, the \u201ccosmic arms race\u201d could start in earnest in the medium term, particularly given the lack of international legal agreements to regulate weapons in space.&nbsp; In the immediate future, however, new non-nuclear weapons, such as hypersonic weapons, lasers and directed energy weapons, will contribute to strategic deterrence. Targeted against enemy satellites, these weapons can enable Russia\u2019s strategic nuclear forces to inflict unacceptable damage during a retaliatory strike. While a nuclear strike is accepted as the most catastrophic outcome in any military conflict, strengthening Russia\u2019s nuclear potential and survivability remains a key political and military task which will define Russia\u2019s relative standing on the international arena.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\">Kokoshin\u2019s work in general deserves to be much better and more widely known in the Euro-Atlantic discussion about Russian strategy, war and escalation. Given the current situation and Russia\u2019s war with Ukraine,&nbsp;<em>The Problems of the Applied Theory of War&nbsp;<\/em>is essential reading. It provides considerable insight into how Moscow understands warfare \u2013 not only regarding what war is for and how escalation is understood, but also about problems that Russia often faces in warfighting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\" wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity eplus-wrapper\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>1<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref0\" id=\"_edn0\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Dr. Nazrin Mehdiyeva is a geopolitics and energy security specialist, working with governments, international institutions and energy majors. She is a co-author of&nbsp;<em>Beyond blood oil: philosophy, policy, and the future<\/em>, Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2018, and the author of&nbsp;<em>Power games in the Caucasus<\/em>, I.B. Tauris, 2011.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>2<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref1\" id=\"_edn1\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; A. A. Kokoshin,&nbsp;<em>Voprosy Prikladnoi Teorii Voiny&nbsp;<\/em>[The Problems of the Applied Theory of War]<em>,&nbsp;<\/em>Moscow, Izdatel\u2019skii Dom Vysshei Shkoly Ekonomiki, 2018, pp.178-182.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>3<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref2\" id=\"_edn2\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Ibid<\/em>., p.128.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>4<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref3\" id=\"_edn3\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Ibid<\/em>., p.115.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>5<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref4\" id=\"_edn4\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Ibid<\/em>., p.143.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>6<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref5\" id=\"_edn5\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Ibid., p.134.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>7<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref6\" id=\"_edn6\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; For instance, O. Jonsson,&nbsp;<em>The Russian understanding of war: blurring the lines between war and peace,<\/em>&nbsp;Washington, Georgetown University Press, 2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>8<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref7\" id=\"_edn7\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Kokoshin, pp.112-13.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>9<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref8\" id=\"_edn8\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Leer, G.A. Opyt kritiko-istoricheskogo issledovaniya zakonov iskusstva vedeniya voiny. Polozhitelnaya strategiya. SPb., 1869, p.2 quoted in Kokoshin, p.124.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>10<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref9\" id=\"_edn9\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; This view is shared by a reviewer of the book, retired Major General Vladimir Zolotarev. V.A. Zolotarev, \u201cVoina kak ob\u2019ekt mezhdistsiplinarnogo analiza: Retsenziya na knigu akademika RAN A. A. Kokoshina \u201cVoprosy prikladnoi teorii voiny\u201d, Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, Series 25(4).&nbsp;<em>Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika<\/em>, 2018, pp.138-146, p.143.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>11<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref10\" id=\"_edn10\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; For the discussion of \u201cfriction\u201d and \u201cfog of war\u201d, see Kokoshin, pp.186-193.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>12<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref11\" id=\"_edn11\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp;<em>Ibid<\/em>.,&nbsp;<em>p.219.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>13<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref12\" id=\"_edn12\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Cited in A. A. Kokoshin,&nbsp;<em>Vydayuschiysa rossiiskii voennyi teoretik i voenachalnik Alexander Andreevich Svechin. O ego zhizni, ideyakh, trudakh i nasledii dlya nastoyaschego i buduschego<\/em>, Moscow, Moscow University Press, 2013, p.364. Discussed and quoted in Kokoshin,&nbsp;<em>The Problems of<\/em>&nbsp;<em>the<\/em>&nbsp;<em>Applied Theory of War<\/em>,&nbsp;<em>p.187.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>14<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref13\" id=\"_edn13\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; Kokoshin recently returned to this subject, proposing 17 rungs. See Reach, C. \u201cEscalation and de-escalation of crises, armed conflicts and wars\u201d,&nbsp;<em>NDC Russian Studies Series<\/em>, No.3, March 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>15<\/sup>&nbsp;<a href=\"#_ednref14\" id=\"_edn14\">(back)&nbsp;<\/a>&nbsp; \u201cPutin: \u201cSarmat\u201d zastavit zadumat\u2019sa tekh ogoltelykh, kto pytaetsa ugrojat Rossiiskoi Federatsii\u201d<em>,&nbsp;<\/em><em>TV Zvezda<\/em><em>, 20 April 2022,&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/tvzvezda.ru\/news\/20224201744-wxnnG.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">https:\/\/tvzvezda.ru\/news\/20224201744-wxnnG.html<\/a>, accessed 20 April 2022.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"eplus-wrapper wp-block-paragraph\"><sup>16<\/sup>\u00a0<a href=\"#_ednref15\" id=\"_edn15\">(back)\u00a0<\/a>\u00a0 Kokoshin, p.225.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Russian Studies Series 04\/2022BOOK REVIEW by Dr Nazrin Mehdiyeva1 Review of: \u201cThe Problems of the Applied Theory of<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_eb_attr":"","_lmt_disableupdate":"no","_lmt_disable":"","advgb_blocks_editor_width":"","advgb_blocks_columns_visual_guide":"","editor_plus_copied_stylings":"{}","_EventAllDay":false,"_EventTimezone":"","_EventStartDate":"","_EventEndDate":"","_EventStartDateUTC":"","_EventEndDateUTC":"","_EventShowMap":false,"_EventShowMapLink":false,"_EventURL":"","_EventCost":"","_EventCostDescription":"","_EventCurrencySymbol":"","_EventCurrencyCode":"","_EventCurrencyPosition":"","_EventDateTimeSeparator":"","_EventTimeRangeSeparator":"","_EventOrganizerID":[],"_EventVenueID":[],"_OrganizerEmail":"","_OrganizerPhone":"","_OrganizerWebsite":"","_VenueAddress":"","_VenueCity":"","_VenueCountry":"","_VenueProvince":"","_VenueState":"","_VenueZip":"","_VenuePhone":"","_VenueURL":"","_VenueStateProvince":"","_VenueLat":"","_VenueLng":"","_VenueShowMap":false,"_VenueShowMapLink":false,"_themeisle_gutenberg_block_has_review":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[117],"tags":[],"post_badge":[],"class_list":["post-7443","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-the-russian-studies-series"],"featured_image_src":null,"author_info":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"modified_by":"NDC","author_meta":{"display_name":"NDC","author_link":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/author\/admin_3rwqf6tj\/"},"featured_img":null,"featured_image_urls":{"full":"","thumbnail":"","medium":"","medium_large":"","large":"","1536x1536":"","2048x2048":"","trp-custom-language-flag":"","morenews-featured":"","morenews-large":"","morenews-medium":""},"category_info":"<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/category\/publications\/the-russian-studies-series\/\" rel=\"category tag\">The Russian Studies Series<\/a>","tag_info":"The Russian Studies Series","comment_count":0,"coauthors":[],"tax_additional":{"categories":{"linked":["<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/category\/publications\/the-russian-studies-series\/\" class=\"advgb-post-tax-term\">The Russian Studies Series<\/a>"],"unlinked":["<span class=\"advgb-post-tax-term\">The Russian Studies Series<\/span>"]}},"relative_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 4 ans il y a","modified":"Mis \u00e0 jour 1 an il y a"},"absolute_dates":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mai 28, 2022","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 21, 2025"},"absolute_dates_time":{"created":"Publi\u00e9 le mai 28, 2022 12:53","modified":"Mise \u00e0 jour le f\u00e9vrier 21, 2025 19:35"},"featured_img_caption":"","series_order":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7443","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=7443"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7443\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":7449,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/7443\/revisions\/7449"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=7443"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=7443"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=7443"},{"taxonomy":"post_badge","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.ndc.nato.int\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_badge?post=7443"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}