Russian Studies Series 05/2022

Defining the “Special Military Operation”1

ARTICLE REVIEW

by Roger N McDermott & Charles K. Bartles2

Review of:

Viktor Litvinenko “Sushchnostʹ kategoriy «voyna» i «spetsialʹnaya voyennaya operatsiya»
[The essence of the categories “war” and “special military operation”]”, Armeisky Sbornik, July 2022.

Vladimir Kvachkov, Otkrytoye pis’mo polkovnika V.V. Kvachkova ofitseram Generalʹnogo shtaba i Komandovaniya spetsialʹnykh operatsiy [An open letter from V. V. Kvachkov to the General Staff Officers and Command of the Special Operation], 28 March 2022.

Introduction

Moscow insists on using the term spetsial’naya voyennaya operatsiya (“special military operation”) or spetsoperatsiya (“special operation”) to describe its campaign in Ukraine. The terms appear to be used interchangeably in both a colloquial context, and in the context of Russian military theory.3 Those familiar with Russian military theory are also interested in what exactly the term special military operation meant for the Russians, as there was no formal standing definition, or even commonly accepted meaning, for the term.  This is somewhat baffling: Russian defense scholars and officers invest much time and effort in defining explicitly what exactly military terms mean for the Russian military and security communities. Thus, it was somewhat surprising that Russians began using this relatively obscure term to describe the invasion.4

Given the circumstances, little thought in the West has been given to what exactly the term means, with most Western mass media and governments understanding the term to be simply a euphemism for military invasion and war. Perhaps this view was best encapsulated by the humor of the website Urban Dictionary, which defines the term as “An Invasion. Especially one conducted by an authoritarian regime”; and “This isn’t an Invasion of the sovereign nation of Ukraine. It is a Special Military Operation”, somewhat in jest.5

Most Russians were, and arguably still are, as confused about the term as their Western counterparts. But understanding what it may mean, and thus placing the operation into the hierarchy of Russian military strategy sheds light on Moscow’s intentions and goals, not to mention Moscow’s choice of forces used and possibilities for escalation. This essay reviews how Russian military theorists define and understand a special military operation in the context of Russian military theory.

Kvachkov’s Definition of “Special Military Operation”

Retired Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov was one of the first to provide a working definition of the term.6 On March 28, 2022, he published an open letter to the Russian General Staff and command of the special operation. The letter focuses on justifying Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and seems directed less at a military audience than to influence the Russian civilian population. Nevertheless, some insight may be gleamed from his description of the term:

What is the difference between a special military operation, its goals and objectives, and other operations of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation? The main difference is that the course and outcome of a special operation are directly related to military-political goals and objectives, in contrast to the combined-arms offensive and defensive operations of operational and operational-strategic formations (during the Great Patriotic War －armies and fronts), as well as other independent and joint operations of branches of the Armed Forces and combat arms. This statement is also true for the strategic actions of the Armed Forces … Thus, military-political goals and tasks in special operations are lowered to the level of tactical actions of formations, units and even battalions (battalion tactical groups). The officially declared goal of the ongoing special military operation is the and denazification of Ukraine.7

This understanding of the “special military operation” is nested in Russian military theory and the Russian concept of military conflict: “war” is the most intense form of military conflict with other types of military conflict, such as a “special military operation”, being on the spectrum of military conflict, but less intense.8 With this in mind, achieving victory in what the Russians call “war” can require military, economic, and/or social mobilization, deep battle, physical encirclements, and multiple operations, and have military-strategic goals such as the total destruction of the enemy forces, occupation of the enemy’s homeland, eventually leading to the military-political goal of political capitulation. Achieving victory in lesser types of military conflicts, such as a “special military operation” may be achieved more simply through the application of a varying mixture of military and non-military (indirect) methods to coerce the enemy’s political-military leadership to accept unfavorable terms.9

In terms of the spectrum of military conflict, therefore, the most important difference between “war” and a “special military operation” is that the former requires multiple operations for strategic success, while strategic success for the latter can (in certain circumstances) be achieved by a single decisive operation.  It should be noted that Russian military theory recognizes several different types of operations, but in relation to the “special military operation”, Kvachkov is referring specifically to operations conducted by combined arms formations, not strategic operations.10 Moreover, in certain circumstances a single operation can not only be decisive in terms of a political-military goal, but also of a relatively short duration such as an active phase of 10-15 days.11

In sum, Kvachkov’s understanding is that the “special military operation” differs from other combined arms operations due to the more direct way that the political-military goal is achieved, without the use of strategic operations at the highest level of state commitment.  Kvachkov understands the “special military operation” applied to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine as a combined arms operation intended to rapidly achieve the military-political goal of “demilitarization and denazification.”

Litvinenko’s Definition of ‘Special Military Operation’

Though the “special military operation” is extensively covered in Russian mass media, there was no other discussion of theoretical aspects and where it might fit in Russian military strategy until retired Colonel Viktor Litvinenko published an article on the term in the July issue of Armeyskiy Sbornik (Army Digest). This is an important contribution, given the author and the publication: Litvinenko is a prominent and well-respected member of the Russian professional military-scientific community,12 and Armeyskiy Sbornik is the monthly journal of the Russian Armed Forces, covering a wide range of military issues primarily at the tactical and operational levels. Given his background, current position, and the well-known severe penalties for criticizing Russia’s military or spreading ‘fake news’, it can be safely assumed that Litvinenko’s definition and understanding of the “special military operation” is similar, if not identical, to other Russian military theorists and the Russian government’s view on the matter.

Litvinenko explains the term in a slightly different light from Kvachkov, but they both have largely similar understanding. Given the definitions previously discussed, Litvinenko posits that the special military operation” in Ukraine was intended to have distinct features, which make it a new category on the “military conflict” spectrum.13  Litvinenko even states that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) definition of the term is “a special operation of troops (forces) that involves the special actions of troops (forces) coordinated in objectives, tasks, place and time, carried out according to a single plan to achieve specified goals.”14

He further elaborates that this definition is closer to the Russian MoD’s concept of “military operation” than to the concept of “war”.15 The main difference between the two is that the goal of the special operation is to defeat only the enemy’s military. Therefore, the actions of the operation (strikes, battles, and the like) were carried out specifically to achieve this end within a specified period of time. This form of military action is more focused, and limited in nature, than the Russian concept of “war”. Litvinenko believes that the criteria for a “special military operation” might also apply to past military operations carried out by the United States, NATO, Russia, and others countries. For example, such operations would include Russia’s 2015 military operation in Syria and US operations in Yemen.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Litvinenko’s article, however, has less to do with the specific definition of the term “special military operation”, than the way he instead framed it in the along the spectrum of military conflict, admitting that the character of the conflict has changed. This suggests that Russian military theorists may think that despite the initial declaration of “special military operation”, the military conflict has since evolved into something different, and more intense: perhaps a “local war”, or even, as some Russian pundits have argued, a “regional war”.16

Litvinenko points out a number of reasons for this change relating to the various types of military aid being provided to Ukraine. His comments further Moscow’s narrative that Russia is not just fighting Ukraine but also the “collective West” by proxy: “the Ukrainian soldier is used as cannon fodder, while western diplomats convince the world that the West upholds peace and democracy, while at the same time supplying combat equipment and weapons to the Ukrainians, advancing their own interests by selling weapons.”17 This view was then also made by the senior national leadership, including Putin, at the Moscow International Security Conference in August 2022.

Conclusion

From a Western lay perspective, the Russian’s use of the term “special military operation” is simply a euphemism for “war” But this is not the understanding of Kvachkov, Litvinenko, and likely most Russian military theorists – indeed there is an important distinction in the Russian view, with implications for our understanding of Russia’s activities, particularly in terms of the scale of Moscow’s military (and wider state) deployment. For both Kyachkov and Litvinenko, a “special military operation” falls on the spectrum of military conflict below the level of “war”.

Here, the use of the term “operation” is key. In general, they believe that “war” required multiple combined arms operations for strategic success. To them, the “special military operation” was special because of the intention to be a single combined arms operation with the aim of achieving strategic success. This does not downplay or mitigate any Russian responsibility for the invasion. Rather, it describes how Russian military theorists view these events on the spectrum of military conflict.

There are two implications. First, given this understanding of the nature of a military operation, Putin’s declaration about its purpose, and the general debacle for Russia that was the early days of the invasion, it appears that Moscow genuinely envisaged a single, large operation to achieve the goals of “demilitarization and denazification” in a relatively short period of time.

Second, Russia’s inability to quickly achieve the military-political goals of the operation (demilitarization and denazification) meant that the “special military operation” failed. Consequently, though it has not been declared openly, the view of Russian military theorists appears to be that the “special military operation” has now escalated to become what many Western observers declared in February, a “war”. The regime’s insistence on the use of the former term is likely for political reasons: an admission that the country was now at war would mean the special military operation was a failure.

Nevertheless, invoking the term, “war”, not only raises the level of intensity of military involvement, but also the capabilities and the goals. While events in Ukraine may look like “large-scale combat operations” or “war” to a Western audience, the distinctions raised by different terminology in the context of Russian military theory can assist with understanding how Russians interpret red lines, escalation, victory, and defeat.