War in Europe: preliminary lessons

• NDC Research Paper 23: War in Europe: preliminary lessons , edited by Thierry Tardy *

The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day,
the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of
Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades.

Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether
in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war
was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as
improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so
when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The
means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to
its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is
clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was
underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving
their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its
society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the
very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of
the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the
exception of part of the Donbas).

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